Competition and Volatility in Parliamentary Party Systems for 212 Polities

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This paper reports on data collected on parliamentary parties across the world for a work in progress tentatively titled "Explaining Country Governance: Size, Wealth, and Politics." We intend to demonstrate the effects of country size, wealth, and politics on the World Bank's Indicators (WGI) representing the quality of governance in 212 polities in 2007.[1] These indicators, created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM),[2] covered all 192 members of the United Nations, some non-member nations (such as Taiwan), and some entities (such as Guam and Hong Kong) not normally regarded as independent nations. Accordingly, the World Bank calls them "countries" instead of "nations."[3] We accept the term countries, but think they are more properly called "polities." We use countries and polities as interchangeable terms in this paper. The polities are listed in the Appendix.

Drawing on the World Bank's global resources, KKM rated these polities on six different indicators: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Governmental Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption.[4] These indicators are widely used in cross-polity research as independent variables explaining country variation in international investment, policy reforms, economic growth, and societal development.[5] Few studies have focused on the WGI scores as dependent variables, and no studies of which we are aware try to explain variation in all 212 polities.

Our tentative title, "Explaining Country Governance: Size, Wealth, and Politics," argues (in a nutshell) that much of the cross-polity variation in the WGI scores can be explained by country size (smaller nations are easier to govern than larger nations) and country wealth (richer nations deliver better governance than poorer nations). Politics affects the quality of governance after country size and wealth have their impacts.

We consider only two aspects of politics in each polity: its democratic nature and features of its political party system. Controlling for size and wealth and using Freedom House ratings for democratic nature, we find that Free nations tend to have higher governance scores on all six indicators than Partly Free nations, which rank higher than Not Free. Controlling for country size, wealth, and democratic nature, we *tentatively* find that countries with parliamentary party systems that are low on

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[1] The data are available at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/.

[2] Daniel Kaufmann, World Bank Institute; Aart Kraay, World Bank Development Economics Research Group; Massimo Mastruzzi, World Bank Institute.

[3] See Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, *Governance Matters VII: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators, 1996-2007* (Washington, DC: World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 4654, June 2008), which does not mention "nations" in the body of the text.

[4] "The indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 35 separate data sources constructed by 32 different organizations from around the world." Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, p. 1.

[5] Christiane Arndt and Charles Oman, *Uses and Abuses of Governance Indicators*. Paris: Development Centre of the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2006. Chapter 1.

volatility and high on competitiveness tend to have higher governance scores, but the effects vary depending on the particular quality of governance being rated.

This paper describes the data we collected on selected variables pertaining to parliamentary parties in these polities for the purposes of our study. We are still refining the indicators we will create from these variables to serve as our measures of parliamentary party systems—primarily their competitiveness and volatility. Because our research is still underway, we reserve the right not to release the data at this time. We think, however, that they will interest scholars who may plan to utilize the data when the study is completed, hopefully within 2009.

The Research Challenge

These six World Bank indicators of the qualities of governance are widely regarded as the best and most comprehensive cross-polity data on governance.[6] Although the intercorrelations among the indicators ranged roughly between .70 and .95, individual polities varied considerably on individual indicators, and for any particular indicator the cross-polity variation was substantial. The measures are not perfect. As two WGI authors note, "All indicators of governance include measurement error." This means "that the true level of governance is unobservable and that the observed empirical indicators of governance provide imperfect signals of the fundamentally unobservable concept of governance."[7] They discuss at length how to assess and allow for measurement error and adopt a method that facilitates comparisons across nations and indicators.

KKM scored every polity in relationship to every other, transforming each of the six indicators into standard scores (commonly called z-scores) with means of 0 and standard deviations of 1. Every polity was scored on at least one of the six indicators, and 204 were scored on all six. KKM's methodology for generating WGI scores invites researchers who treat the scores as dependent variables to explain variation across the entire set of 212 polities. Because the scores on each indicator have the admirable properties of summing to 0 with standard deviation (and variance) equal to 1 only when *all* valid cases are analyzed, there is a premium on scoring all 212 polities on all the independent factors—size, wealth, and politics.

