

SOCIAL AGGREGATION, ARTICULATION, AND REPRESENTATION
OF POLITICAL PARTIES: A CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

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ABSTRACT

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This paper investigates social cleavages as they relate to the structure of popular support of political parties. It involves (1) a summary of some of the literature; (2) the development of three measures of the structure of party support--social representation, social aggregation, and social articulation; (3) a discussion of the International Comparative Political Parties Project data on which the analyses in the paper are based; (4) an examination of the structure of party support in order to determine the political importance of social cleavages; and (5) an examination of the consequences of the structure of party support for the success and policies of political parties.

The structure of party support is examined according to six cultural differentiators--economic status, religion, ethnicity/race/language, region, urbanization, and education. A cross-national analysis of the salience of these differentiators for over 100 parties in 52 countries finds ethnicity to be the most important variable followed in order by religion and economic status--with urbanization, education, and region all of lesser and roughly equal importance in differentiating among parties. There are clear and consistent differences in the patterns of party support both by regional groupings of nations and by groupings of parties by competitive and non-competitive strategy.

An analysis of the political consequences of the social bases of party support finds that highly representative and aggregative parties rank high in governmental status, and the relationships increase when only competitive parties are considered. The relationships are even stronger when the underlying theory is refined to link representation and aggregation to electoral support as one manifestation of governmental status. The political consequence of party support is also seen in parties' issue orientations, but only when industrialization is imposed as an intervening factor. For competitive parties in Western societies, ideological intensity is negatively related to social representation and social aggregation across all six cultural differentiators. In contrast to representation and aggregation, the concept of social articulation shows no clear relationship to either governmental status or issue orientation--despite the concept's similarity to discussions of social "cohesion" and "homogeneity" which have figured so prominently in the recent literature.

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This paper will investigate social cleavages as they relate to the structure of popular support of political parties. It will involve (1) a summary of some of the issues in the literature; (2) the development of three measures of the structure of party support--social representation, social aggregation, and social articulation; (3) a discussion of the data which are used in the investigation; (4) an examination of the structure of party support in order to determine the political importance of social cleavages; and (5) an examination of the consequences of the structure of party support for the success and policies of political parties. The data on which these analyses are based come from the International Comparative Political Parties (ICPP) Project.¹

I. Some Issues in the Literature

Social Cleavages

Numerous scholars have noted the existence of social cleavages. According to Rae and Taylor, "(a) cleavage is merely a division of a community..." (1970:23). Social cleavages are lines of differentiation in a society. Other terms, such as social divisions, social differentiations, segmental divisions, cultural diversity and cultural pluralism, have been used to refer to the same phenomenon. The social structures of virtually all societies are marked by at least one type of social cleavage. Rubushka and Shepsle assert that "...cultural diversity is a near-universal phenomenon..." (1971:462). Porter states, "(a)ll societies are internally differentiated, and the more developed and complex they are the greater their differentiation" (1967:16). In addition to inevitable lines of societal cleavage such as age and sex, other characteristics may serve as bases of social cleavage. According to Nordlinger, (1972), social divisions based on class (wealth, income, and occupation) and/or communal (race, tribe, religion, language, and ethnicity) lines are existent in all societies.

Political Importance of Social Cleavages

In spite of the universality of social cleavages, their existence may not be politically important for a society; that is, for that nation social cleavages may not be the basis of political conflict.² Members of a society may not attach much significance to social differences--not viewing the interests of the different segments of society as competing with each other. In such cases, the existence of social cleavages has little consequence for politics. The political importance of social cleavages is dependent upon whether and how these societal differences are translated into demands on the political system. Cleavages which characterize the social structure of a society are politically important only if they form the bases of political demands and actions and structure the political conflict in that society.

The crucial factor for the political significance of social cleavages, then, is that the social cleavages are also political cleavages, i.e., social divisions are translated into divisions in the political system. However, this translation does not occur in all societies. Examining ethnically-divided societies, Rubushka and Shepsle distinguish between "(1) 'plural societies,' in which politics tends (exclusively) to follow ethnic lines, and (2) 'pluralistic societies,' in which politically relevant issues and actions do not always coincide with ethnic groups" (1971:462-3). In pluralistic societies, social cleavages are not regarded as conflict-producing by the members of the society. "Social structural phenomena seen as important by sociologists may not be regarded as equally important by voters" (Dogan and Rose, 1971:144). On the other hand, in a plural society, social cleavages are regarded as politically important, in part, because political and community leaders of the society consider them to be important (Rubushka and Shepsle, 1971).

Thus, the significance of social cleavages is dependent upon their becoming political cleavages. If they assume political status, there are several ways by which the interests of the different segments of society can be communicated as demands on the political system. Political parties serve as one of the major instruments for the communication of the demands of the various segments of a society into the political system. As Eldersveld writes:

A political party is a structural system seeking to translate or convert (or be converted by) social or economic interests into political power directly (1971:33).

In many societies, the interests which the political parties of a nation promote provide the bases for political conflict in that nation. If social cleavages assume political importance, these divisions may be manifested in the political

parties. The social differences may become "...institutionalized, in that they form boundaries separating differing core bases of electoral support for the major political parties" (Urwin, 1970:321). However, although social cleavages may be translated into the political system through political parties and serve as the bases of political parties, some writers (Dogan and Rose, 1971; DiPalma, 1972) have warned that this situation is not inevitable. Just as social cleavages may not be politically salient, the structure of support for political parties may not be based on social divisions.

(W)hile some parties, under specified conditions, may represent a single cell of a complex society, parties may also play an independent and creative role, and their leaders may successfully solicit electoral support by aggregating groups in very different positions within society (Dogan and Rose, 1971:144).

Whether a party's support comes from a specific segment of society or from the society in general is subject to empirical investigation. The political importance of social cleavages for political parties, and therefore the political system, is determined by the extent to which these cleavages structure the bases of support of the parties.

Types of Social Cleavages

Certain types of social differences are regarded as more likely to be potential bases of political divisions than are others. Rae and Taylor (1970) identify three general classes of potential politically salient cleavages: (1) ascriptive or "trait" cleavages; (2) attitudinal or "opinion" cleavages; and (3) behavioral or "act" cleavages. Inglehart (1973) also sees three general types of potential political cleavages: (1) pre-industrial cleavages, based on ascriptive factors such as religion, language, ethnicity, and race; (2) industrial cleavages, based on factors such as income, occupation, education, and membership in labor unions; and (3) post-industrial cleavages, based on values, life-style and life experiences. Grove (1975) attempts to evaluate the political importance of several cultural divisions: ethnicity, religion, race and language. In general, discussions on the significance of different social divisions for the political system have focused on those cleavages which Inglehart calls pre-industrial and industrial.

The importance of social cleavages for political parties lies in their defining the structure of popular support of the parties. Based on studies of political parties and voting behavior, ascriptive and industrial differences tend to be viewed as being the bases of support for parties. Converse attempts to identify "those variables in voting behavior which seem to have the greatest explanatory power for comparative research and therefore should become standard items in all social surveys" (1974:727). He suggests the following: education,

religion, race and ethnic differentiation, occupation, urban-rural residence, region of residence, and age. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) posit four decisive lines of cleavage which may determine the pattern of popular support for political parties: center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and owner-worker. In their analysis of social cohesion of political parties, Rose and Urwin (1969) concentrate on divisions resulting from religious, regional, communal (ethnic and linguistic), urban-rural, and class differences. These five dimensions of social structure and educational differences appear to be viewed as providing the major lines of party support.

Although there is a general consensus on which factors of social cleavage are likely to structure political conflict, the relative importance of each of these factors either for the political system as a whole or specifically for political parties is disputed. Lipset states "classes have been the most important bases of political diversity" in the economically developed Western nations (1967: 43). Rose and Urwin (1969) argue that religion provides the major social basis of political parties. However, their conclusions are grounded on an analysis of 76 parties in 17 Western nations which shows that 35 parties are homogeneous on the religious dimension and only 33 parties are homogeneous on the class dimension. The difference between the two dimensions of the social structure of only two parties does not seem to justify any definitive statements.

Both of the two studies above refer to only Western nations. In a more inclusive analysis (45 nations), Grove (1975) concludes that racial differences are more politically significant than ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences. Converse argues that all social surveys should include an education item because education "shows remarkable discriminating power as a status measure in predicting to ... party position" (1974:730). Others have argued that certain cleavages may be more relevant to certain groups of nations than others. For example, Blondel (1969) suggests that whether communal divisions or associational divisions (that is, tribal, ethnic and religious divisions or class divisions) define the primary lines of political cleavages tends to be linked to the socioeconomic development of nations; class divisions are more pervasive in developed societies. Lipset and Rokkan (1967) indicate that the sequence and timing in a nation of four critical lines of social cleavage determines which of these cleavages will be politically salient. Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young (1974) focus on cultural pluralism in the third world. They suggest that in each of four crudely defined geographic areas, different types of cultural divisions predominate. Africa is characterized by ethnicity; Asia by ethnicity, language, and religion; the Middle East by religion; and Latin America by social and economic class, race, and regionalism.

