

VARIATIONS IN PARTY ORGANIZATION ACROSS NATIONS  
AND DIFFERENCES IN PARTY PERFORMANCE

by

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## ABSTRACT

### VARIATIONS IN PARTY ORGANIZATION ACROSS NATIONS AND DIFFERENCES IN PARTY PERFORMANCE

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A random sample of the world's parties is analyzed to determine the effect of party organization on party performance. Four dimensions of party organization were studied: complexity, centralization, involvement, and factionalism. These dimensions were related to three aspects of party performance: electoral success, breadth of activities, and legislative cohesion. The concepts and data came from the International Comparative Political Parties Project, which covered 158 parties operating in 53 countries from 1950 to 1962. To establish the theorized causal sequence, the parties' organization in 1950-56 was linked to their subsequent performance in 1957-62. Separate analyses were conducted for the entire set of parties and for only competitive parties in 28 democratic systems.

Almost 30 percent of the variance in electoral success among competitive parties could be attributed to differences in party complexity, centralization, and involvement. As theorized, more complex and less involved parties were higher in electoral success, and the relationship was stronger for competitive than non-competitive parties. Contrary to expectation, however, the more centralized parties also tended to be more successful.

Breadth of party activities (e.g., propagandizing and providing for members' welfare) was related to centralization within both sets of parties, but complexity and involvement had different explanatory roles among all parties as opposed to competitive parties. Complexity and centralization alone explained 40 percent of the variance among competitive parties, compared to 33 percent explained by centralization and involvement for all parties.

Theoretical expectations concerning legislative cohesion did not appear until the data set was further restricted to only competitive parties in systems with effective legislatures. Then, about half the variance in cohesion could be linked to high cohesion, high complexity, low involvement, and high leadership factionalism.

All three aspects of party performance were related to the four organizational dimensions through canonical analysis. Two significant correlations were produced, one ( $r=.88$ ) explaining variation in a "principled" party performance syndrome and the other ( $R=.55$ ) explaining a "winning" party syndrome.

The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the analysis for party reform. It argues that reformers ought to pay more attention to the effects of organizational factors on party performance, rather than treating organizational characteristics as end products of reform. In particular, they should consider more carefully the trade-offs between decentralization, as a value in its own right, and centralization, which predicts so consistently to various dimensions of party performance.

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What is the effect of party organization on party performance? This question has prompted several studies in the United States, where "strong" party organization usually was found to add from 5 to 20 percentage points to a party's vote. (Cutright and Rossi 1958, Katz and Eldersveld 1961, and Crotty 1971) Studies in other countries have also concluded that organizational activities have modest but important consequences for election outcomes. (Pimlott 1972 and 1973, Taylor 1974, and Miller 1975) While these studies confirm our common-sense expectations about the effects of party organization, they do so in an idiosyncratic manner which gives little attention to different dimensions of organization and no attention to alternative measures of party performance. This paper aims at contributing to our knowledge of the effect of party organization on party performance by analyzing a 50 percent sample of the world's parties to measure the effects of distinct organizational characteristics upon alternative conceptions of party performance.

The concepts and data employed in the analysis came from the International Comparative Political Parties Project, which covered 158 parties operating in 53 countries from 1950 to 1962. (See Janda, Comparative Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey, in press.) The project included not only electorally "competitive" parties but also "restrictive" and "subversive" parties (e.g., Somoza's Nicaraguan Liberal Party and the Iranian Communist Party). Insofar as possible, all parties were scored separately for two periods, 1950-56 and 1957-62, permitting time lags in causal analysis. The distribution of parties by area, country, and time period is given in Table 1. Attention will be given to the performance of all 147 parties in 1957-62 and to the subset of 95 competitive parties existing in 28 democratic countries (marked with asterisks in Table 1). Propositions concerning the effects of party organization on party performance should hold more strongly for this competitive subset. Separate analyses of all parties in the random sample of 53 countries and of only competitive parties in democratic countries will test this expectation and determine the generality of the findings. The measures employed in the analysis were all constructed from variables included in the ICPP Project and are contained in the data available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research.

TABLE 1: Coverage of the ICPP Project: Parties by Area, Country, and Time Period

Cultural-Geographical Area	Country	Parties per country	Parties by area	Number of parties in		Number of parties in both periods	
				1950-56	1957-62		
<u>Anglo-American:</u>	*United States	2	}	22	22	22	
	*United Kingdom	2					
	*Australia	3					
	*Canada	4					
	*New Zealand	2					
	*Ireland	3					
	Rhodesia/Nyasaland Fed.	4					
*India	2						
<u>West Central Europe:</u>	*Austria	3	}	16	16	16	
	*France	5					
	*West Germany	3					
	*Greece	4					
	Portugal	1					
<u>Scandinavia and Benelux:</u>	*Denmark	4	}	22	22	22	
	*Iceland	4					
	*Sweden	4					
	*The Netherlands	6					
	*Luxembourg	4					
<u>South America:</u>	*Ecuador	5	}	18	14	14	
	Paraguay	3					
	*Peru	5					
	*Uruguay	2					
	*Venezuela	3					
<u>Central America:</u>	Dominican Republic	1	}	17	12	7	
	El Salvador	2					
	*Guatemala	7					
	Nicaragua	3					
	Cuba	4					
<u>Asia and the Far East:</u>	*Burma	4	}	16	13	14	
	Cambodia	2					
	Indonesia	4					
	North Korea	1					
	*Malaya	5					
<u>Eastern Europe:</u>	Albania	1	}	10	10	10	
	Bulgaria	2					
	East Germany	5					
	Hungary	1					
	USSR	1					
<u>Middle East and North Africa:</u>	Sudan	3	}	14	12	14	
	Tunisia	1					
	*Lebanon	4					
	Iran	4					
	*Turkey	2					
<u>West Africa:</u>	*Dahomey	3	}	13	10	9	
	Ghana	4					
	Guinea	1					
	Upper Volta	1					
	Togo	4					
<u>Central and East Africa:</u>	Central African Republic	1	}	10	4	10	
	Chad	2					
	Congo-Brazzaville	2					
	*Kenya	2					
	*Uganda	3					
TOTALS				158	135	147	124

\*These countries were classified as having democratic or at least "competitive" political systems during 1957-62.