Data can be collected relatively easily for the variables concerning country size and county wealth. The CIA *Factbook* provides estimates of country size in square kilometers and in total population for virtually every polity.[8] (We employ both measures of country size.) The CIA (and other sites) also provides estimates of country wealth in the form of gross domestic product per capita. Freedom House annually reports its "freedom" classifications for some 200 nations and territories.[9] The data availability problem arises with obtaining data on political party systems in 212 diverse polities.

Existing data sets on the characteristics of party systems fail to serve our purposes for two reasons: the observations are not timely for explaining governance in 2007, or the observations do not cover nearly enough party systems. We needed data on the presence, absence, and nature of political

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[6] Steven Radelet said they are "the best set of governance indicators currently available" in *Challenging Foreign Aid: A Policymaker's Guide to the Millennium Challenge Account* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Global Development 2003), p. 34.

[7] Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, "Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be Going?" *The World Bank Research Observer*, 23 (Spring, 2008), p. 20.

[8] http://www.allcountries.org/wfb2007/.

[9] http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1.

party systems in virtually all of 212 polities. That meant we had to collect the data ourselves. We report the fruits of our labor in the remaining portion of the paper.

Focusing on Party Representation in Parliaments

Relatively few countries elect presidents or other chief executives, but virtually all have parliaments or legislatures. (We use these terms interchangeably.) As shown in Table 1, parliaments in 180 of the World Bank's 212 polities in 2006 had elected deputies seated by political parties in what are commonly called the lower chambers in bicameral bodies.

Table 1: Status of Parliamentary Parties in Lower Chambers in 2006 [a]

	Frequency	Percent
No parliament	2	.9
Appointed deputies, no parties	6	2.8
Appointed deputies, unofficial parties	1	.5
Appointed deputies seated by parties	4	1.9
Elected deputies, no parties	9	4.2
Elected deputies, shadowy/banned parties	4	1.9
Elected deputies, unofficial parties	6	2.8
Elected deputies, seated by parties	180	84.9
Total	212	100.0

[a] Based on data in the 2006 CIA *World Factbook*

Another 11 polities had some form of legislative body with elected or appointed deputies affiliated with unofficial parties or parties which existed in the shadows or were ostensibly banned (rows 3, 6, and 7). Only 15 parliaments had deputies without party affiliations (rows 2 and 5). Only two nations in 2006 (Nepal and Myanmar) had no parliament or legislative council. The Appendix indicates how all polities were coded for these categories and also how they were coded for a related variable concerning how the parliamentary seats were filled.

Most existing cross-national data on political party systems focus on percentage of votes cast for parties in parliamentary elections to fill the lower chamber. Such electoral data is commonly available for larger and established democracies among the 180 countries in Table 1, but it is often unavailable for smaller and nascent democracies. Fortunately, one can virtually always learn a related item of information: the percentage distribution of parties in parliament. Sometimes one can also learn party affiliations even when deputies are appointed or when parties are unofficial, shadowy, or banned. Needing to score as many polities as possible on features of their party systems, we opted to collect data on the percentage of party seats held in lower chambers, not on the percentage of votes cast for parties in parliamentary elections.

The percentage of party seats in parliament is also more relevant to our research than the percentage of party votes cast in elections. Because all electoral systems distort translating votes won to seats won, party success in elections does not necessarily produce party control of parliament. Moreover, parties in parliaments play a more direct role in what governments do than parties in elections. So both practical and theoretical considerations led to collecting data on parliamentary parties to create our measures of competition and volatility in parliamentary party systems.

Data Needs and Data Sources

Although parliamentary party seat data are more readily available than party vote data, obtaining such data for 212 polities is still challenging and tedious. We narrowed the task to collecting data on only the three largest parties in a recent election, which we use to estimate party competition in the parliamentary arena. Even finding contemporary data on the three largest parties for all polities proved difficult. We compounded the difficulty by expanding our task to collect data on the three largest parties in a *second* election, which we needed to measure party system volatility. We call these two successive elections the *stimulus* election and the *referent* election.

