

## MEASURING ISSUE ORIENTATIONS OF PARTIES ACROSS NATIONS

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This paper reports a preliminary analysis of data generated from the International Comparative Political Parties Project. The ICPP Project was established in 1967 to conduct the first comprehensive, empirically-based, comparative study of political parties throughout the world.<sup>1</sup> It covers some 150 political parties in 50 countries, constituting about a 50% random sample of party systems stratified equally according to ten cultural-geographical areas of the world. The time period chosen for study is 1950 through 1962. Data for the analysis comes from the thousands of pages produced on party politics in our fifty countries. While essentially a library research operation, the ICPP Project uses a variety of modern microfilm and computer information processing techniques in order to manage the vast amount of printed material relevant to the research. The information retrieval aspects of the project are discussed elsewhere.<sup>2</sup>

Work on the ICPP Project to date has postponed data collection and analysis in favor of (1) careful preparation of information files on which to base our coding judgments,<sup>3</sup> (2) special attention to controlling the quality of the data we generate,<sup>4</sup> and (3) explicit formulation of a detailed conceptual framework to guide data collection and analysis.<sup>5</sup> The process of scoring or "coding" parties on variables in our conceptual framework did not begin until the Fall of 1969, more than two years after the project was funded by the National Science Foundation and more than four years after a test of the research methodology was begun. As of the Spring, 1970, we are at various stages of coding for approximately half of our parties and expect coding to be completed by the Fall of 1970. The data reported in this paper comes from 26 political parties in twelve countries that we have coded so far according to "issue orientation."<sup>6</sup>

The concept of "issue orientation" is only one of eleven constituting the conceptual framework of the ICPP Project. Seven of these concepts can be conceived in terms of a party's "external relations" with society in general. They are (1) institutionalization, (2) governmental status, (3) social aggregation, (4) social articulation, (5) issue orientation, (6) goal orientation, and (7) autonomy. The remaining four concepts can be viewed as describing a party's "internal organization." They are (8) degree of organization, (9) centralization of power, (10) coherence, and (11) involvement. Each concept in the ICPP framework is represented by a "cluster" of 5 to 33 "basic" variables, which will be employed either in an "additive" or "multiplicative" approach to concept measurement.<sup>7</sup> The interested reader must necessarily be directed elsewhere for an explanation of all these concepts, the justification for their inclusion in cross-national analyses of political parties, and an elaboration of the basic variables that serve as different indicators of the concepts.<sup>8</sup> Our concern here is limited to the "issue orientation"

concept and the 13 basic variables selected as indicators of a party's issue orientation.

### The "Issue Orientation" Variable Cluster

Ever since Edmund Burke described a party as "a body of men united, for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest, upon some particular principle upon which they are all agreed,"<sup>9</sup> orientations toward political issues has been a major basis for classifying and analyzing political parties.<sup>10</sup> Occasionally, issue orientation is treated very broadly from the perspective of systems analysis, resulting in the classification of parties as "innovator" or "rejector,"<sup>11</sup> "pro-" or "anti-system,"<sup>12</sup> "territorial" or "center," "interest-specific" or "ideological,"<sup>13</sup> and "integrative" or "competitive."<sup>14</sup> More often, parties are categorized at a lower level of abstraction according to the general content of the issues or policies they favor. "Religious," "agrarian," and "labor" parties are such examples, but the most pervasive classification of issue orientation at this level is the "liberal/conservative" or "left/right" distinction, which frequents the literature and continues to be used despite criticism of irrelevancy for contemporary politics.<sup>15</sup> Finally, at the lowest level of abstraction, some parties--primarily minor ones--warrant classification as "single issue" parties.<sup>16</sup>

The approach to issue orientation followed by the ICPP Project is to work initially at the lowest level of abstraction, scoring parties on a series of 13 separate issues, and then to combine party scores on these issues for higher levels of abstraction--including certainly the traditional left/right typology. The issues, which were selected with concern for cross-national relevance, are listed below according to their position within the 5th variable cluster (issue orientation) in the ICPP conceptual framework:

- 5.01 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION
- 5.02 GOVERNMENT ROLE IN ECONOMIC PLANNING
- 5.03 DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH
- 5.04 ROLE OF THE STATE IN PROVIDING FOR SOCIAL WELFARE
- 5.05 SECULARIZATION OF SOCIETY
- 5.06 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO THE MILITARY
- 5.07 ALIGNMENT WITH EAST/WEST BLOCS
- 5.08 INDEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN CONTROL
- 5.09 SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION
- 5.10 NATIONAL INTEGRATION
- 5.11 EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE
- 5.12 PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS
- 5.13 INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES

The information base used in scoring parties on these issues comes from more than 60,000 pages of literature from over 3,500 documents on party politics in our fifty countries. Every page of text in this vast information file has been indexed with one or more three digit code numbers and photographed on 16 mm. microfilm in conjunction with corresponding code numbers, which have been rendered machine readable for automatic search and retrieval with Eastman Kodak's MIRACODE equipment. By searching one or more film magazines prepared for a given country (our files average 1,250 pages per country and usually can be contained on one magazine), we are able to retrieve for display only those pages that are

tagged with a specific party identification code and a code for "issue orientation." Thus, in several hours' research time for an average country, we are able to locate and review all the pages in our file that have been indexed as discussing a party's issue orientation. With the use of our specially prepared information base and the MIRACODE retrieval system, we are in a unique position to extract statements and findings from the parties literature that can be used in a systematic attempt to score parties in different countries on comparable issues. Before presenting the preliminary results of our research so far, it is in order to discuss some major problems in the comparative study of issue orientation.

### Problems in the Comparative Study of Issue Orientation

There are at least five difficult conceptual problems that complicate the comparative study of issue orientation. These problems deal with (1) selecting issues for analysis, (2) formulating a consistent framework for handling pro-con positions on issues, (3) deciding between an "absolutist" or "relativist" basis for scoring positions on issues, (4) distinguishing between issue consensus and practice. Each of these problems will be discussed in turn before presenting the conceptual and operational definitions prepared for the basic variables in this variable cluster.