Political Consequences of Social Cleavages

The structure of popular support for political parties can have an important impact on both the political parties and the political system. However, political conflict within a society does not have to originate from the social cleavages within that society. In addition, the social base of a political party is not necessarily defined by these divisions. The possibility that a political party may primarily gather diverse social interests rather than express specific

interests suggests that one should examine both situations in order to evaluate the political consequences of each. In addition to studying homogeneous political parties (i.e., parties which receive their support from a specific segment of society), one should also study heterogeneous parties (i.e., parties which get their support from diverse segments of society). The political consequences of each type of party should be evaluated relative to the other type. Segal states that Rose and Urwin's failure to stress the similarities and differences between the homogeneous and heterogeneous parties in their analysis biases their conclusions about the social bases of political parties.

(It) underemphasizes the manifold bases of support of the heterogeneous parties, although it acknowledges that the trend in their importance in the political arena. Nineteen of the original seventy-six parties, or 25 percent, fell into the heterogeneous category ... The size of these parties relative to other political parties in the Western world ... and the increasing importance of heterogeneous parties generally demand that greater attention be paid to the social structure forms that account for their support (1974:65).

An accurate appraisal of the political consequences of social cleavages requires the comparison of the two types of parties.

A number of scholars have suggested links between the social bases of parties and the structure and policies of both political parties and political systems. Both Rose and Urwin (1969) and Segal (1974) assert that heterogeneous parties tend to have a numerically larger support base than do homogeneous parties. This, in turn, means that in competitive systems heterogeneous parties are more likely to control the governmental decision-making organs than are homogeneous parties. Others posit that the social base of a political party is related to its goals and the demands it communicates (e.g., Blondel, 1969;1972). According to Almond and Powell (1966), the major objective of a heterogeneous party usually is the election of its party candidates. Following Downs' model, in order to achieve this goal, the policies of heterogeneous parties usually are designed to accommodate diverse interests. They tend to be broad and flexible. The policies of homogeneous parties, Almond and Powell argue, tend to be specialized and rigid. Rose and Urwin (1969) also hypothesize that homogeneous parties tend to be more "ideological" in nature than do heterogeneous parties. In addition, the extensiveness, or geographical coverage, of a party is asserted to be related to the nature of its support (Blondel, 1969;1972). On the systemic level, the structure of popular support for the parties of a society is thought to influence the extent of regime strains in that society (Rose and Urwin, 1969).

The above discussion indicates some of the major issues in the study of the social bases of political parties. Several of these issues are summarized by DiPalma:

Major concerns of the sociology of parties are the social bases of parties (that is, their relation to social cleavages and the extent to which they recruit their supporters from distinctive social groups),

the ways in which social change transforms the social bases, and the significance of the parties' social composition for their political strategies (1972:163).

This paper will investigate some of these issues using data from the ICPP Project. First, it will attempt to assess the extent to which social cleavages find expression in political parties (i.e., examine the structure of popular support of parties) and the relative importance of six major social variables which are potential sources of political cleavage. The second goal is to examine the consequences of the structure of a party's popular support upon its success and policies. These issues will be evaluated both world-wide and within cultural-geographical clusters of nations. Before the analysis can proceed, however, the three concepts used to measure the structure of popular support for a party must be presented. In addition, the six cultural differentiations which will be examined must be defined.

II. Measurement of the Structure of Party Support

This paper is concerned with the political importance and implications of social cleavages. More explicitly, it focuses on how these divisions in the society are reflected in popular support for the political parties. The social bases of the political parties can be assessed on several dimensions. Alford develops an "index of class voting" to assess the extent to which party support is based on class. This index is calculated "by subtracting the percentage of nonmanual workers voting for 'Left' parties from the percentage of manual workers voting for such parties" (1967:82). Rose and Urwin (1969) look at the "social cohesion" of political parties, that is, the extent to which support for a political party comes from one specific interest. They determine the social cohesiveness of political parties on the basis of the percentage of a party's support which comes from different groups. According to Rose and Urwin, if at least 67% of a party's support comes from a specific social group and if this proportion is at least 17% greater than that group's proportion of the national population, the party is socially cohesive.

While this measure does tap some aspects of party support, primarily the homogeneity of support for a political party, it does not examine one important aspect of party support and combines two other aspects which perhaps should be examined independently. At least three questions should be asked about the structure of popular support for a political party: (1) "How well does a political party represent the different dimensions of a society?" (2) "How well does it aggregate the different types of supporters within each of the cleavage dimensions." and (3) "How much does a party appear to articulate specific interests due to any group's predominance among its supporters?" In order to investigate each of these questions, three measures of party support are proposed in the ICPP Project. These are social representation, social aggregation, and social articulation.

The concept of social representation is the most familiar of these three due to its prominence in recent party politics--notably the selection of delegates to the 1972 national party conventions. The reform rules of the Democratic Party

specified that "blacks, women, and youth be represented in each state delegation in 'reasonable relationship to their presence' in the population of each state" (Sullivan, et al., 1974:17). The idea of "reasonable relationship to their presence in the population," or representativeness, can be applied not only to convention delegates but also to party supporters in general.

The concepts of "aggregation" and "articulation" have also figured prominently in the literature of political parties. Almond uses aggregation to refer to the process of gathering, combining, and accommodating different interests into policies pressed upon the government and articulation to refer to the process by which individuals and groups express demands on political decision-makers (Almond and Coleman, 1960; Almond and Powell, 1966). The processes of interest aggregation and interest articulation are difficult enough to study through intensive field research; they are virtually impossible to tap through library research, which was employed in the ICPP Project. This research problem is simplified by assuming that the processes of interest aggregation and articulation discussed by Almond follow from the underlying structures of social support for the parties.³ To avoid confusion between Almond's dynamic concepts of interest aggregation and articulation and the ICPP Project's conceptualization involving the patterns of social support for the parties within a country, these latter concepts will be referred to with the labels social aggregation and social articulation.

The measurement of social representation, aggregation and articulation derives from two different ways of assessing the social bases of party support. It will be easiest to discuss these measures in reference to Table 1, which gives party identification by race for the United States in 1960. In the table, responses to party identification are percentagized first by columns and then by rows.

TABLE 1: Party Identification by Race in 1960

Party ID	No. of cases	% of sample	Percents by Columns		Percents By Rows		Rep.	Agg.	Art.
			Whites	Blacks	Whites	Blacks			
Democrats	865	46.4	46.0	50.6	90.4	9.6 /100%	.95	.95	.65
Republicans	562	30.2	31.5	16.5	95.2	4.8 /100%	.75	.69	.82
Independents	437	23.4	22.5	32.9	87.6	12.4 /100%	.78	.81	.57
			100%	100%					
	Number of Cases.....		1,700	164					
	Percent of Sample.....				91.2	8.8			

Source: Survey Research Center, National Survey, 1960

Social Representation

The social representation measure is designed to get at the representativeness of a party's supporters. "Social representation" is defined as the extent to which the composition of the party identifiers accurately reflects the social composition of the national electorate. A party which is high on "social representation" for a given variable reflects in its own composition the proportional distribution of social groups which exists in the society. To take the religion dimension, for example, if the society is 40% Protestant and 60% Catholic, a perfectly representative party would also display a division of 40% Protestant and 60% Catholic. On the other hand, if a party is 10% Protestant and 90% Catholic in a society which is 90% Protestant and 10% Catholic, it would not be considered representative.

Operationally, the measurement of social representation involves the absolute value of the deviation of the row percentages for each party from the row percentages for the total sample. It may be instructive to look at the example provided by Table 1. If one first looks at the Democratic Party, there is an absolute deviation of .8 percentage points $|90.4 - 91.2|$ between the whites' percentage of the Democratic supporters and the whites' percentage of the total sample and an absolute deviation of .8 percentage points $|9.6 - 8.8|$ between the blacks' percentage of the Democratic supporters and the blacks' percentage of the total sample. These deviations are calculated for each party and then entered into the following formula which computes a social representation score for each party:

$$\text{Social Representation} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k \left| \frac{\text{Percent of party supporters from group } j - \text{Percent of group } j \text{ in population}}{\text{Percent of group } j \text{ in population}} \right|}{2k - 2}$$

Where: k = the number of groupings in the social variable in the formula.

This formula produces scores which range from 0 to 1 only when the population is equally distributed along the k groupings for the social variable. When the population distribution is unequal, the formula can produce negative values. These negative values represent situations of extreme inequality, e.g., social groups with very small percentages of the total population furnishing most all of a party's supporters. The resultant values for the Democratic and Republican Parties are .95 and .75, respectively, indicating that in 1960 the Democrats were more representative of the racial composition of the society than were the Republicans.

Social Aggregation

The basic assumption underlying the social aggregation measure is that the extent to which a party aggregates social interests--that is, gathers disparate interests and processes them in its policy-making activity--is a function of the

distribution of support that the party receives from each major social group relative to other groups. Therefore, "social aggregation" is defined as the extent to which the party draws its supporters or identifiers evenly from each significant social grouping. A party that is supported to the same extent from each grouping of society on an important social variable--e.g., occupation, race, or religion--is assumed to be open to input from each group on an equal basis. Put in another way, if the different social groupings are all equally supportive of a given party, it is assumed that each perceives the party as receptive to its interests in comparable degrees. A party is assumed not to be aggregative of diverse social interests if its support pattern varies widely across groupings.