Given that we were using WGI governance scores for 2007 as our dependent variable, we needed data on parliamentary parties that were elected in a *stimulus* election held some time prior to 2007. We recognized that some lag would occur between election of new parliament and its impact on governance, but could only guess at the minimum lag time—which we arbitrarily chose as two years. Therefore, we fixed 2005 as the last date for a stimulus election—the election for the parliament that could affect governance scores in 2007. The distribution of years in which stimulus elections were held is reported in Table 2. Note that some of these "elections" resulted in non-partisan deputies.

Table 2: Dates for the Stimulus Elections

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1992	1	.5
	1994	1	.5
	1996	1	.5
	2000	3	1.4
	2001	19	9.0
	2002	44	20.8
	2003	38	17.9
	2004	52	24.5
	2005	45	21.2
	Total	204	96.2
Missing	System	8	3.8
Total		212	100.0

Table 2 shows that about 20 percent of the stimulus elections occurred in 2005 and almost 85 percent occurred from 2002 to 2005. The earliest elections (1992, 1994, and 1996) were in Angola, Eritrea, and the Palestinian territories (respectively). Eight nations (Bhutan, Brunei, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, Myanmar, Nepal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates) did not hold elections to elect a parliament or legislative council, although all but Nepal and Myanmar had one.

In addition to collecting data on the percentage distribution of the three largest parliamentary parties after the stimulus election, we collected data on the three parties for the election that preceded the stimulus election to measure party system "volatility." Typically, party system volatility is based on the changes in *percentages of votes won by all parties* in adjacent elections. We measure volatility by comparing the *percentages of seats won by only the three largest parties* in adjacent "stimulus" and "referent" elections. We initially thought that the referent election should be held prior to the stimulus election to calculate volatility. But one can argue that volatility should be assessed over the span of the

governance measure and that some nations' political dynamics favor an election after 2005 better represents the party systems' maturity. We have not resolved that issue.

Table 3 shows that we chose post-2005 elections for about 35 percent of the polities. In two cases (Cuba and Pakistan) we choose 2008. Also in two cases, we were forced to choose years before 1990 (Angola, 1986 and Rwanda, 1988). The 14 polities that had no reference elections include the 8 polities in Table 3 that had no stimulus elections.

Table 3: Dates for the Referent Elections

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	1986	1	.5
	1988	1	.5
	1993	2	.9
	1995	1	.5
	1996	3	1.4
	1997	6	2.8
	1998	13	6.1
	1999	32	15.1
	2000	28	13.2
	2001	18	8.5
	2002	11	5.2
	2003	4	1.9
	2005	2	.9
	2006	45	21.2
	2007	29	13.7
	2008	2	.9
	Total	198	93.4
Missing	System	14	6.6
Total		212	100.0

Before reporting data on the distribution of the three largest parties after the stimulus and referent elections, we should discuss our data sources. Fortunately, the Internet contains some excellent sources of election and parliamentary data. By far the two most important sources for the stimulus election were Adam Carr Election Archives[10] and Wikipedia Election Results by Country.[11] Finding data for the earlier referent election proved to be more difficult, forcing us to scour the Internet for information. The Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)[12] helped considerably, as did the African Elections Database.[13] The obscure site, Travel Documents System, was the only source found for parliamentary seat data for the tiny polity, Reunion, an island east of Madagascar.[14] Tables 4 and 5 report our sources for the percentages of seats recorded for the stimulus and referent elections.

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[10] http://psephos.adam-carr.net/.
[11] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_election_results_by_country.
[12] http://www.ipu.org/english/home.htm.
[13] http://africanelections.tripod.com/.
[14] http://traveldocs.com/.