1. Selecting issues for analysis: We might begin by conceiving of a hypothetical universe of all issues confronting political parties during our time period, 1950-1962. Limiting our attention to issues during this time period in itself imposes constraints on comparative analysis, for another time period might well produce a different universe of issues. But accepting this restriction, we can narrow the universe considerably by also requiring that the issues not be confined to party politics in any one country. Moreover, we can require that the issues be pervasive enough to elicit conflicting positions by parties in more than two countries--insisting, in fact, that the issues must either cut across countries in different cultural-geographical areas or that they be common to most of the party systems within a single area. Even thus delimited, the universe of issues is ill-defined and probably still far larger than the set of 13 which we identified for inclusion in the analysis. The issues that we selected constitutes a "sample" of the universe only to the extent that we have not included all the issues that might be included in a cross-national analysis. We hope that we have selected the important ones, or at least have not neglected important ones, but suggestions of other issues that warrant inclusion are welcome.

2. Formulating a consistent pro-con scoring framework: Issue-oriented politics are commonly discussed in terms of pro and con positions; one party is for a certain government policy and another is against it. This kind of dualism lends itself to scoring parties either positively or negatively on the policy or issue and expressing the magnitude of their support or opposition in terms of the value accompanying the sign. Such a scoring system would seem to facilitate analysis by incorporating the pro-con distinctions of political discourse into the data. Moreover, the analysis would appear to be facilitated that much more if one of the main, if not primary, political distinctions during that time period were also incorporated into the data according to the best possible fit of the distinction to the issue.

Without question, the "left-right" distinction permeates the literature of party politics during our time period. One of the most important tasks for the comparative analysis of political parties will be to investigate the universality and unidimensionality of this presumed continuum. To help this analysis, we attach "left-right" interpretations to the parties' positions on the issues at the time of scoring, adopting the convention that a positive score is associated with a "leftist" position. Clearly, attributing left-right positions to parties is easier on some issues than it is on others, but despite the imperfect fit for certain issues, the decision of which side should be treated as "left" and which side as "right" proved to be easier than expected. The extent of the appropriateness of this procedure, and the extent of the unidimensionality of the distinction, will emerge from an empirical analysis of the available data.

3. Deciding between "relative" and "absolute" scoring: It is obvious that a "leftist" position on an issue in one country might constitute a "rightist" position in another country, which indicates that "left" and "right" can be regarded in relative terms, depending on national party politics. According to this relative approach, single-party systems present special complications in scoring, for the governing party's position would not be defined in relationship to an opposition position and thus would not provide a basis for judging where it stood relative to national party politics. Moreover, cross-national descriptions of parties' orientations toward issues would be invalidated for lack of a common and consistent referent. Therefore, we have opted for an "absolutist" approach to scoring issue orientation, which involves formulating common scales for parties in all our countries, and scoring them according to "absolute" left-right extremes that cut across party systems. In order to simplify the scoring task, however, we do not attempt to capture and express the full range of variation between the most extreme positions possible on each issue. Instead, we limit our scoring to the subcategories "weak," "moderate," and "strong" within each of the pro-con categories. Allowing for a zero or "neutral" point on this scale, we thus develop a basic seven-point scale, ranging from "strong negative" to "strong positive" issue orientations. Later we will see how this scale unfolds into an eleven-point scale after introducing the distinction between party program and party practice.

4. Distinguishing between issue "consensus" and issue "irrelevancy": A political issue can be defined as a social problem for which a vigorous division of opinion exists on the nature or appropriateness of government action directed toward solving the problem. If we think of the "division of opinion" in terms of national boundaries, then some populations do not harbor divided opinions on government solutions to social problems which generate intense controversy within other populations. While these questions certainly constitute political issues in the latter countries, they might be viewed as "irrelevant" to politics in the former countries. If we accept this approach and regard some issues as irrelevant to party politics in certain countries because they elicit settled rather than divided opinion, we introduce severe problems for comparative cross-national analysis. For example, are the religious parties in a two-party theocracy not to be coded as "clerical" because there is no strong popular sentiment for the separation of church and state? To avoid these problems and promote cross-national comparisons, we interpret "division of opinion" from an international rather than national perspective. If the issue is pervasive enough to be selected for study, then we have established that sufficient division of international opinion exists to make the issue relevant to all countries, even though opinion on it is firmly settled within given countries and the issue is not significant for national politics. Instead of treating this issue as "irrelevant" to the country, we treat it as one

which features a consensus of opinion. Therefore, we strive to score every party on every issue.

5. Handling discrepancies between party "program" and party "practice": Discrepancies between party program and party practice are commonplace in American politics, for our national parties, once in power, often fail to enact legislation that is promised in party platforms. One could argue that parties ought to be scored on performance and not promise, but strict reliance on this approach presents both practical problems of comparability across parties and conceptual problems in establishing the purpose of identifying a party's issue orientation. At the practical level, one can best detect differences between program and practice for major governmental parties, which are given the opportunity to practice what they preach. Because non-governmental parties may not assume responsibility for formulating governmental policy, their programs need not be so constrained by worldly matters. As a result, tests for issue orientation prove to be more severe for governmental parties (more properly, Duverger's "majority bent" parties) because we contrast what they say with what they do, given the opportunity.

At the conceptual level, we ask ourselves the purposes of identifying a party's issue orientation. One purpose would be to analyze public policy outputs according to different party inputs, including issue orientation. A second would be to analyze bases of support according to issue orientation. Both of these purposes appear to be served by scoring parties primarily on their programs. Discrepancies between the issue orientation of a governing party and its policy output can be isolated and analyzed more effectively when the practice is not hopelessly confounded in its issue orientation score. The second purpose also seems to be better served by scoring parties primarily on their programs, for this is the face that parties present in seeking popular support.