The social aggregation measure is not derived from the overall or mean level of support given to a party but rather from the evenness of its preference patterns--with "preference pattern" interpreted as the percentages of each group preferring or supporting the party, i.e., the data percentagized by column in Table 1. If the column percentages for a political party are uneven, indicating that the party's support varies widely across social groupings, the party's social aggregation is low. The less the deviation among the column percentages for a given party, the higher the aggregation. The formula for social aggregation computes the absolute deviations of the column percentages from the mean and calculates a score which ranges from 0 to 1.0, with higher values meaning higher aggregation. A party's social aggregation score is calculated by this formula:

$$\text{Social Aggregation} = 1 - \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k |X_j - \bar{X}|}{\frac{2(k-1)}{k} \bar{X}}$$

Where: X_j = the proportion of the jth group's support given to the party

\bar{X} = the mean proportion of support for the party, calculated over all social groupings, k

k = the number of different groupings within the variable in the analysis

Examining the percents by column in Table 1, one finds that the Democrats display a fairly even pattern of support from blacks and whites while the Republicans show a more uneven preference pattern. Inserting the percentages into the social aggregation formula results in values of .95 for the Democrats and .69 for the Republicans, indicating the uneven nature of support for the Republican party relative to the aggregative nature of the Democratic Party.

Social Articulation

The final measure, social articulation, is based on the assumption that the extent to which a party articulates social interests--that is, stresses specific interests in its policies and presses for these policies within the government--is a function of the concentration of social groupings within the party. Thus, "social articulation" is defined as the extent to which party supporters or identifiers are concentrated in specific social groupings. A party whose concentration is completely dominated by supporters from the same social group is assumed to be articulative of that group's interests to the exclusion of competing interests. A party is not assumed to be articulative of any special interests if its composition is equally divided among competing groups.

The social articulation measure is derived from the degree of concentration in the pattern of the party's composition, with the pattern based on the percentages of the party's strength received from each group--i.e., the data percentagized by rows in Table 1. The social articulation formula involves squaring and summing the proportions of each grouping within the party. The formula is:

$$\text{Social Articulation} = \frac{\sum_{j=1}^k \text{Percent of Party}_i^2 - 1/k}{1 - 1/k}$$

Where: k = the number of groupings in the social variable involved in the formula.

This formula ranges from 0--when the party's support comes equally from all competing groups--to 1.0 when one of the groups contributes all of its strength. Again looking at the percentages by row in Table 1, one finds that both parties draw most of their support from the white segment of society. However, the Republican Party draws a higher proportion of its support from whites than the Democratic Party and accordingly receives a higher articulation score, .82 and .65, respectively.

Relationship of the Measures

The social cohesion measure developed by Rose and Urwin seems to be comparable to a combination of the social articulation and social representation measures. Similar to the social articulation measure, social cohesion indicates whether a specific group controls a party by the requirement that at least 67% of a party's support must come from one group. However, Rose and Urwin also require that the structure of party support must not be representative of society (operationally, the proportion of the dominant group in the party must be at least 17% greater than its proportion in society). Social cohesion ignores the aggregation aspect of party support.

Within the ICPP Project, social representation, social aggregation, and social articulation are viewed as being independently informative, each answering

one of the questions posed above about the structure of popular support for a party.⁴ Based on the party's composition relative to the composition of the society, the representation measure indicates the extent to which the party's composition "represents" the different dimensions of the society. Based on the proportion of the groups' support given to a party, the aggregation measure indicates the extent to which the party collects major interests within the society. If a group gives a party 100% of its support and all other groups give no support to the party, it is likely that only the first group perceives the party as being receptive to its interests. If each of k groups of a society gives a party the same level of support, i.e., $1/k$ th, the party is assumed to be perceived as equally receptive to the interests of each group. Based on the proportion of the party's support drawn from given groups, the articulation measure indicates the relative strength that different interests have within the party and which ones are most likely to be voiced in party policy. It differs from Rosè and Urwin's social cohesion measure by ignoring the social composition of the society. Regardless of whether a social trait characterizes 10% or 90% of a population, if 90% of a party's support comes from the members of the society who are characterized by that trait, the party is potentially an articulator for the interests of that segment. A more definitive statement can be made in the negative; it is extremely unlikely that the interests of the groups which are not dominant in a party will be expressed by that party.

In combination, these three measures can also indicate the characteristics of a society and the appeals of its parties. The social articulation and representation measures together behave similarly to social cohesion. They indicate whether a party's high articulation score is a consequence of the party's selective appeal or whether the party merely reflects the underlying social structure. They suggest the political salience of the cleavage for that party. For example, a party composed of 10% Protestant and 90% Catholic would score very high on religious social articulation. However, the importance of this level of articulation would depend upon the religious composition of the society. A social structure which is radically different from the party structure suggests that religion is more politically salient than it would be in a society also composed of 10% Protestant and 90% Catholic. Which of the three measures or which combination of the three measures is the most informative depends upon the facets of party support in which one is interested.

Cultural Differentiators

These three measures of party support are applied to six "cultural differentiators" previously identified as major sources of political cleavages. These are (1) economic status, (2) religion, (3) ethnicity/language/race, (4) region, (5) urbanization, and (6) education. Economic status was variously interpreted in terms of occupation, social status, or amount of income--depending on availability of data and appropriateness for the country being studied. Religion assesses one of two significant dimensions of religious conflict, either interfaith conflict or intra-faith conflict. The ethnicity/language/race social variable is designed to get at the "communalism" dimension of social cleavages. Region as a differentiator taps the extent to which geography plays a part in structuring party support. Similar to regionalism, urbanization reflects the spatial grouping of people. This cultural differentiator refers to divisions based on rural-urban cleavages. The final cultural differentiator is education, which reflects either formal education or literacy, depending on the country being studied.

III. Data

Definition of a Political Party

The units of analysis employed in this study are political parties. A party is defined in the ICPP Project as an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions. The components in this definition bear closer examination. A political party is defined first as an organization--implying recurring interactions among individuals with some division of labor and role differentiation. All organizations are acknowledged to have multiple goals; to qualify as a political party, an organization must have as one of its goals that of placing its avowed representatives of the party in government positions. Moreover, these individuals must be avowed representatives of the party, which means in practical terms that they must be openly identified with the party name or label. Finally, the term "placing" should be interpreted broadly to include competing with other parties in the electoral process or restricting the activities of opposing parties or subverting the system and capturing the government.

The universe of parties as conceptually defined is too large for practical research, and two restrictions are incorporated into the operational definition used to identify parties to be studied in the ICPP Project. The first restriction limits the universe of study to only those parties that operate in national politics, which excludes some local parties. The second requires that the parties achieve a given level of importance in national politics during the time period of the project (1950-62), defining importance in terms of strength among the population and stability of existence.

These criteria are embodied in the specific operational definitions used to identify legal and illegal parties for inclusion in the ICPP Project study. For legal parties, the operationalization requires that the party win at least 5% of the seats in the lower house of the national legislature in two or more successive elections. For illegal parties, the definition specifies that the party receives the support of a sizable proportion of the population, at least 10%, which is sustained over a certain period of time, at least five years.

Data Set

The political parties in the ICPP Project constitute a stratified random sample of 154 political parties operating in 52 countries during the period 1950 to 1962. Fifty of these countries were selected at random--five being drawn from each of ten cultural geographical areas of the world. The other two countries, Great Britain and the United States, were added for reasons of substantive interest after they failed to appear in the sample. All parties in these countries were selected for inclusion if they met our definition of a party, including our minimal levels of strength and stability. The countries included in the project, the number of parties in each country, and the time period studied in each country are given in Table 2.

Enter Table 2

In order to provide for changes in party attributes during the thirteen year time slice, the parties were scored separately for the first and second "halves" of the period. The time divisions were usually 1950-56 and 1957-62, but they varied somewhat from country to country depending on factors in national politics which dictated the use of other cutting points. The time divisions for each country are noted in Table 2. The data reported in this analysis is drawn only from the second half of the period (roughly 1957-62), which reduces the total sample of parties to 143, for some parties existed only in the first half of the period. The complete list of parties included in this study is given in Appendix A.

Data Availability

Not all six cultural differentiators are present as forces for political division within each country. In particular, the religion and ethnicity/language/race differentiators are apt to be inoperative in highly homogeneous countries. Occupation as a differentiator, moreover, may be less relevant for underdeveloped than developed countries.

If the applicability of the cultural differentiators varies from country to country, so too does the nature and number of groups within the cultural differentiator. In the United States, for example, there are only two major racial groupings, whereas in Malaya, there are three. In other cases, the underlying divisions are generally comparable, but the available data on party support use quite different breakdowns--e.g., reporting only a crude urban-rural dichotomy in one case but detailed data by size or cities in another. The data recording and data analysis procedures used in the ICPP Project are quite flexible, and whatever groupings the research literature identified as relevant for the country and whichever appeared to be supported with the best data were used.