Table 4: Data Sources for the Stimulus Election

	N	%
Adam Carr Election Archives	96	45.3
Wikipedia Election Results by country	84	39.6
CIA World Factbook 2002	4	1.9
IPU Parline Database	6	2.8
African Elections Database	2	.9
Political Handbook of the World	3	1.4
Traveldocs.com	1	.5
Wikipedia Elections	1	.5
Total	197	92.9
Missing	15	7.1
Total	212	100.0

Table 5: Data Sources for the Referent Election

	N	%
Adam Carr Election Archives	89	42.0
Wikipedia Election Results by country	58	27.4
CIA World Factbook 2008	1	.5
CIA World Factbook 2002	7	3.3
CIA World Factbook Other Year	1	.5
IFES Election Guide	1	.5
IPU Parline Database	17	8.0
ACE Electoral Knowledge Network	1	.5
African Elections Database	12	5.7
Traveldocs.com	1	.5
Total	188	88.7
Missing	24	11.3
Total	212	100.0

Although the Internet provided useful sources of information on parliamentary party compositions, the available information usually had to be sifted and analyzed before determining how many seats each party held, and which party was which. Different sources sometimes reported different figures. Often the sources differed on party names. Too often the parties experienced splits or mergers between elections, making it difficult to trace parties across elections and posing difficulties in deciding how to allocate percentages after party splits. Country experts, no doubt, will dispute some of our scoring decisions. We agonized over some calls ourselves as we rechecked our coding. We cannot verify that our data our error-free, but we can link every score to a party and a source.

## Assessing Competition in Parliamentary Party Systems

We collected data on parliamentary party distribution in order to generate measures of party system competition. Table 6 reports statistics for percentage of seats held by the top three parties in the 187 polities that had deputies seated by parties even in parliaments for which some seats were appointed. The Appendix lists only the seat percentage of the largest party in the stimulus election. The minimum value of 7 percent for the largest party in parliament comes from the stimulus election of 2004 in Belarus, where most seats in the stimulus election were won by nonparty groups, except for the 7 percent won by the Communist Party. The maximum value of 100 percent for the second largest party in a reference election is attributed to Monaco, where a party that won all the seats in 1998 was not the largest party in 2003.

Table 6: Means and Standard Deviations for Percent Seats Held
by the Original Top Three Parties in Both Elections

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Party #1 % in stimulus year	187	7.0	100.0	51.7	20.9
Party #1 % in referent year	187	.0	100.0	42.2	28.2
Party #2 % in stimulus year	187	.0	49.3	23.3	12.5
Party #2 % in referent year	187	.0	100.0	22.9	21.0
Party #3 % in stimulus year	187	.0	24.0	7.6	6.3
Party #3 % in referent year	187	.0	55.0	7.8	9.9

Figures 1a and 1b are histograms that graph the distribution of the percentages of seats held by the largest parties in the stimulus year and by the *same* parties in the referent years, superimposed with the line for a normal curve. The figures reflect the data in the first two rows of Table 6. Two features stand out in these distributions. (1) The percentage distribution in the stimulus year is unimodal, fairly symmetrical, and approximately normal around a mean of 51.7. (2) The comparable distribution for the same parties in the referent year has a much lower mean (42.2) and higher standard deviation (28.2 v. 20.9). Note also that more than 15 of the largest parties in the stimulus year held virtually no seats in the referent year.

Figures 1a and 1b: Histograms for Seat % Held by Party #1, Both Years

Figures 1a and 1b differ because they do not simply display the percentage of seats held by the "largest party" in each year. Instead, they track how well party #1 (the largest party in the stimulus year) fared in the referent year. The designation as "party #1" derives from its status in the stimulus year, and it is not a ranking that carries over to the referent year. In fact, party #1 might fall to second place, third place, or further in percentage of seats held in the referent year. Indeed, the data implies that this often occurs, and the correlation is only .56 between the seats that party #1 won in both years.