While these arguments favor program over performance in determining issue orientation, it seems appropriate to temper a party's score on issue orientation with knowledge of discordant practices, when these are known--which is similar to the procedure used by Meisel in scoring the issue orientations of Canadian parties.<sup>17</sup> We thus treat party program as being equal in importance with party practice in our operationalization of issue orientation, allowing for inconsistencies between program and practice to average into an intermediate score. Scores are assigned to parties as they are positively or negatively oriented toward (favor or oppose) the issue in question.

The party's position as shown in practice	<u>The party's position as stated in its program</u>		
	WEAK	MODERATE	STRONG
WEAK	+ 1	+ 2	+ 3
MODERATE	+ 2	+ 3	+ 4
STRONG	+ 3	+ 4	+ 5 ✓

If the literature refers to either the program or the practice of the party and it notes no difference between the two, they are assumed to be equivalent and the party will be scored along the diagonal (+1, +3, or +5). Given a stated discrepancy between the two, the party will be scored from the appropriate cell off the diagonal. In the extreme case of a difference in sign between program and practice, the party is assigned the mean score, observing negative and positive signs.

### Scoring Parties on Policy Issues

Working from a manual of instructions that provided extensive conceptual discussions and operational definitions of the thirteen basic variables in our issue orientation cluster, a group of Northwestern graduate and undergraduate students coded 26 political parties for their issue orientations during 1957-1962. The parties coded for this exploratory analysis were: AUSTRALIA: Labour, Liberal, and Country; NEW ZEALAND: National and Labour; FRANCE: Popular Republican Movement, Radical Socialist, Socialist, Union for the New Republic, and Communist; VENEZUELA: Democratic Republican Union, Democratic Action, (Socialist Christian); CUBA: Liberal, Democratic, Popular Socialist; KOREA: Workers; EAST GERMANY: Socialist Unity; TURKEY: Republican People and Democratic; GHANA: Convention People's; GUINEA: Democratic; KENYA: African National Union and African Democratic Union; UNITED STATES: Democratic and Republican.<sup>18</sup>

The twelve countries represented by these 26 parties were selected primarily because their microfilm information files were completed and prepared for MIRACODE use. Thus, no claim is advanced for the representativeness of this limited sample, and the data and findings to follow should be regarded as partial and preliminary results intended to illustrate our approach in the larger project. Only our eventual sample of some 150 political parties from 50 nations is intended to be representative of the universe of parties meeting minimum levels of strength and stability during 1950-1962.

In the interests of brevity, I omit reproducing the lengthy conceptual discussions that underlie the operational definitions employed in coding parties on our basic variables.<sup>19</sup> Indeed, the operational definitions themselves are too long to present in their entirety, so I have chosen to illustrate the nature of the scales by producing only the extreme "leftist" (PRO-STRONG) and extreme "rightist" (CON-STRONG) positions for each issue. The scale scores associated with these extreme positions are +5 and -5 respectively. Intermediate scores between these positions can be obtained as shown in the above scoring matrix. The marginal distributions of our 26 parties across the unfolded eleven-point scale are also given. Of course, the marginal entries will not always total to 26 because of missing data.

## 5.01 GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP OF MEANS OF PRODUCTION

Strongly favors government ownership: advocates government ownership of all basic industries; advocates government ownership of means of production generally

Strongly opposes government ownership: opposes even government regulation of production and marketing activities of industries other than minimal requirements for health, safety, and honesty; urges repeal of present regulations

Scale											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Parties:	5	2	3		6		7	1	2		

N = 26

## 5.02 GOVERNMENT ROLE IN ECONOMIC PLANNING

Advocates government prescription of the level and nature of resource allocation, commodity production, and distribution. Often represented by the promulgation of "five-year plans" and the like

Opposes government interference in the natural development of the economy, with the possible exception of state action to protect private property rights or vested commercial interests

Scale											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	+1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Parties:	7	1	8	1	3	1			3		

N = 24

## 5.03 DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH

Advocates severe redistribution from rich to poor; suggestions to major land reform and equalization of all incomes; demands that retributions be immediate; combined seizure and redistribution

Advocates new policies that would enhance the income acquiring capacity of the wealthy at the expense of the poor

Scale											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Parties:	3	1	5		6		4		3		

N = 22

## 5.04 PROVIDING FOR SOCIAL WELFARE

Advocates or supports universally available social welfare through a compulsory program of public assistance, including aid to the poor, unemployed, aged, and health care and medical benefits

Advocates repeal of existing policies that promote social welfare programs; supports the reduction of program scope and coverage; prefers returning to government inactivity

Scale Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	
Parties:	10	2	4		1		3		2			N = 22

## 5.05 SECULARIZATION OF SOCIETY

Advocates expropriation of church property and/or official discouragement of religious practices

Advocates establishment or support of a state religion; imposition of a system of laws based on religious prescription

Scale Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	
Parties:	2	1	2		2	4	5		6			N = 23

## 5.06 ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES TO ARMED FORCES

Pro-Military: favors greater infusion of resources into armed forces or increase in expenditures to achieve pervasive security against perceived foreign or domestic enemies; military budget given priorities over domestic programs, with little questioning of underlying assumptions

Anti-Military: argues in principle against the maintenance of security forces greater than necessary to handle routine domestic police functions and patrol national boundaries; favors continuation of that situation if existing

Scale Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	
Parties:	5	1	2	1	11		2		1			N = 26



## 5.07 ALIGNMENT WITH EAST/WEST BLOCS

Supports entering or maintaining formal military alliance with countries in the "eastern" bloc

	<u>Supports entering or maintaining formal military alliances with countries in the "western" bloc</u>											
Scale	↓											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	
Parties:	3		1		2	2	4		4		9	N = 25

## 5.08 INDEPENDENCE OF FOREIGN CONTROL

Advocates complete independence of foreign control immediately; rejects continued or future cooperation with any superior foreign country; urges expropriating foreign investments without compensation

	<u>Advocates status as an administrative subdivision of the superior country; accepting political rule by the superior country without insisting on participating in its decisions; often the status quo situation in colonies</u>											
Scale	↓											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	
Parties:	11	1	5		4	2	1					N = 24