Missing data was an especially vexing problem in assessing party support. It proved difficult to collect the necessary data for computing precise representation, aggregation and articulation scores for all parties and all six cultural differentiators. For almost half of the countries, sample surveys were located which furnished all or most of the information needed. For another one-quarter of the countries, figures on membership composition or election returns provided some suitable information. For the remaining quarter of the sample, party compositions were estimated from scholars' statements about party support (see Janda, forthcoming). In spite of the efforts to quantify patterns of party support whenever possible, many parties have not been scored on the three dimensions of party variation for all six cultural differentiators selected for cross-national study. Table 3 reports both the total number of parties coded and summary statistics for each of the six major social variables. It is noteworthy that for three of the differentiators,

TABLE 2: Coverage of the ICPP Project: Areas, Countries,
Number of Political Parties, and Time Periods

Cultural-Geographical Area	Country	Parties	1st Part	2nd Part
0- Anglo-American	United States	2	1950-56	1957-62
	United Kingdom	2	1950-56	1957-62
	Australia	3	1950-56	1957-62
	New Zealand	2	1950-56	1957-62
	Ireland	3	1950-56	1957-62
	Rhodesian Federation	4	1953-57	1958-63
1- West Central Europe	India	2	1950-56	1957-62
	Austria	3	1950-55	1956-62
	France	5	1950-57	1958-62
	West Germany	3	1950-56	1957-62
	Greece	4	1950-56	1957-62
	Portugal	1	1950-56	1957-62
2- Scandinavia and Benelux	Denmark	4	1950-56	1957-62
	Iceland	4	1950-56	1957-62
	Sweden	4	1950-56	1957-62
	The Netherlands	6	1950-56	1957-62
	Luxembourg	4	1950-56	1957-62
3- South America	Ecuador	5	1950-56	1957-62
	Paraguay	3	1950-56	1957-62
	Peru	5	1950-55	1956-63
	Uruguay	2	1950-56	1957-62
	Venezuela	3	1952-57	1958-63
4- Central America	Dominican Republic	1	1950-56	1957-61
	El Salvador	2	1950-55	1956-60
	Guatemala	7	1950-54	1955-62
	Nicaragua	3	1950-56	1957-62
	Cuba	4	1952-58	1959-62
5- Asia and the Far East	Burma	4	1950-57	1958-61
	Cambodia	2	1950-55	1956-62
	Indonesia	4	1950-56	1957-62
	North Korea	1	1950-56	1957-62
	Malaya	5	1950-56	1957-62
6- Eastern Europe	Albania	1	1950-56	1957-62
	Bulgaria	2	1950-56	1957-62
	East Germany	5	1950-56	1957-62
	Hungary	1	1950-56	1957-62
	USSR	1	1950-56	1957-62
7- Middle East and North Africa	Sudan	3	1953-58	1959-62
	Tunisia	1	1950-55	1956-62
	Lebanon	4	1950-56	1957-62
	Iran	4	1950-56	1957-62
	Turkey	2	1950-56	1957-60
8- West Africa	Dahomey	3	1950-56	1957-62
	Ghana	4	1951-56	1957-62
	Guinea	1	1950-56	1957-62
	Upper Volta	1	1950-56	1957-62
	Togo	4	1950-58	1959-62
9- Central and East Africa	Central African Republic	1	1950-56	1957-62
	Chad	2	1950-56	1957-62
	Congo-Brazzaville	2	1950-56	1957-62
	Kenya	2	1950-56	1957-63
	Uganda	3	1952-57	1958-62

TABLE 3: Mean Values of Representation, Aggregation, and Articulation Scores for all Parties Coded on Social Bases of Support

	Number of Parties Coded	% of total number of Parties Coded (N=143)	<u>Representation</u>		<u>Aggregation</u>		<u>Articulation</u>	
			mean	std dev	mean	std dev	mean	std dev
Economic Status	125	87%	.51	.73	.68	.22	.22	.20
Region	116	81	.72	.25	.72	.24	.19	.24
Urban-rural	98	69	.64	.58	.71	.25	.27	.28
Religion	69	48	.31	1.22	.52	.31	.40	.30
Education	68	48	.67	.41	.75	.21	.24	.24
Ethnicity	41	29	.07	2.12	.49	.35	.55	.36

ethnicity, religion, and education, less than 50% of the total parties are coded.

The lack of data for a country on any cultural indicator probably is indicative of the fact that not all six variables are regarded by scholars as being applicable for that particular country. However, the variability of the number of parties coded on each differentiator creates problems for their comparison. Several of these variables, such as occupation and region, tend to be reported regardless of whether or not they are politically "salient" in a country. Others, however, especially ethnicity and religion, tend to be reported only if they are considered important, even if the country is heterogeneous on that dimension. The result probably is that mean values for those cultural differentiators on which fewer parties are coded overestimate the "true" mean levels of these variables.

The concepts of representation, aggregation, and articulation are logically independent of one another. In general, this is true also of their measurement formulas, but certain interrelationships exist at the extremes and under conditions of equal distribution of groups within the society (see footnote 4). Social forces, moreover, can operate to produce empirical relationships among the indicators. The intercorrelations among the three indicators within each cultural differentiator are given in Table 4. The interrelationships among the indicators are much higher for region (ranging in absolute magnitude from .82 to .97) than for any other differentiator. This appears to be due to the tendency during coding to construct regional categories of roughly equal population size when regional categories were not dictated by imperatives of domestic politics. As noted, conditions of equality in size of categories elicit equalities in values from the formulas. The three measures are designed to capture differences in patterns of party support when society is not divided so equitably, which is more often the case for the other five cultural differentiators.

TABLE 4: Intercorrelations among the Representation, Aggregation, and Articulation Measures for Each Cultural Differentiator

	Representation with Aggregation	Aggregation with Articulation	Articulation with Representation
Economic Status	.69	-.34	-.07
Region	.97	-.87	-.82
Urban-Rural	.74	-.53	-.22
Religion	.41	-.66	-.05
Education	.86	-.22	.06
Ethnicity	.44	-.66	-.28
Mean over Differentiators	.68	-.55	-.23

Because of the high intercorrelations among the regional measures, any findings pertaining to regional party support should be reflected in terms of representation, aggregation, and articulation. Such redundancy should not be expected from the other analyses beforehand. While the representation and aggregation measures are more strongly related than either of the other pairs, apart from region and education, their correlations are not great enough to predetermine that results based on one measure will mirror the results based on the other. And, of course, articulation is quite often independent of representation in particular.

The first part of the analysis in this paper investigates the importance of the various cultural differentiators. Because the aggregation, articulation, and representation statistics are based on substantially different numbers of parties, however, one should be cautious in making comparisons across the cultural differentiators. Strictly speaking, such comparisons should be limited to sets of parties scored on the same differentiators, e.g., parties in the same country, but some deviations from the ideal should be tolerable. The same problem applies, to a lesser extent, to comparisons of mean levels on one variable for different groups of countries. These problems will be noted in the analysis to follow.

IV. Analysis--The Structure of Party Support

The social cleavage literature reviewed above contains differing opinions about the political salience of social cleavages--specifically, the relative importance of various potential bases of support and the patterns of support for parties across countries. Despite their disagreements, almost all authors would endorse these minimal assumptions:

A. Some cultural differentiators are more salient than others as bases for party support.

B. The salience of cultural differentiators for party support varies across nations grouped by national characteristics.

C. The salience of cultural differentiators for party support varies across parties groups by party strategies.

Most of the literature reviewed dealt mainly with assumptions A and B: the salience of social variables in comparison with one another and variations in salience across nations. Assumption C is largely implicit in the literature, for most writers presuppose that they are discussing parties which pursue a competitive rather than non-competitive strategy. The data analysis in this section will be devoted to testing these three assumptions in turn.

Salience of differentiators across all parties:

One measure of the salience of cultural differentiators for party support is the proportion of parties that could be coded on each of the six differentiators. The ability to code parties on the differentiators is a function of the importance of the differentiator in domestic party politics. The more salient it is, the more likely it is discussed in the literature, and the greater the likelihood that the party will be scored on that differentiator. If one were to judge the salience of the differentiators by successful coding, the salience ranking would be as in Table 3. The most salient differentiator would be economic status, on which 87 percent of the parties were coded. The least salient would be ethnicity, which yielded codes for only 29 percent of the parties. This criterion supports Lipset's claim that class is the most important base for political diversity and argues against Rose and Urwin's case for religion, which was coded for only 48 percent of the parties. While there is something appealing about using this measure of "relevance" to judge "salience," it also leaves something to be desired--especially omitting the magnitude of diversity in social support among parties.

The magnitude of these diversities can be assessed through the concepts of representation, aggregation, and articulation and their associated measures. The scores for all parties that could be coded on these measures were reported in Table 3. For ease of comparison, these scores are portrayed graphically in Figure 1, which is constructed to display low representation and aggregation scores at the top and low articulation scores at the bottom. Thus the most salient differentiators--those for which the parties were low on representation and aggregation and high on articulation--appear toward the upper portion of the figure.