Much the same story is repeated in Figures 2a and 2b, histograms that graph the distribution of the percentages of seats held by the second largest parties in the stimulus year and by the *same* parties in the referent years. The figures reflect the data in rows three and four of Table 6. The average second-place party in the stimulus year held 23 percent of the seats. Again, the distribution is unimodal, roughly symmetrical, and also roughly normal. One party (the MLP in Malta) held 49.3 percent of the seats, just short of making it party #1 instead of party #2. More than 10 parties lie in the other tail of the distribution, holding virtually no seats and reflecting that a single party monopolizes some parliaments. More than 40 #2 parties held virtually no seats after the referent election. The correlation is .52 between the seats that party #2 won in both years.

Figures 2a and 2b: Histograms for Seat % Held by Party #2, Both Years

Figures 3a and 3b, histograms graphing the distribution of seat percentages for the third largest parties in the stimulus year and by the *same* parties in the referent years, reflect data from rows five and six in Table 6. These graphs are somewhat different from those for party #1 and party #2. The data distributions are highly skewed. The average #3 party held only 7.8 percent of the seats in the stimulus year, and about 40 countries lacked a third party with parliamentary representation. Nevertheless, the correlation is .48 between seats won by #3 parties in both years.

Figures 3a and 3b: Histograms for Seat % Held by Party #3, Both Years

Although we recorded data on only the top three parties in the stimulus election (and on their seats after the reference election), we captured most of the parliamentary party representation in most of the polities. Table 7 shows that the top three parties held on average over 80 percent of the parliamentary seats in the stimulus election. In referent elections, they held just over 70 percent. The drop occurs because we omitted parties that won seats in the referent election but were not among the top three parties in the stimulus election.

Table 7: Seats Held by Parties #1, #2, and #3 in Both Elections

	N	Minimum	Maximum	Mean	Std. Dev.
Sum of seat percentages for parties #1, #2, and #3 in stimulus election	187	11	100	82.5	18.6
Sum of seat percentages for parties #1, #2, and #3 in referent election	187	.0	100	72.9	27.9

What did we learn about party parliamentary party competition in the stimulus years, from our scores for the top three parties? Of course, the three variables are not mathematically independent. The greater the seat share for party #1, the less the seat shares available to be split between parties #2 and #3. But the correlations were somewhat surprising. The correlation was -.58 between party #1 and party #3, but the correlation between party #1 and party #2 was only -.30. So it seems that the largest parties tend to suck parliamentary representation from parties other than its largest challenger. The very low correlation (+.11) between percentages of seats held by parties #2 and #3 suggests that the success of the second largest party is largely independent of the third party's success. The percentage of seats held by the second largest party in parliament offers itself as a good simple indicator of parliamentary party competition. In our preliminary analyses, we have found that it also has small but significant effects on most World Bank measures of governance.

Assessing Volatility in Parliamentary Party Systems

We collected data on how well those parties were represented after the referent election to assess parliamentary party system volatility. Table 8 summarizes the continuity of parties #1, #2, and #3 over both the stimulus and referent elections. Overall, a great deal of shuffling occurred among the parliamentary parties in the 212 polities. In less than 45 percent of the polities were the parties that ranked 1-2-3 after the stimulus election also among the top three parties after the referent election. The

bigger parties, however, did tend to appear in both elections. Another 21 percent of the time parties #1 and #2 (including those in two party systems) were represented after both elections. In almost 12 percent of the polities, the largest party in the stimulus year stood out as the largest party in the referent year while no other parties from the stimulus year appeared with it.

Table 8: Continuity of Parties #1, #2, and #3 over the Stimulus and Referent Elections

	Frequency	Percent
No parties in chamber either year	24	11.3
None of top 3 parties seated in referent year	7	3.3
Only party #3 held seats both years	2	.9
Only party #2 held seats both years	3	1.4
Parties #2 & #3 held seats both years	4	1.9
Only party #1 held seats both years	25	11.8
Parties #1 & #3 held seats both years	8	3.8
Parties #1 & #2 held seats both years	26	12.3
Two party system, both parties retained seats	18	8.5
Parties #1, #2, and #3 held seats both years	95	44.8
Total	212	100.0

The data in Table 8 hints at the volatility of the polities' parliamentary party systems, but it does not directly measure volatility. In a seminal article, Pedersen defined the concept of "electoral volatility, by which will be meant the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers."[15] He operationalized his concept by summing the absolute differences in the percentage of votes cast for all parties in two adjacent elections and dividing by 2 (to avoid double-counting losses and gains). Others have applied Pedersen's formula to the distribution of parliamentary party seats held by all parties in two adjacent elections.