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 Table 1  
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### Measuring Party Performance

Notwithstanding the natural tendency to judge party performance by criteria of electoral success (especially in the United States, see Wright 1971: 517 and Sorauf 1963: 44), other benchmarks for evaluating performance deserve to be considered. Among these are the party's success in shaping governmental policy, its ability to command cohesive behavior from party activists, and the extent and breadth of the party's activities in promoting its message and attending to the needs of its members. All of these conceptions of performance present difficulties in measurement. This is especially true of the party's success in shaping public policy, which is too complex to conceptualize and study in this paper. The other aspects mentioned, however, are feasible to research with available data. Our study will therefore focus on assessing the party's electoral success, the breadth of its activities, and its cohesion. Party performance along each dimension will be assessed with reference to data from the ICPP Project. To promote understanding of our research procedures through illustration, the discussion of each measure will conclude by citing the scores assigned to the major parties in the United States and the United Kingdom for 1957-62.

Electoral success: What is the best measure of party success? The ultimate objective of political parties is, of course, control of the government, which is referenced by the ICPP variable, "Governmental Leadership"--the proportion of time from 1957 through 1962 that a party representative held the position of head of government. In parliamentary systems, which account for 25 countries and 84 parties in the study, governmental leadership is a function of the party's success in winning parliamentary seats, referenced by the variable, "Legislative Strength"--the average proportion of seats the party held during 1957-62. The party's legislative strength is in turn a function of votes won in legislative elections, referenced by "Electoral Strength"--the average proportion of votes won in elections during 1957-62. The means for these three measures of electoral success and their intercorrelations are reported in Table 2.

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 Table 2  
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Table 2 reveals that the average party in the entire sample enjoyed governmental leadership about one-third of the time, held about 30 percent of the seats, and won about 30 percent of the votes. Eliminating non-democratic countries from the analysis, we find the average competitive party also leading the government nearly 30 percent of the time and winning about one-quarter of the seats and votes. But these are only averages; the standard deviations imply the existence of wide variations in governmental leadership compared to legislative and electoral strength. The correlations between votes, seats, and governmental leadership support the assumption of a causal chain running from votes to seats and then from seats to leadership.

TABLE 2: Measures of Electoral Success for IGPP Parties, 1958-62

<u>Intercorrelations among the Measures</u>					
	Number <sup>a</sup>	Mean	S.D.		
				Governmental Leadership	
				Legislative Strength	
<u>All parties:</u>					
Governmental Leadership	147	.32	.42		
Legislative Strength	146	.30	.28	.84	
Electoral Strength	109	.30	.20	.70	.87
<u>Competitive parties:</u>					
Governmental Leadership	95	.29	.39		
Legislative Strength	95	.25	.18	.81	
Electoral Strength	92	.27	.16	.64	.81

<sup>a</sup>The number of parties scored for performance in 1957-62 may fall below the maximums of 147 for the entire sample and 95 for competitive parties in democratic systems due to missing data.

with the lowest correlation between votes and leadership. Even though the correlations are somewhat weaker for competitive parties, which operate in a less deterministic environment, these findings justify the emphasis given in the literature on votes won as a measure of party performance, and we will therefore focus on this variable as our indicator of electoral success. By way of illustration, we scored the Democratic and Republican parties in the United States .54 and .45 respectively on votes won in congressional elections from 1957 to 1962, while the Conservative and Labour parties in the United Kingdom were computed as winning .49 and .44 of the vote in elections to parliament during the same period.

Unfortunately, our search for a measure of party success cannot stop with the selection of the ICPP variable, "Electoral Strength." The number of parties in the system is strongly and negatively related to raw electoral strength ( $r = -.55$ ), reflecting the obvious fact that it is easier to win 40 percent of the vote in a two-party system than in a three-party system. In general, the more parties in the system, the lower the proportion of vote needed to be "successful." Because electoral success is a relative matter, depending on the system, we adjust for system differences by expressing votes won by each party as deviations from the average won by all parties we studied in that country. Thus, parties which won more votes than average (e.g., the Democrats and Conservatives), obtained positive deviations and those which deviated below the mean received negative scores. This adjustment resulted in a relative measure of electoral strength which averaged to 0 over parties in a system and also over all parties in the sample. This adjusted measure will serve in our later assessment of party success.

Breadth of activities: A distinction can be drawn between party activities and the functions of parties for society. Activities are what parties actually do while functions are what scholars see as the social consequences of those activities (see Scarrow 1967). Scholars agree that parties perform numerous functions in addition to providing for leadership change through contesting elections. Presumably, the greater the variety of activities that parties perform, the more multi-functional they appear. At a point, however, activities and functions blur together, as in the list of eleven functions attributed to American parties by Scott and Hrebener (1979:2). The concept of breadth of party activities in the parties project is concerned more with what parties actually do than with the imputed consequences of their actions. It is measured by the sum of party scores on two distinct factor-analytic dimensions: (a) propagandizing ideas and programs and (b) providing for members' welfare ( $r = .51$  between the factor-scales). The "propagandizing" factor contained four indicators: (1) passing resolutions and platforms, (2) publishing position papers, (3) operating party schools, and (4) operating mass communications media. The "welfare" factor contained five: (1) providing food, clothing, shelter to members from party resources, (2) running employment services, (3) interceding with government on members' behalf, (4) providing basic education in addition to political education, and (5) providing recreational facilities or services.

Due mainly to the lack of information on the "welfare" indicators, only 77 parties could be scored for the breadth of their activities. The mean score was .11, far above the Democrats' -.47 and

the Republicans"  $-.67$ . The British parties scored somewhat higher than the American parties,  $-.24$  for both the Conservative and Labour parties.