## 5.09 SUPRANATIONAL INTEGRATION

Favors elimination of specific nation/state as it now exists, as well as complete economic and political union with other nation/states

	<u>Opposes the establishment or maintenance of a free trade community or political federation in principle and urges the enactment of higher tariffs to discourage imports and promote economic and political self-sufficiency of the nation</u>											
Scale	↓											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	
Parties:	2	1	6		5	2	4		1			N = 21

## 5.10 NATIONAL INTEGRATION

Extreme nationalist: advocates obliteration of subnational authority; complete assimilation of all segments of society into national culture

Separationist: advocates perpetuation of subnational autonomy through creation of administratively independent unit; secession

Scale											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Parties:	6	1	5		4		5		1		N = 22

## 5.11 EXTENSION OF THE FRANCHISE

Advocates maintaining or introducing universal adult suffrage (commonly 18-23 years of age)

Advocates a significant reduction in the proportion of the enfranchised population; opposes popular election as a general principle for selecting government leaders

Scale											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Parties:	20		3		2						N = 25

## 5.12 PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS

Advocates a government policy of outlawing discrimination broadly across social life and providing for enforcement of the policy

Advocates enactment of discriminatory legislation in broad areas of social life and establishment of penalties for noncompliance

Scale											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5
Parties:	7	1	6	2	1		1		2		N = 20

## 5.13 INTERFERENCE WITH CIVIL LIBERTIES

Favors state ownership of all mass media: radio, television, and newspapers; restricts expression of opinion through the media and in public

	Recognizes freedom of expression as an acknowledged and enforced governmental policy, with virtually no restrictions on content other than pertaining to slander and libel											
Scale	↓											
Scores:	+5	+4	+3	+2	+1	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	↓
Parties:	4	1	2	2	2	4	1	2	2	5	N = 20	

In general, the underlying principle for fixing the PRO-CON positions on these issues was to link the PRO position with greater governmental activity in the issue area, interpreted as the "leftist" response and (arbitrarily) given the "positive" scale scores. This principle does not apply with equal force for all these issues and is really irrelevant with respect to variable 5.07, "Alignment with East/West Blocs," for which the "leftist" position is simply asserted to be alignment with the East and the "rightist" position alignment with the West. I believe that the left/right attributions can be successfully defended conceptually, but the crucial test is whether or not they emerge empirically as coherent and consistent positions across issues. The empirical coherence must be determined through data analysis.

#### Data Analysis

The left-right interpretations imposed on the PRO-CON positions for our thirteen issues are admittedly heuristic; we wanted to facilitate investigating the universality and unidimensionality of this presumed continuum. If the left-right orientation is truly pervasive, we would expect to find the parties' scores to be highly intercorrelated across the entire set of issues. While I might have reproduced the table of intercorrelations among these issues, a more efficient procedure for determining the amount of shared variance among them is to factor analyze the intercorrelation matrix and report the loadings on the first unrotated factor as extracted by the principal components solution.<sup>20</sup> If the variables are all highly intercorrelated, the first unrotated factor should extract a very large percentage of the total variance and each variable should have a high "loading" on the unrotated factor, i.e., each variable should correlate highly with the underlying factor. Inspection of Table 1 shows that this is not the situation.

TABLE 1: Unrotated Factor Analysis for All 13 Issues

Issue	Loadings
5.01 Government Ownership	.91 *
5.02 Economic Planning	.86 *
5.03 Distribution of Wealth	.90 *
5.04 Social Welfare	.71 *
5.05 Secularization of Society	.68 *
5.06 Support of the Military	-.35
5.07 East/West Alignment	.85 *
5.08 Independence of Foreign Control	.24
5.09 Supranational Integration	.34
5.10 National Integration	.49
5.11 Extension of the Franchise	.39
5.12 Protection of Civil Rights	-.17
5.13 Interference with Civil Liberties	.45

Proportion of explained variance = 38%

In examining Table 1, one should recall that the numbers of cases involved in the original correlation matrix are quite small, ranging from about 20 to 26 according to the extent of the missing data problem for different variables. Therefore, this pattern of loadings is likely to be unstable and may vary considerably before it settles down with the addition of more cases. Despite the likely instability in loadings, the factor analysis contains some salient features that deserve comment. First, it is obvious that many of the variables share little common variance with others, as expressed both by their low loadings with the principal factor and by the relatively modest proportion of variance explained by the first factor, which is 38%. Second, eleven out of the thirteen variables do load positively on the factor, suggesting that there is some validity to the assignment of left-right positions on the issues--although the two issues that load negatively appear as clear exceptions to the principle. Finally, there are six variables, marked with asterisks, that correlate relatively highly with the factor and imply that they might constitute a subset of issues that define a left-right dimension.

Due to the small number of cases in the analysis and the presumed instability of subsequent factors as they might be extracted and rotated to capture variables that do not load highly on the first factor, no attempt will be made to identify and interpret interrelationships among the seven variables not marked with asterisks in Table 1. Their interrelationships should be studied after the acquisition of more data to decrease distractions apt to be caused by sampling error for these variables. Appreciable changes in the factor structure, however, are less likely to occur for the six variables that load highly on the first factor, and these will be tentatively identified as defining a left-right dimension of issue orientation for the cross-national comparisons of political parties. As a further check on their unidimensionality, a second factor analysis was performed on these six variables alone. The results are presented in Table 2.

TABLE 2: Unrotated Factor Analysis for Six Issues

Issues	Loadings
5.01 Government Ownership	.92
5.02 Economic Planning	.91
5.03 Distribution of Wealth	.93
5.04 Social Welfare	.76
5.05 Secularization of Society	.71
5.07 East/West Alignment	.82

Proportion of explained variance = 72%

The data in Table 2 reflect substantial intercorrelations among the six variables and support the assumption of unidimensionality in our six-issue scale of left-right policy orientation. The scale might be purified further by omitting issue 5.05, or even issues 5.04 through 5.07. But this purification would be purchased at the price of sloughing off some conceptual aspects of the left-right distinction and also at the cost of reliability as the number of items in the scale would drop from six to three. Therefore, we settled on all six issues for inclusion in our left-right issue orientation scale.