We measure parliamentary party volatility with a comparable formula but one that adjusts for the share of seats won by *k* parties in adjacent elections when not all parties are included in calculating changes in seat shares.[16] It replaces 2 in the divisor in Pedersen's formula with the sum of the seats won in each election by the set of parties (*k*) included in the calculation. The modified formula no longer ranges from 0 to 100 but from 0 to 1 and can be interpreted as the proportion of change in seat percentages held by *k* parties in two adjacent elections.

$$\text{Volatility in parliamentary party representation}_k = \sum_{i=1}^{k} |p_{i(t)} - p_{i(t-1)}| \Big/ \left(\sum_{i=1}^{k} p_{i(t)} + \sum_{i=1}^{k} p_{i(t-1)} \right)$$

Where k = number of parties compared (here, k=3)
$p_{i(t)}$ = percentage of seats in stimulus year
$p_{i(t-1)}$ = percentage of seats in referent year

Our formula produced "raw" volatility scores—ranging from 0 to 1—that were heavily skewed. To normalize the distribution, we computed logarithms for the raw values. Figures 4a and 4b report data on both volatility variables for all 187 polities that seated deputies by parties. Figure 4a shows that raw party seat volatility is heavily right-skewed, as seven polities generated volatility scores of 1.

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[15] Pedersen, Mogens N. 1979. "The Dynamics of European Party Systems: Changing Patterns of Electoral Volatility," *European Journal of Political Research,* 7, 1-26.
[16] We learned that Sarah Birch used the same formula in *Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe* (Basingstoke: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003) Chapter 6.

A score of 1 meant that no parties repeated in winning seats in both the stimulus and reference elections. Figure 4b portrays the logarithm of the party seat volatility scores, which resembles a normal distribution. By coincidence, seven polities also had volatility scores of 0—a value that cannot be rendered as a logarithm. Instead of treating these as missing data, the volatility scores were arbitrarily set at .01, which permitted logs to be calculated.

Figures 4a and 4b: Distributions of Volatility Scores: Raw and Logged.

There was virtually no correlation (.06) between the logged volatility score and the percentage of seats held by party #2 in the stimulus year. Volatility correlated slightly negatively with party #1 seats (-.28) and slightly positively (.20) with party #3 seats. Our findings correspond with those by Lane and Ersson, who analyzed fifteen party system variables for 16 European nations and found the intercorrelations "generally speaking, not very high, which means that the indicators do not go together." In particular, "volatility does not co-vary with any of the other party system dimensions."[17]

Summary and Conclusion

To help explain cross-polity variation in the six indicators of governance created by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi at the World Bank for 212 countries in 2007, we collected data on political party composition in every polity that had a parliament, legislature, or legislative council—all but two had such a body in 2006. In some of the 210 polities with parliaments, the deputies—whether elected or appointed—had no party affiliations. After painstaking searching on the Internet, we were able to determine for 187 polities the percentages of seats held by the three largest parliamentary parties after a *stimulus* election prior to 2006. We then recorded the percentage of seats held by these same three parties in a *referent* election either prior to or after the stimulus election.

We now turn to our substantive analysis of the World Bank governance scores with plans to rely heavily on two uncorrelated indicators of parliamentary party systems: (1) the percentage of seats held by the second largest party in the parliament at the stimulus year and (2) the log of parliamentary party volatility calculated over the stimulus and referent years. Perhaps our efforts in collecting data for those measures, as reported in this paper, will help us understand to what extent party systems affect the quality of governance in polities across the world.