Cohesion: In a "proper" party, party members are expected to carry out party policy, especially in voting on issues in the legislature, where a highly cohesive party would be expected to demonstrate unanimity in voting behavior among its members. Blondel even cites "unity" as one of the four requirements of an ideal party (1978: 138), and Ozbudun contends, "The more cohesive a party is, the greater is its role as a policy-making agent" (1970: 303). The concept of Legislative Cohesion in the ICPP Project was operationalized by computing (or estimating) the Rice Index of Cohesion for samples of party votes on issues before the legislature. It proved very difficult to obtain the data for computing the index of legislative cohesion, and we usually resorted to estimating the index from impressionistic judgments of the party's cohesiveness. Even so, we were only able to score 95 of the 147 parties in 1957-62 on their legislative cohesion, and one must expect a substantial component of random measurement error in this measure of party performance.

The mean level of legislative cohesion for all 95 parties was  $.85$ . The Democrats and Republicans averaged  $.63$  and  $.65$  respectively on voting in the House of Representatives during this period, while the Conservatives and Labour parties displayed virtually complete cohesion ( $1.0$ ).

### Measuring Party Organization

The conceptual framework of the ICPP Project embraced ten major concepts for comparing political parties, distinguishing between concepts pertaining to the party's "internal organization" and those describing its "external relations." Our dimensionalization of party organization will focus on the four ICPP concepts: complexity, centralization, involvement, and coherence (re-conceptualized for our purposes as "factionalism").

Complexity: Termed initially as the "degree of organization," this concept pertained to the complexity of regularized procedures for coordinating the efforts of party supporters in executing the party's strategy and tactics. "Complexity" alone seems a better term and will be used throughout this paper. Note that this conceptual definition, unlike the idea of "strong" party organization in the literature, refers to structural differentiation rather than the location of authority, which is the subject of the next concept. We measured complexity with six indicators:

- Structural Articulation
- Intensiveness of Organization
- Extensiveness of Organization
- Frequency of Local Meetings
- Maintaining Records
- Pervasiveness of Organization

Each of these items was measured on a multi-point continuum. Factor analysis of the items showed that a single factor accounted for 52 percent of their variance. After standardization into z-scores, the items were summed to form a scale with reliability of  $.82$  as measured



by Cronbach's alpha. The mean level of complexity for 132 parties scored in 1950-56 was  $-.11$ . The Democrats at  $.14$  and the Republicans at  $.01$  were slightly above average on complexity of organization, but they were substantially below the Conservative score of  $.51$  and the Labour score of  $.42$ .

**Centralization:** This term stands for the ICPP concept, centralization of power, which was viewed in terms of the location and distribution of effective decision making authority within the party. A centralized party is one which features the concentration of effective decision making authority in the national party organs, with a premium placed on a smaller number of individuals participating in the decision. We sought to tap the locus of power within a party with eight indicators:

- Nationalization of Structure
- Selecting the National Leader
- Selecting Parliamentary Candidates
- Allocating Funds
- Formulating Policy
- Controlling Communications
- Administering Discipline
- Leadership Concentration

These items were also scored on a multi-point continuum, factor analyzed, and combined into a composite scale with reliability of  $.83$ . The mean centralization score for 132 parties in 1950-56 was  $-.02$ . The Democrats and Republicans were among the least centralized parties in the world, scoring  $-1.48$  and  $-1.41$  respectively, placing them far below the Conservative score of  $.41$  and the Labour score of  $.21$ .

**Involvement:** Under the concept "involvement," the ICPP framework assessed the extent to which party activists were psychologically committed to the party and participated to further the party's objectives. This concept was indicated with five items:

- Membership Requirements
- Membership Participation
- Material Incentives
- Purposive Incentives
- Doctrinism

These items were also factor analyzed and subjected to the same procedures for scale construction, resulting in an Involvement scale with a reliability of  $.78$ . The mean was  $-.03$  for 132 parties in 1950-56. As expected, low levels of involvement in furthering party objectives accompanied participation in the Democratic and Republican parties, each rating only  $-.77$ . Participation in the Conservative and Labour parties, on the other hand, brought higher levels of involvement ( $-.20$  and  $.20$ ), with greater involvement shown within the Labour party.

**Factionalism:** The ICPP conceptual framework contained the concept of "coherence," which was defined as the degree of congruence in the attitudes and behavior among party members. One of the five indicators of coherence was "Legislative Cohesion," which we earlier identified as a measure of performance. The other four items measured different types of factionalism:

- |                          |                   |
|--------------------------|-------------------|
| Ideological Factionalism | (mean 2.3, N=129) |
| Issue Factionalism       | (mean 1.9, N=116) |
| Leadership Factionalism  | (mean 2.0, N=139) |

### Strategic/Tactical Factionalism (mean 2.1, N=116)

Each type of factionalism was scored on a 7-point continuum ranging from 0 (the basis of division was not subject to debate or disagreement among party leaders) to 6 (the matter created a "large" faction within the party with some formal organization of its own or provoked a split after the beginning of the period). The mean scores for the numbers of parties scored in 1957-62 are given above in parentheses. As for factionalism along these dimensions in the U.S., suffice it say that the Democrats were scored higher for ideological and issue factionalism, while Republicans were more factionalized on leadership and strategy. In the U.K., the Labour Party was rated as more factionalized than the Conservative Party on every indicator.

Factionalism is certainly an aspect of party organization, but it differs from complexity, centralization, and involvement--the other concepts in the study--in its "involuntary" nature. Parties presumably determine the appropriate level of complexity, centralization, and involvement given their goals and environment. They do not ordinarily settle upon an appropriate amount of factionalism, which occurs in spite of organizational intentions rather than because of them. For those who are interested in manipulating organizational characteristics to improve party performance, the intractability of factionalism may make it an uninteresting variable. Because this paper has implications for such party engineering, the concept of factionalism will be employed only sparingly--only when factionalism is really needed to account for performance.