Having determined the issues to be included in our scale, the next step is to generate composite scores for our individual parties. One approach to the construction of such over-all scale positions would be to use factor scores as computed by the factor analysis program, but factor scores are not routinely calculated when there is missing data. An alternative approach is to transform the original scores for individual parties on each issue into standard scores (sometimes called z-scores) according to the formula:  $\text{standard score} = \frac{\text{party issue score} - \text{mean issue score}}{\text{standard deviation of issue scores}}$ , then sum the standard scores for each party across all issues, and divide by the number of issues for which data exists on the party. This approach has the advantage of taking into consideration the central tendency (mean) and dispersion (standard deviation) for each issue in assigning scores to parties. For our special case of studying parties' left/right issue orientations, it also helps to neutralize personal biases of the investigator in fixing "left" and "right" policy positions around a presumed "center" by letting the variation of party policies determine what is "left," "right," and "center."

An example will illustrate the procedure for transforming raw scores into standard scores. The Popular Republican Movement in France was given a raw score of -3 for variable 5.05, secularization of society. (According to our operational definition, a raw score of -3 means "advocates state monetary support of parochial schools, clergy, or church operations.") The mean raw score for all parties on this variable was -.05 and the standard deviation was 2.57. Applying the previous formula, we calculate a standard score for the MRP on this variable as follows:

$$ss = \frac{(-3) - (-.05)}{2.57} = \frac{-2.95}{2.57} = -1.15. \text{ The transformed score of } -1.15 \text{ now expresses}$$

the fact that the MRP's position on secularization of society stood 1.15 standard deviations below the mean, with its direction indicated by the negative sign. The party's composite score on the left-right dimension would be the mean value of its standard scores summed across all issues for which it could be assigned a raw score. Diagram 1 depicts the mean standard scores for all 26 parties on our six issues, arrayed on a left-right continuum.<sup>21</sup>

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DIAGRAM 1

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Validating the Left-Right Scale

Now that we have created a six-item scale for measuring the issue orientations of parties on a left-right continuum, the question arises as to its validity, i.e., does it measure what it intends to measure? Certainly, the positioning of specific parties on the scale imparts some face validity to students of comparative politics: e.g., communist parties are grouped at the extreme left of the scale and two remnant parties from the Batista coalition in Cuba stand at the extreme right. Some of the intermediate orderings also seem to make sense; the U.S. Democrats stand to the left of the Republicans and Australian Labour to the left of the Liberals. But there are some curious placements as well, for example, the anti-clerical French Radical Socialists are located to the right of the clerical MRP. The relatively large gap that separates the U.S. Democrats from Republicans also may be questioned. One insists on more than a general appearance of face validity before taking the measurements seriously.

A more systematic approach to establishing measurement validity is concurrent validity, which requires that the measurement conform to some outside criterion, whose own validity is either established or presumed. To demonstrate concurrent validity, then, we need to obtain high correlations with other, presumed valid, ratings of parties on the left-right dimension. Unfortunately, there are few such comprehensive comparative ratings available in the literature, which is the main reason for attempting the analysis. Many students of comparative politics speak freely of parties as being located on a left-right or liberal-conservative continuum, but few seek to be explicit, systematic, detailed, and comprehensive in their comparisons. However, two usable sets of cross-national party evaluations were located to serve as validating criteria for our measurement.

The first set of evaluations to be considered can be found in an annual publication of the United States Department of State that is seldom cited and apparently little-known by students of political parties. For twenty years, the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research has employed Communist/Left/Center/Conservative distinctions in classifying foreign parties listed in its annual report of WORLD STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, which was in its 19th volume in 1968. In addition to providing detailed information on the membership and strength of communist parties throughout the world, the publication reports election results and legislative representation for the major parties in each country, with the parties clearly classified in one of the four categories mentioned above. Although the State Department appears never to have used "right" or "rightist" as a category by itself, there have been occasional identifications of parties within the "conservative" category as "rightist," "extreme right," and




DIAGRAM 1: Mean standard scores for 26 political parties based on positions taken on six left-right policy issues, 1957-1962

"ultra-conservative." The only major exception to the publication's policy of classifying major parties in left-right terms occurred with the treatment accorded parties in Latin America before 1962, when the State Department categories were "communist," "ruling party or member of governing coalition," and "opposition Party."<sup>22</sup>

Using the State Department ratings of countries published for 1962, we translated their categories into values of 1 through 4 and were able to code 21 of our 26 parties, which distributed across their categories as follows:

<u>Code</u>	<u>Classification</u>	<u>Number</u>
1	Communist	4
2	Non-Communist Left	8
3	Center	4
4	Conservative	5

These ratings were done after the students had completed scoring the parties on all thirteen issues using the ICPP Project information files. They had no access to the State Department classifications when coding parties on the specific issues. We thus can try to validate our own left-right measurement, which emerged from a detailed study of policy positions as presented in the parties literature, by comparing the scores we assigned to parties with the judgmental classifications of parties produced (presumably) by country experts in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the United States Department of State. This constitutes one set of cross-national party evaluations to be used in our validation effort.

The other set of party evaluations should serve to offset the concerns of those who might be suspect of the values or biases operating to affect the judgments of country experts within the U.S. Department of State. POLITICHESKIE PARTII ZARUBEZHNYKH STRAN (POLITICAL PARTIES OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES) is a recent publication of the Soviet Union that reviews the origins, support, and programs of contemporary parties across the world.<sup>23</sup> Done in reference-book style like the WORLD STRENGTH OF COMMUNIST PARTY ORGANIZATIONS, this source devotes a page or more to each party covered. While it does not conveniently classify parties into a four-fold typology à la the State Department, it does employ a familiar vocabulary in describing the parties that can support coding judgments along a left-right continuum. A simple three-point scale was constructed for coding parties according to use of the following descriptors:<sup>24</sup>

<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
Communist	Petty bourgeoisie	Upper bourgeoisie
Left	N = 8	Church leaders
Socialist		Landowners
Marxist-Leninist		Reactionary
Revolutionary		Capitalist
Progressive		Anti-Communist
N = 8		Anti-democratic
		N = 6

These rankings derived from party evaluations by Soviet country experts provided our second set of cross-national ratings for our validation attempt.