Enter Figure 1

There are several points to note about Figure 1. First, there is a general correspondence between rankings of the differentiators on all three measures, which suggests that these measures are all tapping some common aspect of party support--as expected from the intercorrelations among the measures in Table 4. Secondly, ethnicity clearly emerges as the social variable with the greatest capacity for creating unrepresentative, non-aggregative, and highly articulative parties. Third, Figure 1 supports Rose and Urwin's identification of religion as a more important basis of party support than class. Finally, it suggests that urban-rural groupings,

Representation

Aggregation

Articulation




Figure 1: Plot of Party Support Scores

education, and region are approximately equal in their cross-national effect, with region being lower than the others on two of the three measures. A number of other observations might be made about Figure 1 and comparisons drawn to arguments in the literature, but the pressures of space and time implore that the brush strokes be broad now with detail to be painted in a subsequent study. It is more important to disaggregate these patterns of party support by national groupings.

Variations in salience of differentiators across national groupings:

There are a variety of politically meaningful ways that nations can be grouped for the analysis of party support. For example, one might choose levels of economic development or industrialization. Alternatively, nations can be classified according to governmental structure or authority patterns. This analysis employs a simple regional classification, treating regional location as a crude indicator of common political culture. The mean values of the parties' social representation, aggregation, and articulation scores grouped by regions are reported in Table 5.

Enter Table 5

There are 90 different values reported for the six cultural differentiators, five regional groupings, and three measures of social support included in Table 5. No attempt will be made here to probe specific patterns among these 90 scores. The interpretation will rely primarily upon the column of means at the right-hand side of the table, with supplementary reference to its intricate interior. Attention should be directed first to the bottom of the table for disclosure of the numbers of parties underlying each mean. The average number of parties coded for Asia and the Far East as one region and the Middle East and North Africa as another is less than ten, so the reader should be aware of the likely instabilities in scores due to the small numbers of parties involved in some computations. In three instances, for example, only two parties contribute to the means in the table. In general, our information base is much better for the Europe and Anglo-American region (Europe here includes Eastern Europe as well as Western Europe) than for any other region. Even for Europe, however, only 6 parties could be coded for ethnicity, so these results should be interpreted with some caution.

On the basis of statements in the literature (e.g., Segal, 1974), one might have hypothesized that the European/Anglo-American parties would be most representative, most aggregative, and least articulative of the various groups within society. Such parties could be characterized as heterogeneous "catch-all" parties, to use Kirchheimer's term for the modern form of the Western party. The mean values on the right-hand side of the table--calculated across all six cultural differentiators--tends to support this hypothesis, but for one consistent exception. The Latin American parties produce higher means on representation and aggregation and a lower mean on articulation. An examination of the interior of the table shows that the European parties differ from the Latin American parties primarily in their religious distinctiveness (which is understandable, given the predominance of Catholicism in Latin America) and in economic status--which appears to be due to the elitist politics of Latin America avoiding the engagement of the masses in party politics as in Europe.

From studying the representation, aggregation, and articulation mean values for the rest of the Third World, it appears that masses have been mobilized into party politics even in these countries in a way quite different from that in Latin America. Parties in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa definitely show more diversity in their patterns of social support, with the African parties being the least representative and aggregative and the most articulative. These data largely support the contentions

TABLE 5: Mean Values of Representation, Aggregation, and Articulation Scores for Parties Grouped by Regions

	Ethnicity	Religion	Economic Status	Urban-Rural	Education	Region	Overall Means
<u>Representation:</u>							
Europe/Anglo-America	.84	.60	.63*	.73	.74*	.78*	.72
Latin America	.81	.93	.71	.73	.79	.80	.80
Asia and Far East	.31	.33	.40	.61	.97	.73	.56
Middle East/N. Africa	.76	.05	-.01*	.57	-.70	.68	.23
Africa	-.37	-.25	.16	.29	.68	.46	.16
<u>Aggregation:</u>							
Europe/Anglo-America	.83*	.60*	.68*	.75	.78*	.78*	.74
Latin America	.85	.93	.78	.76	.78	.80	.82
Asia and Far East	.30	.36	.60	.65	.97	.74	.60
Middle East/N. Africa	.73	.30	.51	.66	.22	.67	.52
Africa	.41	.51	.75	.61	.75	.48	.59
<u>Articulation:</u>							
Europe/Anglo-America	.56	.39*	.17*	.15*	.24	.13*	.27
Latin America	.28	.07	.19	.22	.18	.14	.18
Asia and Far East	.79	.58	.33	.36	.09	.10	.38
Middle East/N. Africa	.71	.37	.27	.39	.08	.26	.35
Africa	.47	.35	.31	.61	.44	.40	.43
<u>Numbers of Parties:</u>							
Europe/Anglo-America	6	27	59	51	41	51	39
Latin America	2	5	28	13	14	24	14
Asia and Far East	9	14	12	9	2	10	9
Middle East/N. Africa	2	7	14	11	4	10	8
Africa	22	16	12	14	7	21	15

* Indicates that the variation among the means of the groups is significant at the .05 level.

of Anderson, von der Mehden and Young about cultural divisions by region. The special place of ethnicity (race and tribe) in African politics can be seen not only by the negative means for representation (which signal situations of extreme under- and over-representation) but also in the large number of parties (22) that were coded on this variable for Africa. The regional relevance of ethnicity as a social variable accounts for the difference between the Lipset/Rose/Urwin claim that class and religion were the most important differentiators and the greater salience of ethnicity in this study. Thus, these data instead confirm Grove's emphasis on race, one manifestation of ethnicity. Ethnicity appears not to be a major factor in party support within the European countries, but it rises dramatically in importance when the analysis becomes cross-cultural, as well as cross-national.

Variations in salience across party strategies:

Of the 143 parties in the sample operating during 1957-1962, 93 were classified as pursuing a competitive strategy for placing their representatives in government positions (i.e., through the electoral process) and 50 were classified as non-competitive, either restricting competition from other parties or subverting the political system. Table 6 presents the mean representation, aggregation, and articulation scores for competitive and non-competitive parties.

Enter Table 6

The data in Table 6 reveal systematic differences between competitive and non-competitive parties in the structure of their social support. In general--over all six cultural differentiators--competitive parties tend to be more representative of the social structure of their societies than non-competitive parties. With the exception of ethnicity, which shows no appreciable difference, competitive parties are also more likely to be aggregative of major social groupings. Finally, with the exception of ethnicity and also religion, competitive parties tend to be less articulative of specific social interests than non-competitive parties.

The information in Table 5 demonstrated the effect of region in accounting for some of the variation in social support patterns for political parties. The data in Table 6 suggest that the regional groupings may simply reflect differences in party strategies, with the competitive parties located mainly in Europe and Latin America and the non-competitive parties predominating throughout the rest of the world. This phenomenon is indeed demonstrated in Table 7, which classifies parties by strategies and by regions.

TABLE 7: Distribution of Competitive and Non-Competitive Parties by Region

	Competitive	Non-Competitive
Europe/Anglo-America	49	11
Latin America	18	12
Asia and the Far East	9	7
Middle East and North Africa	8	6
Africa	8	15

TABLE 6: Mean Values of Representation, Aggregation, and Articulation Scores for Parties Grouped by Strategy

	Ethnicity	Religion	Economic Status	Urban-Rural	Education	Region	Overall Means
<u>Representation:</u>							
Competitive	.46	.54*	.55	.74*	.71*	.75*	.63
Non-Competitive	-.27	-.23	.41	.30	.37	.60	.20
<u>Aggregation:</u>							
Competitive	.48	.55	.71*	.76*	.77*	.76*	.67
Non-Competitive	.49	.46	.62	.55	.58	.60	.55
<u>Articulation:</u>							
Competitive	.58	.40	.17*	.20*	.22	.14*	.29
Non-Competitive	.53	.38	.31	.52	.39	.32	.41
<u>Number of Parties:</u>							
Competitive	19	49	85	76	60	87	63
Non-Competitive	22	20	40	22	8	29	24

* Indicates that the differences between the means of the groups is significant at the .05 level.

As Table 7 shows, there is a strong relationship between region and party strategy, but Latin America's propensity for competitive parties is not nearly as great as Europe's. This warns us that the regional groupings do not "simply" reflect differences in party strategies. Because this relationship between region and strategy holds in broad outlines, however, subsequent analyses will favor the simpler competitive/non-competitive breakdown rather than the finer regional divisions.

V. Analysis--Political Consequences of Support Bases

The literature on social bases of party support offers two major propositions about their political consequences that will be tested in this section. The first contends that diversity in support bases is associated with political success. The second holds that diversity is also associated with moderation in issue orientation. In their more general (and non-directional) form, these two propositions can be stated as follows:

- A. The social bases of party support affect the party's governmental status.
- B. The social bases of party support affect the party's issue orientation.