### Explaining Electoral Success

Any theoretically complete explanation of party success in winning votes must involve such critical factors as the parties' positions on issues, the voters' attitudes toward party policies, the state of the economy, and the parties' traditional bases of social support. Our analysis will include none of these factors. It seeks to account for the success of parties in elections solely on the basis of three organizational characteristics: complexity, centralization, and involvement. Therefore we begin our task knowing that our explanation will most certainly be incomplete. Our goal is not to provide a complete explanation of electoral success but rather to determine what proportion of its variance can be attributed to organizational factors alone and whether the attributions of effects make theoretical sense.

The theory that guides our inquiry is not rigorously developed and comes from several sources. The effect of complexity on electoral success is treated in the empirical research literature cited above. In studying party organizational activities in getting out the vote, that research was concerned closely with what we have called "organizational complexity." This yields our first proposition: the greater the complexity, the greater the electoral success.

The literature is not so clear in the prediction offered for the effect of party centralization on electoral success. Some major non-quantitative studies theorize that centralized parties tend to be more successful in mobilizing voters. Certainly this was important to Duverger's explanation of the superiority of "modern" mass-membership organizations adopted by leftist parties over the loose caucus-type

organizations of older, more conservative parties, which had to re-organize to meet the challenge from the left (1963: 25). While Epstein argues that recent technological developments have brought contagion from the right, the counter-organizational tendencies he sees in the "new" modern party reject only the complexity or mass-membership aspect of leftist organization, not centralization of power. Indeed, Epstein believes that the small membership and less complex parties "made it easier to impose a central and an efficient direction of campaigns by professionals" (1967: 258). On the other hand, some scholars stress the advantages to electioneering of the decentralization of power, which enables parties to capitalize on local environmental conditions. (Huckshorn 1976: 265) This argument appears in Agranoff's analysis of the "new style" in election campaigns (1972: 113) and is echoed in many recent explanations of the "decline of party organizations." (Fishel 1978: xxii, Feigert and Conway 1976: 392) The research hypothesis which guided this inquiry was influenced by this alternative theory, giving rise to the proposition: the less the centralization, the greater the electoral success.

Although the ICPP concept of "involvement" is not used as such in the party literature (but see Etzioni, 1975: 8-9), similar ideas are contained in the folklore that "pragmatic" parties are more successful in elections than "ideological" parties, which are reluctant to bend principles to win votes. This belief was expressed in American politics by many Republicans who opposed emphasizing the party's right-wing ideology with the nomination of Goldwater in 1964 and again by many Democrats who opposed stressing the party's left-wing ideology by nominating McGovern in 1972. For both groups, the folklore was vindicated. The abandonment of involvement in return for electoral rewards was treated specifically by Kirchheimer, who discussed the development of the "catch-all" party which sought to collect votes from socially diverse groups by shaping party policies to fit their interests (1966: 190). When cast into ICPP terminology, the relevant proposition becomes, the less the involvement, the greater the party success.

Before conducting the analysis to test these propositions, closer consideration must be given to the matter of causality. Even if the variables correlate as expected, do high complexity, low centralization, and low involvement cause electoral success, or do successful parties develop more complex organizations, become more decentralized through expansion, and sacrifice the psychological involvement of their members? Clearly, one suspects a feedback element in the relationship. The problem of reciprocal causation will be handled in this analysis by relating the levels of party complexity, centralization, and involvement as scored for 1950-56 to the average party success in 1957-62. This design does not distinguish between cause and effect as finely as one would like, but it does impose the causal sequence through brute force, offering some protection against the main rival hypothesis. /1/

The data in Table 3 demonstrate that variations in party organization do indeed affect electoral success. More than one-quarter of the variance among 88 parties within all countries can be attributed to differences in complexity, centralization, and involvement. As expected, somewhat more variance in relative success

(almost 30 percent) among 75 competitive parties in democratic countries could be explained by these variables. However, the effects are not entirely as hypothesized. While complexity and involvement are related to success as predicted, centralization has a positive effect on success, which supports traditional arguments for the value of centralization in elections over the new conventional wisdom favoring the campaign flexibility of decentralization. Note, moreover, that each of the organizational factors demonstrated a stronger direct effect on electoral strength when the other two were held constant in the regression analysis than the factor did in the simple correlation analysis. This is true even for complexity and involvement, which are strong and positively intercorrelated (about .5) but predict to electoral success in opposite directions!

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Table 3  
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In sum, the manner in which parties are organized does predict to party performance at the polls. Involvement of party members in the broader purposes of the party has a strongly negative effect on electoral success, meaning that "pragmatic" parties do indeed win more votes. Of somewhat lesser importance than members' opportunism in electoral success is organizational complexity, but it is clear that well organized (i.e., "more complex") parties also do better in elections. Although centralization does not have nearly as strong an effect on electoral success as complexity, its effect is positive rather than negative, which directly contradicts arguments for party decentralization as a source of electoral strength.

These findings raise some questions about alternative forms of party performance. For example, do parties with greater involvement of their members do better on other aspects of performance? Do such parties spend their members' energies in activities beyond electioneering? We turn to the concept of "breadth of activities" for an answer.

### Explaining Breadth of Activities

What factors are likely to be involved in a "complete" explanation of party efforts in propagandizing their ideas and programs and providing for members' welfare? Among the more important would be the type and intensity of the party ideology, the economic condition of the party's supporters, the nature of the competition the party faced from other parties in the system, and the social welfare role assumed by the government itself. By attempting to explain parties' reliance on propaganda and welfare activities using only organizational variables, we are again dealing with only a subset of those which are theoretically important. As before, we seek only to determine what proportion of the variance in breadth of party activities can be attributed to organizational characteristics in theoretically sensible ways.