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[17] Jan-Erik Lane and Svante O. Ersson, *Politics and Society in Western Europe, 3ᵗʰ ed.* (London: Sage Publications, 1994), pp. 180-181.

APPENDIX: List of 212 World Bank Polities with Coded Values and Seat Percentages

Polity	ParParty*	Chamber1**	Party #1***
Afghanistan	7	2	
Albania	8	0	40
Algeria	8	0	51
American Samoa	5	2	
Andorra	8	0	50
Angola	6	7	59
Anguilla	8	1	36
Antigua/Barbuda	8	0	70.5
Argentina	8	0	39
Armenia	8	0	24
Aruba	8	0	52
Australia	8	0	50
Austria	8	0	43
Azerbaijan	8	0	45
Bahamas	8	0	72
Bahrain	6	2	
Bangladesh	8	0	64
Barbados	8	0	77
Belarus	8	4	7
Belgium	8	0	17
Belize	8	0	76
Benin	8	0	38
Bermuda	8	0	61
Bhutan	1	6	
Bolivia	8	0	55
Bosnia/Herz.	8	0	24
Botswana	8	0	77
Brazil	8	0	18
Brunei Darussalam	1	6	
Bulgaria	8	0	34
Burkina Faso	8	0	52
Burundi	8	1	59
Cambodia	8	0	59
Cameroon	8	0	74
Canada	8	0	43
Cape Verde	8	0	55
Cayman Islands	8	1	60
Cen. Afr. Rep.	8	0	40
Chad	8	0	73
Chile	8	0	54
China	4	6	100
Colombia	8	0	33
Comoros	8	1	36
Congo (Brazz)	8	0	34
Congo (Kinshasa)	4	6	18.8
Cook Islands	8	0	50
Costa Rica	8	0	30
Cote D'Ivoire	8	0	43
Croatia	8	0	43.7
Cuba	8	4	98
Cyprus	8	0	36
Czech Republic	8	0	35
Denmark	8	0	30
Djibouti	8	0	100
Dominica	8	1	37.5
Dominican Rep.	8	0	49
Ecuador	8	0	15
Egypt	8	1	68.5
El Salvador	8	0	37
Equatorial Guinea	8	0	98
Eritrea	4	7	100
Estonia	8	0	28
Ethiopia	8	0	60
Fiji	8	0	45
Finland	8	0	28
France	8	0	63
Fr. Guiana	8	0	55
Gabon	8	0	73
Gambia	8	1	94
Georgia	8	1	90
Germany	8	0	36.8
Ghana	8	0	56
Greece	8	0	55
Grenada	8	0	53
Guam	8	0	60
Guatemala	8	0	26.5
Guinea	8	0	75
Guinea-Bissau	8	0	45
Guyana	8	1	52
Haiti	8	0	88
Honduras	8	0	48
Hong Kong	8	1	20
Hungary	8	0	48
Iceland	8	0	35
India	8	0	27
Indonesia	8	0	23
Iran	6	2	54
Iraq	8	0	51
Ireland	8	0	49
Israel	8	0	32
Italy	8	0	58
Jamaica	8	0	58
Japan	8	0	62
Jordan	6	2	16
Kazakhstan	8	1	55
Kenya	8	1	30
Kiribati	8	1	57
Korea, North	8	4	100
Korea, South	8	0	50.8
Kosovo	8	1	41
Kuwait	8	1	42
Kyrgyzstan	7	2	
Laos	8	4	99
Latvia	8	0	26
Lebanon	7	2	
Lesotho	8	0	64.2
Liberia	8	0	23
Libya	3	6	
Liechtenstein	8	0	48
Lithuania	8	0	27
Luxembourg	8	0	40
Macao	8	5	7
Macedonia	8	0	51
Madagascar	8	0	66
Malawi	8	0	30.6
Malaysia	8	0	49.8
Maldives	7	1	
Mali	8	0	33.1
Malta	8	0	50.7
Marshall Islands	5	2	
Martinique	8	0	68
Mauritania	8	0	79
Mauritius	8	1	61.3
Mexico	8	0	44.8
Micronesia	5	2	