These propositions have been generalized into a non-directional form to facilitate the theoretical development of this section. Unfortunately, the literature is inconsistent and frequently vague about what is meant by "diversity in support bases." Sometimes this means "heterogeneity" across cultural differentiators, sometimes non-homogeneity within a given differentiator, sometimes "aggregation" across differentiators, and so on. "Diversity" in support bases, moreover, seems to be an inappropriate label for the representativeness of parties, which depends essentially on the structure of society itself. This analysis, therefore, largely abandons the conventional scholarly vocabulary and interprets propositions A and B explicitly in terms of the concepts of representation, aggregation, and articulation and specifically in terms of each of the six cultural differentiators. The broader statements are more accommodative of the working hypotheses to be cast in turn under each of these propositions.

The effect of social bases on governmental status:

The concept of governmental status refers to the access that the party enjoys to the governmental structure (Janda, 1970a). It is a broad concept that is measured in the ICPP Project through a scale composed of five indicators: governmental discrimination for or against the party (measured by scores ranging from +16 to -16), percentage of years that the party holds the governmental leadership, percentage of years that the party claims cabinet participation, the average amount of legislative strength as measured in percentage of seats held, and the average amount of electoral strength as measured in the percentage of votes won. These five indicators inter-correlated sufficiently well to create a composite scale from the standardized scores with a reliability of .89 as measured by Cronbach's alpha (Bohrstadt, 1970). The governmental status scale is employed with the three social support measures in the following hypotheses:

- A.1: Party representation is directly related to governmental status.
- A.2: Party aggregation is directly related to governmental status.

A.3: Party articulation is inversely related to governmental status.

Table 8 contains the data to test these hypotheses.

TABLE 8: Correlations between Three Measures of Party Support and Governmental Status for All Parties and All Differentiators

No. of Parties		Correlation of Governmental Status with:		
		Representation	Aggregation	Articulation
41	Ethnicity	.03	.34*	-.25
69	Religion	.06	.23*	-.03
125	Economic Status	.14	.29*	-.11
98	Urban-rural	-.05	.15	-.04
68	Education	.21	.34*	.17
116	Region	.26*	.27*	-.16*

*Indicates correlation significant at .05 level.

The results in Table 8 are fairly clear. The relationships are in the directions predicted by the hypotheses for every differentiator except urban-rural representation. The relationships achieved statistical significance in general only for aggregation, and the single exception for aggregation is again urban-rural. Region--which was previously identified as the least salient cultural differentiator--has the most consistent political consequences, being significantly related to governmental status through representation, aggregation, and articulation. (Note that this consistency would be expected given the high intercorrelations among these indicators.)

This analysis provides strong support only for proposition A.2, which implies that parties which draw their support evenly across social groupings (i.e., are high in aggregation) enjoy higher governmental status than those which are either high in representation or low in articulation. Accurate reflection of society (high representation) and heterogeneity in support across subgroupings (low articulation) bear less relation to the governmental status than does high aggregation. This applies to parties throughout the world, regardless of region or party strategy.

We have already seen, however, that the structure of party support varies considerably across regions and across types of parties. Perhaps the relationships between party support and governmental status vary as well. One might also argue that the theory which links party support to governmental status is intended to apply only to competitive parties. Put more formally, the hypotheses become conditional ones: hypotheses A.1, A.2, and A.3 hold only under the condition of open competition. The condition of open competition is more appropriately conceived as a system-level measure, but this controlling condition can be approximated by again dividing the sample according to competitive and non-competitive strategies of the individual parties. Table 9 reports the data analyzed by party strategy.

TABLE 9: Correlations between Three Measures of Party Support and Governmental Status for All Differentiators by Party Strategy

No. of Parties			Correlations of Governmental Status with:					
			Representation		Aggregation		Articulation	
Comp.	Non-Comp.		Comp.	Non-Comp.	Comp.	Non-Comp.	Comp.	Non-Comp.
19	22	Ethnicity	.14	.11	.09	.48*	.21	-.43*
49	20	Religion	.28*	.06	.15	.46*	.09	-.19
85	40	Economic Status	.21*	.15	.35*	.37*	-.23*	-.20
76	22	Urban-Rural	.34*	.02	.44*	.31	-.19*	-.49*
60	8	Education	.27*	.27	.39*	.47	-.14	-.38
87	29	Region	.40*	.34*	.43*	.34*	-.25*	-.29

*Indicates correlation is significant at the .05 level.

The results in Table 9, while not as clear-cut as those in Table 8, are more supportive of the three hypotheses. Whereas the correlations over all parties only showed that aggregation was systematically related to governmental status, the correlations for the competitive parties are statistically significant for most of the cultural differentiators for all three measures of party support, and the magnitudes of the relationships are usually increased. Unexpectedly, however, there are some significant relationships also between party support and governmental status and party support for non-competitive parties which are not predicted by the theory. Actually, the underlying theory only posits the condition of open competition and says nothing about the relationship of social support to governmental status for non-competitive parties at all. Nevertheless, these findings plus the lack of a complete fit between the data and the three hypotheses for the competitive parties invite further examination of the theory.

As stated, the concept of "governmental status" used in the ICPP Project refers broadly to access to the governmental structure. The thinking that relates diversity of social support to political success looks to the mechanism of elections to provide this access. More specifically, the hypothesis is that diversity of support will translate into electoral success, which will produce political success and--in terms of the ICPP conceptual framework--high governmental status. But not all political systems allow for electoral success to be translated faithfully into political success more broadly conceived. Recognition of this fact urges that the original proposition be refined to predict only to electoral strength—one of the five indicators in the governmental status scale. The three new propositions read as follows: Under the condition of open competition,

- A.1a: party representation is directly related to electoral strength,
- A.2a: party aggregation is directly related to electoral strength, and
- A.3a: party articulation is inversely related to electoral strength.

Table 10 provides the data to test these propositions.

TABLE 10: Correlations between Three Measures of Party Support and Electoral Strength for All Differentiators by Party Strategy

No. of Parties			Correlations of Electoral Strength with					
			Representation		Aggregation		Articulation	
Comp.	Non-Comp.		Comp.	Non-Comp.	Comp.	Non-Comp.	Comp.	Non-Comp.
18	12	Ethnicity	.68*	-.03	.64*	.00	-.36	-.18
45	13	Religion	.33*	-.07	.25*	.10	-.07	.05
76	10	Economic Status	.34*	-.31	.41*	-.04	.06	.07
68	7	Urban-Rural	.50*	-.44	.57*	-.46	.03	-.23
57	3	Education	.39*	a	.42*	a	-.05	a
80	14	Region	.46*	.06	.45*	.00	-.19*	.01

*Indicates correlation is significant at the .05 level.

^aOnly 3 cases could be coded; correlation virtually meaningless and not reported.

The findings in Table 10 are quite striking, completely supporting hypotheses A.1a and A.2a for all cultural differentiators. The correlations for hypothesis A.3a are mixed, and significance is attained only in the instance of regional articulation. In contrast to Table 9, none of the correlations are significant for the remaining non-competitive parties, many of which were forced out of this analysis because they did not compete in elections. Although the theory is silent about the effect of social support on the electoral fortunes of parties which do not focus on elections as a means to office-holding, the complete absence of significant correlations for the non-competitive group reinforces the significance of the correlations for the competitive parties.

This analysis of the political consequences of the social bases of party support unequivocally confirms the hypotheses which link concepts of representation and aggregation to electoral strength. Regardless of which cultural differentiator is studied, there is a tendency for parties to perform better in elections if they accurately represent the social groupings in society and if they draw their support relatively equally across these groupings. There seems to be no major difference in the explanatory potential of these two concepts, which are logically independent but empirically related themselves. Social representation and aggregation appear to have about equal effects on electoral strength. Social articulation, on the other hand, appears to have no systematic effect on electoral strength. This finding is of special note, for the articulation measure comes closest to Rose and Urwin's measure of party "cohesion," which was hypothesized to be inversely related to electoral strength (1969: 23). Our analysis of competitive parties across the world conflicts with their finding of an inverse relationship for the parties in Western Europe.

The effect of social bases on issue orientation:

The literature's concern with the effect of social support on issue orientation is usually stated in terms of a concern for the "ideological" nature of the party. The theoretical argument is that socially diverse parties are apt to be less ideological than socially homogeneous parties. The term "ideology" presents problems both in conceptualization and operationalization; these problems become compounded when one talks about intensity of ideology rather than just direction. The ICPP Project employs several conceptions of ideology, one of which seems appropriate for at least a limited test of proposition B.

Proposition B states that the social bases of party support affect the party's issue orientation. This general proposition can accommodate a series of more specific hypotheses which deal with parties' ratings on a "Positive State" scale. The term "positive state" comes from Greenberg (1974: 3) and refers to an activist government that regulates many facets of a country's economic and social life. The positive state scale consists of these four issues: government ownership of the means of production, government intervention in the economy, redistribution of wealth, and providing for social welfare. An attempt was made to code each party on each of these issues on an 11-point scale ranging from strong opposition to government activity on the issue to strong support for government activity (Janda, 1970b). Each party was assigned a score on the positive state scale based on its mean standard score over all the items on which it could be coded. The reliability of the composite scale was .90.