The basic theory underlying this analysis has been expressed in different terms by several authors. Duverger wrote of variations in the "nature" of participation within parties, some of which were

TABLE 3: Explaining Electoral Success in 1957-62 with Organizational Variables in 1950-56

Organizational Variables	Mean	S.D.	Intercorrelations with			Regression Analysis		
			Complexity	Centraliz.	Votes	Standardized Coefficients	Levels of Sig.	R <sup>2</sup>
<u>All parties, N=88</u>								
Complexity	-.04	.74			.16	.46	.000	} .27
Centralization	-.15	.68	-.11		.17	.24	.011	
Involvement	-.02	.69	.51	.05	-.29	-.54	.000	
<u>Competitive parties, N=75</u>								
Complexity	.02	.72			.16	.45	.000	} .29
Centralization	-.17	.64	-.09		.11	.23	.030	
Involvement	.04	.66	.46	.13	-.34	-.57	.000	

"communities" or even "orders" instead of mere "associations" (1963: 124). Neumann distinguished between the parties of "individual representation" and those of "social integration," which take over a good part of their members' social existence (1956: 404-405). More recently, Blondel contrasted "representative" and "mobilizing" parties (1978: 22). All of these authors separate parties which are exclusively vehicles for electing candidates to government office from those which do not confine their activities to election campaigns but conduct contiguous campaigns of political education and attend to the social needs of their supporters. The general argument is that the broader the scope of party activities, the greater the need for "strong" party organization. Moreover, the broader the scope of party activities, the more involved the members in party life.

Note that the argument as put identifies the scope of party activities as the causal variable. Organizational complexity, centralization, and involvement result from broad activities rather than cause them. On the other hand, it can be argued that the intent to disseminate party propaganda and to provide social benefits to party members cannot be discharged without the organizational requisites. From this perspective, limitations on organizational complexity, centralization, and involvement constitute limits to the breadth of party activities. According to this view, it makes sense to reverse the causal arrow and speak of organizational effects on party activities. Our analysis of these effects will again seek to impose the causal ordering by relating organizational characteristics in 1950-56 to party activities in 1957-62. Translated into concepts in the ICPP Project, the proposition to be tested is the greater the complexity, centralization, and involvement, the broader the scope of party activities.

The data reported in Table 4 for 69 parties of all types and 44 competitive parties generally support the proposition in that complexity, centralization, and involvement all display simple correlations with breadth of activities of approximately .40. But when the variables are entered into regression analysis in a stepwise fashion, only two variables are needed to explain 33 percent of the variance in activities among all parties and about 40 percent among competitive parties. Unfortunately, the two variables are not the same in both analyses. While centralization is about as strong in each, complexity is more important for competitive parties and involvement is dominant among all parties in general.

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Table 4  
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Perhaps this is just a manifestation of collinearity between complexity and involvement, although the correlations in the two analyses (.59 and .39) do not seem high enough to certify that conclusion. An alternative explanation is that the shifting results are artifacts of measurement owing mainly to our inability to score more parties on breadth of activities plus the characteristics of those which were scored. /2/ At least as we have measured the parties, however, it seems that organizational complexity, centralization, and involvement do predict to the breadth of party activities, with complexity and centralization alone accounting for two-fifths of the

TABLE 4: Explaining Breadth of Activities in 1957-62 with Organizational Variables in 1950-56

Organizational Variables	Intercorrelations with					Regression Analysis		
	Mean	S.D.	Complexity	Centraliz.	<del>Notes</del>	Standardized Coefficients	Levels of Sig.	R <sup>2</sup>
<u>Breadth</u>								
<u>All parties, N=69</u>								
Complexity	.21	.62			.37	--	n.s.	.33
Centralization	-.10	.68	.17		.49	.41	.000	
Involvement	.08	.67	.59	.25	.42	.31	.004	
<u>Competitive parties, N=44</u>								
Complexity	.25	.55			.46	.42	.001	.39
Centralization	-.33	.61	.15		.48	.40	.002	
Involvement	.08	.57	.39	.41	.44	--	n.s.	

variance among competitive parties.

### Explaining Legislative Cohesion

What accounts for variations among parties in legislative cohesion? Again, there are many possible system-level and party-level causes. Ozbudun, who studied this topic intensively, concluded, "The pattern of relationships between the executive and legislative authorities are even more closely related to the cohesion of legislative parties than are the social, cultural, and organizational factors." (1970: 380). Kornberg's comparison of party cohesion in the U.S. and Canada (1966) also attributes fundamental importance to the legislative structure, confirming Ozbudun's contention that parliamentary systems elicit more cohesive behavior than presidential systems. In view of the theoretical importance of this factor, the parliamentary nature of the system within which the parties operate will be included as an environmental variable supplementing our organizational factors. Among such factors thought to be important for explaining legislative cohesion, Ozbudun cites "strong party organization" (our "complexity"), "central control" of discipline and nominations (our "centralization"), and the party's "social integrationist character" (our involvement). (Ozbudun, 1970: 325, 339, and 340)

Up to now, we have ignored factionalism for its effects on party performance. /3/ Factionalism, however, has often been cited as a cause of low party cohesion within the Democratic Party in the U.S., and studies in other countries have explained lack of party discipline by high factionalism. (MacRae 1967: 41-55, Belloni 1978: 101-103, and Aronoff 1978: 136) Factionalism, in Ozbudun's analysis, was treated as cohesion at a different "level" in the extraparliamentary party (pp.305-310). But surely factionalism can also be regarded as a causal agent. The basic theory, therefore, is that party cohesion in legislative voting is a positive function of one environmental variable, parliamentarism, and three organizational variables: complexity, centralization, and involvement. Only factionalism is expected to predict negatively to cohesion. Because these factors are unlikely to be themselves consequences of party cohesion, we can correlate the parties' organizational characteristics in 1957-62 with their performance the same year in testing the theory.

The data reported in Table 5 reveal that the basic theory is supported but it holds only when yet another variable is controlled. Moreover, there is an important departure from theoretical expectations about the effect of one variable. If we proceed as before, looking at the results for all parties and the subset of competitive parties in democratic countries (Ns= 93 and 69 for this analysis), we find that the theory is only partly and unimpressively confirmed. While all the bivariate correlations with party cohesion are in the predicted direction, many are quite low. When the variables are joined in multivariate analysis, only two variables achieve significance at the .05 level, but this time they are the same for both sets of parties. Parliamentarism is positively related to cohesion, and leadership factionalism, selected as the best predictor among the factionalism indicators, /4/ is negative related. Although cohesion in competitive parties is explained somewhat better by these



two variables than cohesion in all parties, the percentage explained is disappointing. Moreover, centralization, complexity, and involvement are inexplicably absent as causes of cohesion within the competitive parties subset, where organizational effects were expected to be shown most strongly.