Before comparing the ICPP scale scores to the U.S. and Soviet ratings, we sought to determine the reliability of these expert ratings from both countries. Nineteen parties were rated from both sources, as shown in Table 3.

TABLE 3: Ratings of 19 Political Parties from U.S. and U.S.S.R. Information

USSR Ratings:			
Left	Center	Right	
<u>US Ratings:</u>			
			Conservative
		4	
	Center	2	1
Left	3	4	1
	Communist	4	

The message communicated by Table 3 is somewhat comforting; the country experts who are probably advising the foreign policy makers of both governments appear largely to agree in their assessments of party politics, with the product-moment correlation between these two rankings being .82. The greatest discrepancy between the ratings occurred for the Social Christian Party (COPEI) of Venezuela, which the State Department classified as "non-Communist Left" (although closer to the center than either of the other two Venezuelan parties) and the Soviets described as representing the interests of landowners, major bourgeoisie, and church leaders--judged by us to mean "right." Excluding COPEI, the correlation between the State Department and Soviet ratings correlate .92.

Recognizing that both sets of ratings correlate highly for parties scored in common but also noting that these ratings apply to only 19 of our 26 parties, I decided to transform the US and USSR experts' ratings into standard scores, as before, and create a combined "experts" scale from the mean standard scores for the nineteen parties scored by both and the standard scores for another four parties which were evaluated by one source but not the other. This raised to 23 the number of our parties that were scored by area experts and could be used in concurrent validation of our cross-national measurement.

The product-moment correlation between the experts' ratings and our ICPP mean standard scores for 23 parties on the six-issue left-right scale was .90. This high correlation can be submitted as evidence for concurrent validation of our scaling procedures, which were rooted in detailed research using library type sources for each party. It appears that our scale scores conform closely to the "gestaltist" ratings of parties by country experts in the governments of the United States and the U.S.S.R.

One might wonder why we did not simply use the US/USSR ratings by country experts in the first place, without engaging in the laborious and costly task of

creating our own scores for parties on the left-right dimension. Of course, concurrent validation works both ways. There appears to be no published evidence that supports the "presumed" validity of the State Department ratings of parties in foreign countries and there is almost certainly no previous data that correlates those ratings with ratings produced within the Soviet Union. Moreover, there is a lack of information about the precise factors that enter into left-right evaluations of parties in these sources. Because of the high correlation obtained between the experts' ratings and our scale scores, we can argue that their judgments appear to be influenced by the parties' positions on the six issues in the scale, i.e., government ownership of the means of production, government role in economic planning, distribution of wealth, social welfare, secularization of society, and East/West alignment. Thus the question of who is validating whom invites different answers.

Lest someone expect that the high relationship between the six-issue scale and the US/USSR ratings is due largely to the last variable, East/West alignment, it should be recalled that the East/West variable had one of the lower loadings in the unrotated factor analysis. Furthermore, its simple correlation with the US ratings was .84 and with the USSR ratings .73, both of which are lower than the correlations between the ICPP six-issue scale scores and the combined experts' ratings. So the other variables were contributing to the relationship in important ways.

Perhaps just as important as determining what entered the US and USSR experts' ratings of parties on the left-right continuum is to identify what apparently did not enter their evaluations. Recall that seven of the original thirteen issue orientation variables did not load highly on the first unrotated factor, which means that they were largely uncorrelated with the six variables that did. It seems, then, that these seven issues do not affect the experts' judgments of the left-right nature of political parties. In so evaluating parties they must attach little importance to the parties' positions on such issues as support of the military, independence of foreign control, supranational integration, national integration, extension of the franchise, protection of civil rights, and interference with civil liberties.

#### Another Attempt at Validation


A posture toward validation of measurements that is achieving growing importance within the social sciences is the use of multiple methods, each quite different from one another, to measure the same phenomena.<sup>25</sup> Correlating our scale scores with US/USSR experts' ratings is surely an example of multiple measurement, but one might argue that the methods are not sufficiently different to qualify as truly "independent" measures. After all, scores for parties on the six issues are derived from literature written by country "experts," so our scale might be interpreted as a distillation of expert opinion, which is essentially of the same character as the US/USSR summary expert opinion. What is required for a "triangulation" of measurement is another cross-national rating of parties on a left-right dimension, arrived at in an entirely unique fashion.

As mentioned before, such studies are not easily found, but a recent article by Jean LaPonce, "Note on the Use of the Left-Right Dimension," provides comparable data for seven of our parties.<sup>26</sup> LaPonce conducted a questionnaire

survey of French, American, and Canadian students in social science departments:

The respondent was asked to locate himself as well as names of politicians, states, and selected political concepts in a left to right space presented visually as extending from the left side to the right side of the questionnaire's page. The words to be classified were listed in the middle of the page, one under the other. The subject had to draw an arrow starting from the center and extending as far as he wished toward either side (see figure 1). (p. 482)

Figure 1 from LaPonce's article is reproduced below. It shows a nine-point scale used to elicit self-ratings on a left-right continuum.



LaPonce continues:

If location of the self in a left-right spatial continuum has any political meaning, we should expect that grouping our respondents according to their preferred party, then locating each group on the left to right dimension according to the mean spatial location of its members, should line the electorates in a meaningful political order.