Parties opposed to government activity on these four issues received negative scores on the scale; those supporting government activity received positive scores; and the intermediate parties received scores near zero. Thus the positive state scale measures direction of ideology rather than intensity. A rough measure of intensity was created by taking only the absolute value of the positive state scale, which assumes that ideological intensity increases as one traveled toward either end of the scale and that "centrist" parties are not intense in their ideology. This is admittedly a crude operationalization of the concept, but it should help provide some empirical evidence relevant to proposition B. The exact hypotheses to be tested are as follows:

- B.1: Party representation is inversely related to the absolute value of the Positive State scale.
- B.2: Party aggregation is inversely related to the absolute value of the Positive State scale.
- B.3: Party articulation is directly related to the absolute value of the Positive State scale.

Table 11 provides the data for testing these hypotheses across the entire sample of parties.

TABLE 11: Correlations between Three Measures of Party Support and Absolute Value of Positive State Scale for All Parties and All Differentiators

No. of Parties		Correlations of Positive State Scale with		
		Representation	Aggregation	Articulation
37	Ethnicity	-.46*	-.04	-.05
67	Religion	-.31*	-.15	.10
117	Economic Status	-.07	-.12	-.04
95	Urban-Rural	-.04	-.20*	.10
67	Education	-.01	-.02	.00
112	Region	-.28*	-.25*	.15

*Indicates correlation is significant at .05 level.

The numbers of parties involved in the correlations in this section of the paper will tend to be lower than in the previous sections, for some parties could not be coded for their positions on any of the positive state issues. The mortality rate is not great, however, and the analysis over the entire sample is still based on substantial numbers of cases. The loss in cases will be felt more when the sample is subdivided in later analyses.

The correlations in Table 11 are only partially supportive of the hypotheses. The signs are all in the predicted directions with but three exceptions, but only five of the correlations achieve statistical significance. Based on this analysis, it appears that parties which are high in representation are most likely to be low in ideological intensity (as measured by the absolute value of the Positive State scale). To a slightly lesser extent, aggregative parties also tend to be low on ideological intensity. Social articulation bears no noteworthy correlations with ideological intensity.

As noted in the previous section, theory about the political consequences of social diversity usually assumes the condition of open competition among parties. This is true also for the literature that attributes the decline of ideology to the growth of social diversity within political parties (Di Palma, 1973: 2). Perhaps the correlations would improve if the hypotheses were predicated upon the condition of open competition. Again, this condition can be approximated by examining the correlations separately for the competitive and non-competitive parties, which is done in Table 12.

Contrary to the previous experience of focusing on the competitive parties, the correlations between party support and ideological intensity largely decrease in magnitude, with some signs even changing from the predicted direction. Simultaneously, the correlations for the non-competitive parties--excluded from the scope of the revised hypothesis--tend to increase in magnitude over those reported for the entire sample.

TABLE 12: Correlations between Three Measures of Party Support and the Absolute Value of Positive State Scale for All Differentiators by Party Strategy

No. of Parties			Correlations of Positive State Scale with:					
			Representation		Aggregation		Articulation	
Comp.	Non-Comp.		Comp.	Non-Comp.	Comp.	Non-Comp.	Comp.	Non-Comp.
17	20	Ethnicity	-.12	-.61*	.31	-.38*	-.31	.26
48	19	Religion	-.17	-.60*	-.16	-.04	.14	-.03
83	34	Economic Status	-.07	-.04	-.12	-.10	.05	-.27
74	21	Urban-Rural	-.16	.11	-.19	-.30	.06	.23
59	8	Education	.06	-.34	.03	-.19	-.10	.38
85	27	Region	-.30*	-.31	-.23*	-.31	.12	.23

*Indicates correlation is significant at the .05 level.

Although the high correlations for the non-competitive parties are intriguing, they lie outside the theoretical context of this analysis and will not be pursued through ex post facto explanations in this paper. Of greater theoretical interest is the failure of the competitive parties to behave as hypothesized. The underlying theory needs still closer examination.

It was noted that most writers presupposed the condition of open competition when theorizing about the political consequences of social diversity. In fact, one can identify yet another important condition in their theory: the existence of an industrial society. Alternatively, the theory can be viewed as applying to "Western" rather than "non-Western" societies (see Di Palma, 1973). Put more formally, hypotheses B.1, B.2, and B.3 apply only under the condition of open competition and only for Western societies. Table 13 supplies data to test the hypotheses under these conditions, as the competitive parties are further divided into Western and Non-Western subsets.

TABLE 13: Correlations between Three Measures of Party Support and Absolute Values of Positive State Scale for All Differentiators by Western and Non-Western Competitive Parties

No. of Parties			Correlations of Positive State Scale with:					
			Representation		Aggregation		Articulation	
West	Non-West		West	Non-West	West	Non-West	West	Non-West
4	13	Ethnicity	-.98**	.08	-.99**	.46	.98**	-.58*
26	22	Religion	-.45*	.08	-.41*	.09	.43*	-.14
48	35	Economic Status	-.18	-.05	-.20	-.07	.12	-.03
48	26	Urban-Rural	-.29*	-.10	-.29*	-.09	-.05	.19
40	19	Education	-.32*	.37	-.25	.37	-.17	.25
49	36	Region	-.56*	-.06	-.44*	-.05	.25*	.02

*Indicates correlation is significant at the .05 level.

**Although only four cases underlie these correlations, they are reported because the relationship held across the scale and was not artifactual.

The pattern of correlations in Table 13 strongly supports hypotheses B.1 and B.2 as refined. For competitive parties in Western societies, the intensity of party ideology is inversely related to their representation and aggregation of social groupings over all six cultural differentiators. These relationships achieve statistical significance in nine out of twelve cases, falling just short on the other three. In contrast, the correlations for the non-Western parties were equally divided between positive and negative signs, and none achieved statistical significance. These findings appear to demonstrate rather conclusively the importance of social context in the analysis of party politics. The dynamics of politics in industrialized societies, as represented in Western nations, serves to link the masses to the parties largely as hypothesized in the literature dealing with the decline of ideology, which claims that the rise of heterogeneous catch-all parties have compromised their principles for electoral considerations. This theory simply does not appear to apply to party politics in non-industrial, or non-Western societies.

As in the analysis of the effect of social bases of party support on parties' governmental status, the articulation measures tend not to be related to ideological intensity. This finding runs counter to Rose and Urwin's specific hypothesis, "the greater the social cohesion, the greater a party's concern with ideology" (1969: 27). Although Rose and Urwin found some evidence to support their hypothesis, their test was even more indirect than that reported here. Given the lack of relationships between social articulation and both governmental status and ideological intensity, the explanatory potential of the concept of articulation must be suspect. Other studies appear necessary to determine what political consequences, if any, flow from the concentration of any particular subgroup within a party's support structure. Perhaps the focus needs to be shifted now to the specific issues backed by parties and to specific interests they advance in their programs.

Conclusion

In a recent conceptual and theoretical analysis of the political cleavage literature, Zuckerman finds "contrasting hypotheses linking types of political cleavage with the characteristics of political conflict" but also sees "no preponderance of evidence in support of any of them" (1975: 240). Some of the theory-related problems, Zuckerman notes, exist because "the concepts lack the empirical precision necessary for proper testing," while others are due to a failure to specify intervening variables in the theoretical arguments" (244). This paper attempts to rectify some of these problems in the analysis of political cleavages.

The structure of party support was assessed through three conceptually independent measures: social representation, social aggregation, and social articulation. These concepts were sufficiently precise to allow scoring over one hundred political parties across the world for their bases of support according to six cultural differentiators. A cross-national analysis of the salience of these differentiators in structuring party support finds ethnicity to be most important followed in order by religion and economic

status--with urbanization, education, and region all of lesser and roughly equal importance in differentiating among parties. There are clear and consistent differences in the patterns of party support both by regional groupings of nations and by groupings of parties by competitive and non-competitive strategy. In general, the patterns found were largely as contended in the literature.

Of special significance is the successful attempt in this paper to demonstrate some political consequences of the social bases of party support. Highly representative and aggregative parties were found to rank high in governmental status, and the relationships increased when only competitive parties were considered. When the underlying theory was refined to link representation and aggregation to electoral strength as one manifestation of governmental status, the relationships were even stronger. The political consequence of party support was also seen in parties' issue orientations, but only when industrialization was imposed as an intervening factor. For competitive parties in Western societies, ideological intensity was negatively related to social representation and social aggregation across all six cultural differentiators. In contrast to representation and aggregation, the concept of social articulation showed no clear relationships to either governmental status or issue orientation--despite the concept's similarity to discussions of social "cohesion" and "homogeneity" which have figured so prominently in the recent literature.

This study has obviously not been exhaustive; there are many avenues of future research development. Discussion of the implication of the results is severely limited due to the restraints of time and space, and more comment is warranted. As has already been suggested, it may be instructive to evaluate the explanatory power of the three measures used in this paper--social representation, social aggregation, and social articulation--in combination rather than individually. In addition, proposed relationships between the structure of party support, which these three measures purport to measure, and other party variables can be investigated. The measures may also be developed into system-level measures and employed to explain party system and regime level variables. This data set will be used in the future to explore these issues.