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 Table 5  
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On reflection, one realizes that the theory was really expected to hold most strongly among parties in countries with effective legislatures--whether parliamentary or presidential. When the analysis was performed only for those parties, eliminating 16 parties in Third world countries, all the expectations but one appeared, and the percentage of variance increased to almost half of the total, which is remarkable given the substantial random error suspected in our measure of cohesion. The expectations about involvement, however, did not materialize. While involvement shows slight positive relationships to cohesion at the bivariate level, as hypothesized, its effect on cohesion is actually reversed once the other variables are taken into account. When one controls for the parliamentary system, complexity, centralization, and factionalism, high involvement actually depresses cohesion. Ex post facto explanations are suspect, of course, but it does make sense that parties which feature high levels of involvement in party purposes are more apt to encounter deviations in legislative voting from members who depart from the majority position on matters of principle as they perceive them. Cohesiveness, however, is a small price to pay for those who have little involvement in the party. Once again, this relationship holds only when all the other variables are controlled. Note finally that parliamentarism drops below the .05 level of significance when parties in countries without effective legislatures are excluded. This may be due to the reduction in its variance, as 91 percent of the remaining parties are in parliamentary systems, or due to parliamentarism acting on the organizational variables as a prior cause. (See Janda, 1978.)

### Explaining Party Performance

Up to now, we have been concerned with explaining variations in three separate dimensions of party performance. Can we provide a more comprehensive explanation which would involve all three aspects of party performance? If so, it would approximate scholars' efforts to "type" parties according to similar characteristics and behavioral syndromes. Wright, for example, distinguishes between the "rational-efficient" and "party democracy" models of behavior according to their functions, structural characteristics, party processes, and evaluative criteria. In brief, rational efficient parties focus on their electoral function, engage in limited activities, are motivated by material incentives, employ organization suited to situational requirements, lack formal membership, neglect the policy role of the party, and evaluate effectiveness solely according to electoral success. Those fitting the party democracy mold, on the other hand, pursue ideological and governing functions, engage in activities beyond campaigning, stress purposive incentives, feature extensive and integrated structures, require formal party

TABLE 5: Explaining Legislative Cohesion in 1957-62 with Parliamentary Structure and Organizational Variables in 1957-62

Janda

Organizational Variables	Mean	S.D.	Intercorrelations with						Regression Analysis			
			Parl. Comp.	Cent.	Invo.	Cohesion	Standardized Coefficients	Levels of Sig.	R <sup>2</sup>			
<b>All parties, N=93</b>												
Parliamentary System	.63	.48						.26	.008	} .17		
Complexity	.01	.71	.17					.19	n.s.			
Centralization	-.03	.68	-.27	-.07				.18	n.s.			
Involvement	-.06	.71	.34	.52	.02			.12	n.s.			
Leadership Factionalism	1.72	2.08	-.04	.02	-.27	-.07	-.32	-.31	.002			
<b>Competitive parties, N=69</b>												
Parliamentary System	.80	.41						.45	.000	} .36		
Complexity	.05	.69	.32					.26	n.s.			
Centralization	-.16	.63	-.03	-.13				.10	n.s.			
Involvement	.04	.68	.31	.46	.20			.19	n.s.			
Leadership Factionalism	1.70	1.99	-.11	.09	-.23	-.05	-.44	-.39	.000			
<b>Competitive parties and Effective legislatures, N=53</b>												
Parliamentary System	.91	.30						.38	.089	} .48		
Complexity	.22	.60	-.12					.22	.001			
Centralization	-.28	.59	.48	-.07				.35	.022			
Involvement	.10	.60	.27	.35	.42			.07	.040			
Leadership Factionalism	1.85	2.06	-.31	.09	-.18	-.03	-.51	-.43	.000			

membership, emphasize policy making, and judge their effectiveness in terms of policy results. (1971: 31-54, see also Wellhofer and Hennessey 1974) This "typological" tradition in parties research can be pursued if we can somehow relate organizational variations simultaneously to all three dimensions of performance--electoral success, breadth of activities, and legislative cohesion.

Canonical analysis provides a method for relating two sets of variables, such as our organizational and performance variables. Canonical analysis weights the variables on each side of the equation to produce two sets of composite scores calculated to maximize the simple product-moment correlation between them. The first canonical correlation can be interpreted as the maximum correlation that can be obtained through the best linear combinations of both sets of variables. The second correlation indicates the next best linear combination of the variables under the constraint that this pair of composite scores be uncorrelated with the first pair. The number of canonical correlations computed depends on the number of variables in the smaller of the two sets. Whether the first or any of the subsequent correlations are significant, of course, depends on the relationships within the data. (For a lucid discussion of canonical analysis, see Levine 1977.)

Our canonical analysis of organizational characteristics and party performance will be guided by the theory discussed above as validated and modified by the findings reported for competitive parties. While those results will aid considerably in interpreting the canonical analysis, they will also be the source of some unresolved confusion due to differences in the data sets imposed by requirements of the new technique. The need for complete data on all cases plus the selection of parties in countries with effective legislatures reduces the number of parties to 38, nearly all from "Western" countries. The need for consistency in variables requires that we rely only on organizational characteristics in 1950-56, instead of using the 1957-62 variables when explaining legislative cohesion. Finally, due to the faded significance of parliamentarism in predicting to cohesion once all the other variables were taken into account, that variable was excluded from the analysis.