Having found internal consistency between party preferred and spatial location of the self in all national groups studied separately, the next tempting step is to find whether the same internal consistency is maintained when all the party groupings of whatever nationality are

put on a single continuum. To do so, let us mark for each party (see figure 2) the mean location of its supporters on the nine-point topographical scale used to record the self location of the individuals surveyed. (p. 483)




Figure 2. AVERAGE SELF LOCATION ON A LEFT-RIGHT CONTINUUM OF RESPONDENTS GROUPED BY NATIONALITY AND PARTY PREFERENCE

LaPonce finds the left-right alignment displayed in Figure 2 to be "most satisfying,"

so satisfying, indeed, as to be fascinating; it suggests the use by our respondents not simply of an ordinal, but of a similar interval scale measure, as if the subjects who filled the questionnaire on different continents at different times were using a similar yardstick to express their relative distance from extreme left and extreme right. (p. 485)

He then proceeds to validate his spatial orderings by correlating them with attitude items and finds supportive relationships between spatial orderings and political attitudes.

For our purposes of validation, LaPonce's orderings, obtained by a strikingly different method, need to be compared with the ICPP scale scores for the same parties, which is done in Figure 3. With one exception, the similarity in positions




FIGURE 3: Comparison of LaPonce's student ratings and ICPP scale scores for seven political parties in the U.S. and France

for seven parties from the U.S. and France is strong. True, the students do tend to characterize themselves as more "leftist" than their parties' rankings on the ICPP six-issue scale, but that is understandable. It is also true that the ICPP scale tends to emphasize the difference between the "center" parties and the "leftist" parties, so that the U.S. Democratic Party emerges as more distinctly different from the French Socialists, but that also conforms to common understanding. Allowing for inevitable differences in fixing absolute values for comparison across scales, we find similarity not only in the orderings but even in the distances between orderings. The Democrats, MRP, Gaullists, and Republicans are all about equidistant from one another on both scales, as are the French Communists and Socialists. Thus, our previous concern about the relatively large gap in scale scores between the Democrats and Republicans on the ICPP scale appears to be unwarranted, as the parties are similarly separated on LaPonce's continuum.

The sole exception to a good fit between the continua is the French Radical Socialist Party. It appears slightly left of center in LaPonce's ordering but distinctly right of center on the ICPP scale. The US and USSR experts' evaluations would support the LaPonce characterization, for both describe the Radical Socialists as a "center" party. It might be instructive to examine in some detail the composition of the Radical Socialist mean scale score in comparison with another French party, the Popular Republican Movement (MRP), which is located slightly to the right of the Radicals on the LaPonce scale but far to the left of the Radicals on the ICPP scale.

On the issue of secularization of society in the form of state support to parochial schools, the MRP--regarded as a "clerical" party with Catholic organizational support--is rated slightly more rightist (-1) than the Radicals (+1), who have a traditional reputation as an "anti-clerical" party, but whose anti-clericalism appears to be diminishing in intensity over time. On the issue of alignment with East/West blocs, both parties receive the same strong "rightist" position (-5). On all four of the remaining six issues in the scale--government ownership, economic planning, distribution of wealth, and social welfare--the MRP favors a stronger governmental role than the Radical Socialists, which seems by the record to be more economically conservative than the Catholic MRP. This is the basis for our relatively "rightist" rating of the Radical Socialists. It has been pointed out that the typical Radical Socialist is described "as a man whose heart is on the left but whose pocketbook is on the right."<sup>25</sup> It appears that LaPonce's students were responding from the heart, while our measures were directed at the pocketbook. Less flippantly, I might suggest that the students (and the US/USSR sources) responded with respect to the French radical tradition and not the policy of the French Radical Party. It seems problematic as to which evaluation of the party is more valid.

### Conclusion

Notwithstanding the exceptional situation of the French Radical Socialist Party, the six-issue left-right scale constructed for use in the ICPP Project appears to have emerged satisfactorily after three exercises in validation: examination for face validity, corroboration through one external criterion for concurrent validity, and corroboration through a totally different external criterion for a more rigorous test of concurrent validity. It now remains to use the scale in substantive parties research and to determine if it generates meaningful results in producing findings and testing theories. This procedure,

referred to as construct validation, provides the most important, and most interesting, test of validity. Construct validation of the left-right scale must await the production of more data on additional parties and on the other ten concepts in the ICPP conceptual framework.

Footnotes

<sup>1</sup>Primary support for the project has come from the National Science Foundation Grants GS-1418 and GS-2533. Northwestern University's Research Committee generously supported one year's work pretesting the methodology before application was made to the National Science Foundation. Northwestern's Council for Intersocietal Studies provided data processing equipment and space to facilitate our research and came to our aid with emergency funds when our NSF support was interrupted.

<sup>2</sup>See Kenneth Janda, "Political Research with MIRACODE: A 16mm. Microfilm Information Retrieval System," *SOCIAL SCIENCE INFORMATION*, 6 (April, 1967), 169-181; and Kenneth Janda, "Retrieving Information for a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in William J. Crotty (ed.), *APPROACHES TO THE STUDY OF PARTY ORGANIZATION* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1968), pp. 159-215. Both of these articles are reprinted in Kenneth Janda, *INFORMATION RETRIEVAL: APPLICATIONS TO POLITICAL SCIENCE* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969).

<sup>3</sup>Research activity to build the information files was guided by the bibliographic search instructions, indexing instructions, and indexing codes presented in Kenneth Janda, *ICPP CODES AND INDEXING MANUAL* (Evanston: Northwestern University, ICPP Monograph Series, No. 1.1, 1968). A report on the information files prepared for nine countries is given in Kenneth Janda, "A Microfilm and Computer System for Analyzing Comparative Politics Literature," in George Gerbner *et al.* (eds.), *THE ANALYSIS OF COMMUNICATION CONTENT* (New York: Wiley, 1969), pp. 407-435.

<sup>4</sup>See Kenneth Janda, "Quality Control and Library Research on Political Parties," in Raoul Naroll and Ronald Cohen (eds.), *THE HANDBOOK OF METHOD IN CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY* (New York: Doubleday, in press).

<sup>5</sup>See Kenneth Janda, "A Conceptual Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Political Parties," in Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (eds.), *SAGE PROFESSIONAL PAPERS IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS, VOLUME 1* (in press), which is a revision of "The International Comparative Political Parties Project," a paper delivered at the 1969 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York City.