Country	ParParty	Chamber1	Party#1
Moldova	8	0	55.4
Monaco	8	0	87.5
Mongolia	8	0	48.7
Montenegro	8	0	48.1
Morocco	8	0	15.4
Mozambique	8	0	64
Myanmar	0	8	
Namibia	8	0	70.5
Nauru	5	2	
Nepal	0	8	
Netherlands	8	0	29.3
Neth. Antilles	8	0	18
New Caledonia	8	0	29.6
New Zealand	8	0	41.3
Nicaragua	8	0	53.3
Niger	8	0	41.6
Nigeria	8	0	61.9
Niue	5	2	
Norway	8	0	36.1
Oman	5	2	
Pakistan	8	1	26.1
Palau	5	2	
Panama	8	0	53
Papua N. Guinea	8	0	17.4
Paraguay	8	0	46.3
Peru	8	0	37.5
Philippines	8	0	31.9
Poland	8	0	33.7
Portugal	8	0	52.6
Puerto Rico	8	0	62.7
Qatar	1	6	
Reunion	8	0	60
Romania	8	0	39.8
Russia	8	0	49.6
Rwanda	8	1	75.5
Saint Kitts /Nevis	8	1	63.6
Saint Lucia	8	0	82.4
Saint Vin.&Gren.	8	1	80
Samoa	8	0	46.9
San Marino	8	0	41.7
Sao Tome &	8	0	43.6
Saudi Arabia	1	6	
Senegal	8	0	74.2
Serbia	8	0	32.8
Seychelles	8	0	67.6
Sierra Leone	8	0	74.1
Singapore	8	1	93.1
Slovakia	8	0	24
Slovenia	8	0	32.2
Solomon Islands	8	0	40
Somalia	1	6	
South Africa	8	0	69.8
Spain	8	0	46.9
Sri Lanka	8	0	46.7
Sudan	4	6	52
Suriname	8	0	45.1
Swaziland	5	2	
Sweden	8	0	41.3
Switzerland	8	0	27.5
Syria	8	0	66.8
Taiwan	8	0	39.6
Tajikistan	8	0	77.8
Tanzania	8	1	81.5
Thailand	8	0	75
Timor-Leste	8	0	62
Togo	8	0	88.9
Tonga	7	5	
Trinidad/Tobago	8	0	55.6
Tunisia	8	0	80.4
Turkey	8	0	66
Turkmenistan	8	4	100
Tuvalu	5	2	
Uganda	7	1	
Ukraine	8	0	24.9
United Arab Emir.	1	5	
United Kingdom	8	0	55.2
United States	8	0	53.3
Uruguay	8	0	52.5
Uzbekistan	8	0	34.2
Vanuatu	8	0	34.6
Venezuela	8	0	69.5
Viet Nam	8	0	90
Virgin Islands	8	0	66.6
West Bank/Gaza	8	0	57
Yemen	8	0	79.1
Zambia	8	1	46
Zimbabwe	8	0	52

*ParParty +
Status of Parliamentary Parties at the Stimulus Election
　　　0 No parliament
　　　1 Appointed deputies, no parties
　　　3 Appointed deputies, unofficial parties
　　　4 Appointed deputies seated by parties
　　　5 Elected deputies, no parties
　　　6 Elected deputies, shadowy/banned parties
　　　7 Elected deputies, unofficial parties
　　　8 Elected deputies, seated by parties

***Party #1
% of seats held by the largest party in the stimulus year

**Chamber1
Elections and Parties in the Lower House
　　　0 All seats popularly elected, most with parties
　　　1 Most seats elected with parties, some appointed or
　　　　　indirectly elected
　　　2 Most seats elected, most without parties
　　　4 All seats elected, without choices among candidates
　　　5 Most seats indirectly elected or appointed
　　　6 All seats indirectly elected or appointed
　　　7 Elections postponed, parliament extended
　　　8 No lower chamber