These several changes in the data analyzed complicate comparisons between the canonical and multiple regression results, but most of the previous findings reappear in the canonical results in Table 6. The two significant canonical correlations reported there correspond to different and unrelated syndromes of party performance, which are labeled for purposes of discussion as the "principled" and the "winning" party syndromes. Each syndrome is marked by salient organizational and performance features, which are indicated by the magnitudes of the canonical variate coefficients. The paired composite scores created by multiplying the coefficients by the standardized variables were correlated, yielding two significant canonical correlations. We will offer an interpretation of each analysis in turn.

TABLE 6: Canonical Analysis of Organizational Characteristics in 1950-56 with Party Performance in 1957-62: 'Principled' and 'Winning' Party Syndromes


<u>Organizational Characteristics in 1950-56</u>			<u>Dimensions of Party Performance in 1957-62</u>			
Correlations with composite scores	Canonical Variate Coefficients		Canonical Variate Coefficients		Correlations with composite scores	
			<u>First Correlation:</u>		<u>'Principled' Party Syndrome</u>	
.23	Complexity .02	{ Composite scores for organiza. variables } $R = .83$ { Composite scores for perform. variables }				
.90	Centralization .65				-.31	Electoral Success -.06
.70	Involvement .37				.39	Breadth of Activities .60
-.58	Factionalism -.27				.82	Cohesion .75
			<u>Second Correlation:</u>		<u>'Winning' Party Syndrome</u>	
.66	Complexity 1.18	{ Composite scores for organiza. variables } $R = .55$ { Composite scores for perform. variables }				
.16	Centralization .44				.93	Electoral Success .98
-.16	Involvement -1.00				.23	Breadth of Activities .44
.22	Factionalism -.06				-.10	Cohesion .15

The first canonical correlation pertains to the "principled" party syndrome. It derives its name from the high coefficient (weight) given to legislative cohesion on the performance side, the substantial coefficient for breadth of activities, and the depressing effect of electoral success. The importance of cohesion in computing the composite score can also be seen in the simple correlations on the far right, which indicates that cohesion alone correlates .75 with the composite score. Although cohesion is the main indicator of "principled" parties, the other variables account for about half the variance in the composite score. The canonical correlation squared reveals that 69 percent of the variance in the performance composite can be predicted from the score composed from the organizational variables, of which centralization is the most important. In fact, centralization by itself correlates .90 with the organizational composite. Of virtually no importance in the analysis is complexity, a variable that figured in most of the analyses above. Moreover, involvement, which predicted negatively to cohesion alone, now predicts positively to the principled party syndrome, which is somewhat puzzling. The effect of involvement on party performance appears to vary considerably, depending on the control of other variables and the mix of performance indicators. It deserves closer scrutiny at a later time. A succinct verbal summary of the present canonical analysis results might be that highly centralized, moderately involved parties which are moderately low on factionalism will tend to be very highly cohesive, moderately broad in activities, and moderately unsuccessful.

This analysis can be illustrated by reference to Figure 1, which identifies and plots the composite organization and performance scores from the first canonical analysis for 38 parties. Note that the most "principled" parties in the figure, according to their performance in 1957-62, are the Indian and French Communist parties. At the other extreme, the least principled--in the sense of emphasizing high voting cohesion even at the expense of electoral success--were the Blanco and Colorado parties of Uruguay and the Democrats and Republicans of the U.S. /5/

-----  
Figure 1  
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The second canonical correlation corresponds to the "winning" party syndrome, which is named for the dominant influence of electoral success on the composite performance score. In fact, electoral success by itself is nearly a perfect indicator ( $r=.98$ ) of the composite score. It should be made clear that this composite score is completely unrelated ( $r=.0$ ) to the "principled" party syndrome. The "winning" syndrome constitutes a second solution to the problem of maximizing the correlations between the two sets of variables. The canonical correlation of .55, however, indicates that this solution explains only 31 percent of the inherent variation. Nevertheless, we see that a "winning" performance for these parties is related mainly to high complexity and low involvement, with centralization exhibiting a moderate positive effect--just as in the earlier analysis. Factionalism, which was omitted previously, has virtually no effect here. A quick verbal summary of these results might be that very complex, centralized, and very uninvolved parties tend to be very



successful, somewhat broad, and moderately low in cohesion.

The plot for all 38 parties in Figure 2 illustrates the second analysis of party performance in 1957-62. The highest performers on the "winning" syndrome were the German Christian Democrats, the Swedish Social Democrats, and the Austrian People's Party. The lowest performers were the Swedish Conservative and People's parties. The Democrats and Republicans placed in the center with the British Labour Party, and all were decidedly below the British Conservative Party--although the Conservatives fell below the "winning" performance expected by their complex, centralized, and uninvolved organization.

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Figure 2  
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### Implications for Party Reform in the U.S.

This abstract analysis of organizational effects on party performance across nations may prove interesting to students of comparative politics, but does it have any implications for party reform in the United States? I think it does. In addition to drawing attention to alternative dimensions of party performance through explicit conceptualization and measurement, it indicates that variations in organization do affect different dimensions of party performance, and efforts directed at manipulating organization are certainly worthwhile. Secondly, it suggests that the available theory concerning organizational effects on party performance is largely confirmed by the data--but perhaps not entirely. If "decentralization" is pursued for its presumed contribution to electoral success, the pursuit is misguided, for the evidence in the regression and canonical analyses consistently shows that centralization of power in party organizations is positively related to electoral success. Thirdly, the study shows that centralization is also an important predictor of other dimensions of performance: breadth of activities and legislative cohesion. These findings become significant, I believe, in view of the tendency among many to value decentralization of power as the prime objective in American party reform (see Janda, forthcoming). Without reverting to the other extreme and seeking to maximize centralization in restructuring our parties, those interested in reshaping them as organizational forces for making of public policy should remove "centralization" from the dirty word list and ponder the effects of this organizational characteristic on party performance.