<sup>6</sup>I am grateful to the students, both graduate and undergraduate who have done the coding in the ICPP Project. For data reported in this paper, I specifically want to thank Nancy Artz, Raymond Duvall, Maurice Farbstein, William Goodman, Eve Harris, Kathee Henning, Carol Hodges, Arthur Kallow, Judith McIntosh, Carol Ostheimer, Barbara Seeder, Mark Siegel, Donald Sylvan, and Mary Welfling.

<sup>7</sup>See the discussion of additive indices in John Galtung, *THEORY AND METHODS OF SOCIAL RESEARCH* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), pp. 250-254; and see the treatment of multiplicative indices in Hayward R. Alker, Jr., *MATHEMATICS AND POLITICS* (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 108.

<sup>8</sup>The "Conceptual Framework . . ." paper cited in footnote 5 explains the concepts and outlines the component basic variables. For the most thorough treatment, see Kenneth Janda, *THE ICPP CODING MANUAL*, 2nd Ed. (Northwestern University, 1970). Gilbert Rotkin and Donald Sylvan helped considerably in writing some of the conceptual and operational definitions of our variables.



<sup>9</sup>"Thoughts on the Cause of Present Discontents," in his *WORKS* (Boston: Little Brown, 1871), Volume I, p. 151.

<sup>10</sup>See Avery Leiserson, *PARTIES AND POLITICS* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 133-139.

<sup>11</sup>Peter Ranis, "A Two-Dimensional Typology of Latin American Political Parties," *JOURNAL OF POLITICS*, 30 (August, 1968), 804-806.

<sup>12</sup>Giovanni Sartoria, "European Political Parties: The Case of Polarized Pluralism," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weisberg (eds.), *POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 148-149.

<sup>13</sup>Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan (eds.), *PARTY SYSTEMS AND VOTER ALIGNMENTS* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 9-13.

<sup>14</sup>Roy C. Macridis (ed.), *POLITICAL PARTIES: CONTEMPORARY TRENDS AND IDEAS* (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 21-22.

<sup>15</sup>Certainly, Maurice Duverger's characterization and analysis of parties in terms of "left" and "right" did much to popularize the approach and terminology; see his *POLITICAL PARTIES* (New York: Wiley, 1954). Recent authors who have noted a decline in ideological emphases in political life apparently have been concerned mainly with the left-right of "Marxist" orientation toward politics; see Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," in Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown (eds.), *COMPARATIVE POLITICS*, 3rd ED. (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 1968), 362. Important refinements in the identification of party ideologies have been introduced in Jean Blondel, *AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT* (New York: Praeger, 1969), 112.

<sup>16</sup>Austin Ranney and Willmoore Kendall, *DEMOCRACY AND THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1956), 44-448.

<sup>17</sup>John Meisel, "Recent Changes in Canadian Parties," in Hugh G. Thorburn (ed.), *PARTY POLITICS IN CANADA*, 2nd Edition (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall, 1967), 44-45.

<sup>18</sup>In the ICPP Project, a party is defined as an organization that pursues a goal of placing its avowed representatives in government positions. We interpret this definition broadly to include "illegal" parties and those that do not pursue their goals through competitive electoral strategies. But we limit our attention only to those parties which achieve minimum levels of importance in national politics during our time period (1950-1962), defining importance in terms of strength and stability. Both criteria of importance are easier to specify for legal parties, which must win at least 5% of the seats in the lower house of the legislature in two or more elections from 1950 through 1962. For "illegal" parties, we look for support from at least 10% of the electorate over a five year period, fudging somewhat for parties in newly independent countries.

Although our time period of interest is 1950 through 1962, we have divided that period roughly into two halves--1950 to 1956 and 1957 to 1962--in order to assess changes in party positions on our variables over time. The data reported in this study are taken from the second half of the period, 1957-1962. Some of the parties included in this study, e.g., the Democratic and Liberal parties in Cuba, barely

edged into this second half. Other parties which are prominent in today's politics for some countries did not qualify for inclusion during our period of interest.

Support from the National Science Foundation did not provide for studying the U.S. Democratic and Republican parties, which were included in this analysis on the bases of personal judgments of the parties' positions, without reference to the systematic literature research used for the other parties.

<sup>19</sup>The conceptual and operational definitions are presented in full in the ICPP CODING MANUAL, see footnote 8.

<sup>20</sup>The factor analyses reported in this paper were performed on the CDC 6400 computer at Northwestern using a program called FACTOR, which allows for missing data in the computation of the intercorrelation matrix.

<sup>21</sup>I am indebted to Aileen Lum for writing the special SCORES program that reads raw data, calculates standard scores allowing for missing data, and computes the mean standard scores.

<sup>22</sup>Some Latin American area scholars (see pages 801-804 in Ranis, cited in footnote 11) argue that the left-right distinction is not suitably relevant for Latin American parties, which would support the State Department's earlier decision to exclude them from the standard ratings.

<sup>23</sup>A.F. Kudriasheva and E.I. Kuskova (eds.), published in Moscow by Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury (Publishing House of Political Literature), 1967.

<sup>24</sup>I thank my wife, Ann, for reading the Russian and translating the terms and phrases used to describe the ideological orientation of the parties. With reference to her records of the descriptors used for each party, we independently scored the parties on a three-point scale corresponding to "left," "center," and "right." Our codings agreed in 23 out of 26 parties for an 88% reliability rate. The three discrepancies were readily resolved.

<sup>25</sup>See D.T. Campbell and D.W. Fiske, "Convergent and Discriminant Validation by the Multitrait-Multimethod Matrix," PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 56 (1959), 81-105; and Eugene J. Webb, Donald T. Campbell, Richard D. Schwartz, and Lee Sechrest, UNOBTRUSIVE MEASURES: NONREACTIVE RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), especially Chapter 1.

<sup>26</sup>COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDIES, 2 (January, 1970), 481-502.

<sup>27</sup>Stanley Rothman, EUROPEAN SOCIETY AND POLITICS (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), 356.