Footnotes: Page 1

¹The ICPP Project was established in 1967 for the purpose of conducting a comprehensive, empirically-based, comparative analysis of political parties throughout the world. Primary support for the Project came from the National Science Foundation (Grants GS-1418, GS-2533, and GS-27081) to Kenneth Janda as Principal Investigator. NSF support terminated in 1971. The Foreign Policy Research Institute and the American Enterprise Institute also supported the research by providing funds for released time from teaching. Michael Ward contributed materially to this study by coding many of the parties on social bases of support, and Michael Ward and Doreen Kostel Ellis provided helpful advice in the data analysis.

²Political conflict refers to the competition among interests within a society. It does not refer to political violence, although intense political conflict may result in violence.

³It is a common assumption in political science that political parties advance the interests of those they represent. As Blondel says, "The goals of political parties relate to their social bases" (1972: 87). But as Di Palma points out:

It is rather manifest that there is a conceptual difference between the popular support a party enjoys and the interests it represents. Hence the statement that parties represent the interests of those who support them is simply an empirical hypothesis, not a claim by definition. (1973: 8)

In another place, Di Palma refers even more strongly to the "misconception" that "parties reflect the interests of those who support them," although he grants that there is "more than a kernel of truth" in the assertion (1972: 163-164). Di Palma is correct in noting that it is an empirical question whether the parties represent the interests of those who support them. In assuming that the processes of interest aggregation and articulation follow from the underlying structures of social support for the parties, we are assuming that the answer to the question is largely positive. We make this assumption because of the recognized difficulty in studying the processes of interest aggregation and articulation, which we cannot adequately research here. Our use of the terms "social aggregation" and "social articulation" is intended to help preserve the interest aggregation and interest articulation of political parties as a separate research problem. Pending the production of some empirical findings to settle the extent to which parties represent the interests of their supporters, it seems useful to operate on the basis of the prevailing assumption that parties do reflect their supporters' interests and to delineate the patterns of social support through our concepts of representation, aggregation, and articulation.

⁴As argued in the text and shown by the example dealing with the representation, aggregation, and articulation of racial groupings by the American parties, these measures are conceptually independent of one another. Empirically, however, one would expect positive relations between representation and aggregation and negative relations between both of them and articulation. Moreover, there are certain conditions which dictate mathematical relationships between the measures. The formulas for representation and aggregation yield the same values for the same differentiator when the society is equally distributed across k groupings on that differentiator. As the social groupings depart from equality in size, the formulas are free to give different values.

Aggregation and articulation, on the other hand, are perfectly and inversely related at the extremes of low aggregation and high articulation. A complete absence of aggregation (0) implies perfect articulation (1.0), but perfect aggregation (1.0) does not imply an absence of articulation (0)--except under the same condition that the k groups in society are equal in size. In general, these measures are free to vary independently of one another under the frequently experienced situation of unequal size of social groups in society.

APPENDIX A: Listing of All Parties by Strategy

Party Code	Party Name	Party Code	Party Name
<u>Competitive Parties</u>			
1.00	U.S. DEMOCRATIC	266.00	DUTCH COMMUNIST
2.00	U.S. REPUBLICAN	271.00	LUX CHRISTIAN SOCIAL
11.00	BRITISH LABOUR	272.00	LUX SOCIALIST LABOR
12.00	BRITISH CONSERVATIVE	273.00	LUX DEMOCRATIC
21.00	AUSTRALIAN LABOR	274.00	LUX COMMUNIST
22.00	AUSTRALIAN LIBERAL	351.00	ECUADORIAN VELASQUIS
23.00	AUSTRALIAN COUNTRY	352.00	ECUADORIAN CONSERVAT
31.00	NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL	353.00	ECUADORIAN RAD LIBER
32.00	NEW ZEALAND LABOR	354.00	ECUADORIAN SOCIALIST
51.00	IRISH FIANNA FAIL	371.00	PERUVIAN UNC
52.00	IRISH FINE GAEL	372.00	PERUVIAN CHRIST DEM
53.00	IRISH LABOUR	373.00	PERUVIAN APRA
81.00	INDIAN CONGRESS	374.00	PERUVIAN POPU ACTION
82.00	INDIAN COMMUNIST	375.00	PERUVIAN MDP
101.00	AUSTRIAN PEOPLES	381.00	URUGUAYAN COLCRADOS
102.00	AUSTRIAN SOCIALIST	382.00	URUGUAYAN BLANCOS
103.00	AUSTRIAN VDU-FPO	391.00	VENEZUELAN URD
111.00	FRENCH MRP	392.00	VENEZUELAN COPEI
112.00	FRENCH RADICAL SOC.	393.00	VENEZUELAN AD
113.00	FRENCH SFIC	442.00	GUATEMALAN CHRIS DEM
114.00	FRENCH GAULLIST	443.00	GUATEMALAN PR
115.00	FRENCH COMMUNIST	444.00	GUATEMALAN PRDN
121.00	W. GERMAN CDU	472.00	NICARAGUAN PCN
122.00	W. GERMAN SPD	502.00	BURMESE STABLE AFPFL
123.00	W. GERMAN FDP	503.00	BURMESE CLEAN SFPFL
141.00	GREEK LIBERAL	533.00	INDONESIAN PKI
142.00	GREEK EPEK	581.00	MALAYAN UMNO
143.00	GREEK RALLY-ERE	582.00	MALAYAN MCA
145.00	GREEK EDA	583.00	MALAYAN MIC
201.00	DANISH SOCIAL DEMOCR	584.00	MALAYAN PMIC
202.00	DANISH VENSTRE	761.00	LEBANESE PRG SOCIAL
203.00	DANISH CONSERVATIVE	762.00	LEBANESE CONSTITNLST
204.00	DANISH RAD VENSTRE	764.00	LEBANESE KATA*EB
221.00	ICELAND INDEPENDENCE	765.00	LEBANESE NATIONAL BL
222.00	ICELAND PROGRESSIVE	771.00	IRANIAN PEOPLES
223.00	ICELAND PEOPLES UN.	772.00	IRANIAN NATIONAL
224.00	ICELAND SOCIAL DEM.	774.00	IRANIAN NUF
241.00	SWEDISH SOCIAL DEM	781.00	TURKISH REPUBLICAN
242.00	SWEDISH CENTER	803.00	DAHOMEAN UDD
243.00	SWEDISH LIBERAL	893.00	TOGGOLESE DEM. UNION
244.00	SWEDISH CONSERVATIVE	922.00	CHADIAN SOCIAL ACT.
261.00	DUTCH CATH PEOPLES	932.00	CONGO-BRAZZ MSA
262.00	DUTCH LABOR	961.00	KENYA AF. NAT. UNION
263.00	DUTCH LIBERAL	962.00	KENYA AF. DEM. UNION
264.00	DUTCH ARP	981.00	UGANDA PEOPLES CONG.
265.00	DUTCH CHU	982.00	UGANDA DEMOCRATIC

APPENDIX A: (Continued)

Party Code	Party Name
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Non-Competitive Parties

71.00	RHODESIAN UNITED FED
72.00	RHODESIAN DOMINION
73.00	RHODESIAN ANC
74.00	MALAWI CONGRESS
171.00	PORT. NATIONAL UNION
355.00	ECUADORIAN CFP
361.00	PARAGUAYAN COLORADOS
362.00	PARAGUAYAN FEBRERIST
363.00	PARAGUAYAN LIBERAL
414.00	CUBAN PSP-COMMUNIST
421.00	DOMINICAN PARTY
431.00	SALVADOREAN PRUD
432.00	SALVADOREAN PAR
441.00	GUATEMALAN MDN
447.00	GUATEMALAN LABOR
471.00	NICARAGUAN PLN
473.00	NICARAGUAN PCT
504.00	BURMESE BWPP, NUF
511.00	CAMBODIAN SANGKUM
531.00	INDONESIAN PNI
532.00	INDONESIAN NU
534.00	INDONESIAN MASJUMI
561.00	N. KOREAN WORKERS
585.00	MALAYAN COMMUNIST
601.00	ALBANIAN LABOR
611.00	BULGARIAN COMMUNIST
612.00	BULGARIAN NAT UNION
631.00	E. GERMAN SED
632.00	E. GERMAN CDU
633.00	E. GERMAN LDP
634.00	E. GERMAN DBD
635.00	E. GER DEM PEASANTS
641.00	HUNGARIAN SOCIALIST
671.00	USSR CPSU
741.00	SUDANESE NUP
742.00	SUDANESE UMMA
743.00	SUDANESE SLP
751.00	TUNISIAN NEC-DESTOUR
773.00	IRANIAN TUDEH
782.00	TURKISH DEMOCRATIC
802.00	DAHOMEAN PRD-PND
804.00	DAHOMEAN RDD
811.00	GHANAIAI CPP
812.00	GHANAIAI UNITED
821.00	GUINEAN DEMOCRATIC
871.00	VOLTAIQUE DEM. UNION
891.00	TOGOLESE CUT
911.00	C.A.R. MESAN
921.00	CHADIAN PROGRESSIVE
931.00	CONGO-BRAZZ UDDIA
983.00	UGANDA KABAKA YEKKA

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