American parties are decentralized to an extreme, even to a fault. When carefully assessed on a variety of indicators, they scored below all other "Western" parties on the ICPP concept, centralization of power--easily fulfilling their description in the parties literature for the 1950s and 1960s. But are our parties still structured such that "decentralization" is their "primary characteristic" (Keefe 1976: 29)? Party reforms, state statutes, and court decisions in the 1970s have had a profound impact on party organization and activities (see Longley 1976 and Ranney 1978). However, these changes have not all pushed in the same direction, and the net effect is perhaps to increase the legal and potential

'WINNING' PARTY SYNDROME




FIGURE 2: Plot of Composite Scores from the Second Canonical Analysis



supremacy of the national party organization rather than to result in an operational increase in the centralization of power at the national level. As Ranney observes, although "the national party organs' power to make rules governing presidential nominating processes" is at a peak in this century, the new rules "have all but destroyed the power of national and state party leaders to control the nominating game played under those rules" (1978: 230).

Extreme decentralization fits nicely with pluralist politics as practiced in the United States during our era of economic growth. Current conditions of scarcity require greater coherence in governmental policies than provided by helter-skelter pluralist politics, with private interests obtaining special advantages in public policies. In such a system, decentralized parties seek mainly to stay out of policy fights, keeping their clothes clean for elections. This leaves policy-making to ever-shifting, mind-boggling coalitions of individuals and interests. Because our political parties, as organizations, rarely adopt and support firm policy positions, they can plead innocence for policy failures with perverse justification.

Why value party organization at all? Wilson, a noted student of political organization, argues that organization "provides continuity and predictability to social processes that would otherwise be episodic and uncertain" (1973: 7). Continuity and predictability in turn are necessary for achieving political effectiveness and accountability. The evidence from our cross-national analysis of political parties confirms the predictions of party theory that centralization promotes legislative cohesion, and cohesion--as Ozbudun reminded us--promotes the party's role as a policy-making agent. Even if one grants the argument in favor of a greater policy-making role for American parties via greater centralization and legislative cohesion, what can be done to increase party centralization in view of the suspected (Keefe 1976: 1) and demonstrated (Harmel 1978) influence of environmental factors on party centralization? Must we undertake the questionable and impossible task of switching from a presidential to a parliamentary form of government?

Environmental reforms need not be so drastic to have measureable effects on party organization. One potentially powerful change, which falls clearly under the heading of political "reform," lies in the area of campaigning financing. If the national committees, rather than the candidates, were the recipients and thus allocators of campaign funds (my fourth indicator of centralization of power), there would be a definite increase in party centralization. Unlike reconstituting Congress into Parliament, this environmental change seems practical from the standpoint of party engineering. The political barriers, on the other hand, seem far more formidable in view of the short shrift given within Congress to such proposals in the past (see Jacobson, forthcoming). But unlike the wholesale restructuring of our government, the barrier to funding the national committees is a political hurdle which can be measured and presumably cleared. It does not seem, therefore, that more centralized parties are beyond our grasp. They are merely beyond our understanding, which this paper hopes to improve.

FOOTNOTES

\*I wish to thank William Crotty, Carole Uhlaner, and Alex Hicks for their helpful comments on this paper.

1. Separating cause from effect through time lags depends in part on the magnitude of the correlations between the same variable at two time points. One would expect organizational characteristics to change more slowly than party fortunes, and this is in fact the case. Over all parties, the correlations between the same variables in 1950-56 and 1957-62 are as follows: complexity=.98, centralization=.94, involvement=.96, and electoral success=.67. However, for competitive parties only, the respective correlations are .99, .98, .98, and .88. These very high correlations warn that lagging the variables provides only a weak control for time sequencing, especially for the competitive parties subset.

2. Note that the standard deviations reported in Table 4 for the three organizational variables dropped about .07 to .10 points from the unrestricted set of 69 parties to the competitive group of 44 parties. Involvement, which had the lowest reliability of the three concepts to begin with and then suffered the greatest decrease in variance, may have been washed from the analysis due to the attenuation of correlation through enhancement of its random error component.

3. Incidentally, no factionalism indicator was a significant predictor to electoral success or legislative cohesion when added to the multiple regression equation in any of the analyses reported.

4. Only leadership and ideological factionalism were important among the factionalism indicators as predictors to legislative cohesion at the bivariate level. Of the two, leadership factionalism was more important, and it also retained significance in the multiple regression analysis, while ideological factionalism dropped out. It appears that leadership factionalism, when it appears, has a direct effect on legislative cohesion through the presence of parliamentary members as a source of voting cues. Ideological factionalism, on the other hand, may be buried deeper in the party and may not surface at the parliamentary level unless ideological and leadership factionalism coincide. Thus its effect on legislative cohesion appears to be more indirect. Issue and strategic factionalism most certainly have only small indirect effects.

5. Note that one party in Figure 1, the Dutch Christian Historical Union, is located far from the regression line. What can we learn about the analysis from this deviant case? Let us assume that the CHU was scored reasonably accurately on the organizational variables. We then ask, why should the CHU score the lowest on the "principled" party syndrome when its organizational characteristics should place it near the average of the other parties? Its placement seems to be due to its extremely low score of .40 for legislative cohesion. The discussion of this variable for the CHU in Comparative Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey says,

PARLIAMENTARY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHU ARE ALLOWED TO VOTE AS THEY WISH ON ANY ISSUE. AS A RESULT, IT IS NOT UNCOMMON

FOR THE PARTY'S PARLIAMENTARIANS TO SPLIT IN HALF, OR 60-40 ON ANY VOTE. THE PARTY DOES DISPLAY SOME COHESION ON BILLS WHICH DRAW CHU MEMBERS TOGETHER, SUCH AS THOSE PERTAINING TO RELIGION OR AN ISSUE BASIC TO CHU BELIEFS AND THE THEOLOGY OF THE DUTCH REFORMED CHURCH. THE "AVERAGE" SPLIT IN VOTE FOR THE CHU PROBABLY APPROXIMATES 70-30.

In view of the deviant placement of the CHU in Figure 1, I suspect that our scoring of the party on legislative cohesion was in error. If this is not the answer, perhaps students of Dutch politics can explain why the CHU deviates so much from the regression line in the canonical analysis.

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