Regional and Religious Support of Political Parties and Effects on their Issue Positions

KENNETH JANDA

ABSTRACT. Political sociology assumes that social cleavages are manifested in political alignments. This research focuses on the cleavage factors of region and religion in group support of national political parties. It discusses problems in analyzing these factors across cultures and illustrates the problems by analyzing social support for approximately 150 parties in 53 nations in all cultural-geographical areas of the world. Regional and religious patterns of support clearly affect parties' positions on issues. Regionally homogeneous parties tend to oppose national integration, and religiously homogeneous parties tend to oppose the secularization of society. Moreover, parties' positions on secularization also depend heavily on their specific religious composition.

In their pioneering work, Lipset and Rokkan (1967) contend that patterns of support for political parties may be determined by four decisive lines of cleavage: center–periphery, state–church, land–industry, and owner–worker. This formulation of cleavages is based on political issues rather than sociological divisions. Lipset and Rokkan also refer to political alignments based solely on indicators of cultural diversity, such as region, class, and religious denomination (p. 3). Nordlinger (1972) distinguishes social divisions based on *class* (wealth, income, occupation, and education) from those based on *communal* factors (race, tribe, religion, language, and ethnicity). Nordlinger's dichotomy needs to be supplemented by *spatial* factors, such as region and urban–rural place. Although there are probably other bases of social divisions, this is already an impressive list of factors to study for their effects on party support and issue positions across the world.

The Study of Social and Political Cleavages

Of all the possible bases of social cleavage, social class (in some variant) has loomed largest in the analysis of party support. Lipset once claimed, "On a world scale, the principal generalization which can be made is that parties are primarily based on either the lower classes or the middle and upper classes" (1960: 220). Research on the cross-national analysis of party support by social class, compared with research on communal factors, is aided by two facts:

1. *The influence of social class is pervasive*—virtually every society is divided into social classes. In contrast, communal factors are inherently limited in scope; not every society can be meaningfully divided into racial, tribal, religious, language, and ethnic groupings. Where such divisions are meaningful, they may not travel well across societies. Religion, for example, is politically important in India, Lebanon, and France—but in quite different ways.

2. *Social class can be measured on an ordered metric*—from lower to upper. Ordinality is obvious when wealth, income, or education are used as indicators of class, but even occupation (normally a nominal variable) can be ordered for cross-national analysis (low to high prestige). In contrast, communal factors are inherently nominal variables and resist ordered classification even in a single society.

Spatial factors (region and urban–rural) fall somewhere between class and communal factors in their tractability for cross-national analysis. Spatial variables apply to virtually every country, for only the smallest (e.g., San Marino) lack regional or urban–rural variation. But the two variables present different problems in measurement. Region is the quintessential nominal variable—deriving its meaning for political analysis from the geography, history, and administrative structure peculiar to each country. Consequently, regions that have similar names—for example, "south" and "north"—usually lack any basis for comparison across nations. So it makes little sense to compare parties with strong support in the south of the United States even with those that are strong in the south of England—much less in the south of India.

On the other hand, the urban–rural variable is inherently orderable, and the ordinal categories travel well in analysis across nations. It is reasonable to compare parties with strong support in urban areas in the United States with those that have strong support in cities in Britain. However, it is more difficult to obtain data on party support by urban and rural areas than party support by region. Because election results are usually reported by administrative districts, they can almost always be aggregated into regions to measure party support. But election results cannot be aggregated into homogeneous urban and rural areas as easily.

This paper addresses the cross-national analysis of party support by region and religion. Both types of variable are difficult to employ across nations because they are stubbornly nominal, but they differ in their tractability in other ways. Whereas suitable data are more readily available for region than for religion, religious classifications have more capacity for cross-national comparisons than regional categories. Before analyzing parties across the world for regional and religious support, we would benefit from reviewing major studies of party support in Western nations, where the data are better but the scope more limited.

Party Support in Western Europe

I will briefly review three studies of the social bases of party support in Western Europe. The approaches and findings of these studies provide background for a broader analysis of region and religion in party support.

Social Cohesion in Western Parties.   In their pioneering work, Rose and Urwin (1969) analyzed social cohesion of 76 political parties in 17 Western nations on five differentiators: religious, regional, communal (ethnic and linguistic), urban–rural, and class. Among these possible bases of social division, they found only region

relevant for analyzing party support in every nation. Occupation was a basis of distinction in every country except Ireland (but one suspects that the lack of good data on party support by occupation for Ireland also contributed to its omission). Urban–rural divisions were relevant as a basis of party distinction in all but three nations, and religion was politically relevant in all but five. On the other hand, true communal divisions in party support were lacking in 12 of the 17 nations.

After identifying relevant bases of party support in each nation, Rose and Urwin computed the percentage that each subgroup contributed to the party's composition, while adjusting for the subgroup's size in the population. They defined a party as "socially cohesive" if some minimum percentage (usually 67 percent) of its supporters shared a given characteristic *and* if they did so beyond some minimum percentage of that social group's size in the country.[1] For example, although 85 percent of the supporters of the Australian Liberal-Country party were Protestant, Protestants also accounted for 76 percent of the population. Consequently, Rose and Urwin did not score the Liberal-Country party as distinctively cohesive on religion. In contrast, the Democratic Labor party, which was 60 percent Catholic, qualified as religiously cohesive.

Rose and Urwin calculated that religion figured in the social cohesion of 35 parties, class in 33 parties, region in 8, communalism in 7, and urban–rural in only 4. Their findings challenged Lipset's claim that social class was the dominant basis of party support across nations. At least in their study of Western nations, Rose and Urwin found that parties were more cohesive on religion than on any other social factor. However, by demanding that parties meet their arbitrary standard of cohesion, they may have set the criterion too high to detect the more subtle but more pervasive effects of social class.

Regionalism.   In subsequent research, Rose and Urwin focused on region as a factor in party support, noting that "all states other than city-states have some kind of territorial differentiation" (1975: 5). This time they analyzed regional patterns in voting for 108 parties in 19 nations over two elections—one in the 1940s and the other around 1970. (Note that Rose and Urwin were able to expand their study over time and space because of the ready availability of electoral data by regions.) Although they frequently found subtle-to-strong patterns of support for different parties by regions, Rose and Urwin—using a somewhat different methodology— again did not find much regional cohesion among the parties. Focusing on only those parties contesting the second election, they wrote:

> In practice, "party dominant" regions are rare in Western nations today. Six countries . . . have no party winning as many as two-thirds of the seats in a single region. Overall, only 17 of 94 Western parties took as many as two-thirds of the seats in at least one region within their nation (1975: 32).
>
>   The findings are consistent: Political regionalism, in the sense of areas giving nearly all their support to one party, does not exist in the Western world today and only a small number of countries (e.g., Canada, Switzerland and Belgium) have very distinctive regional parties (1975: 38).

By requiring areas to give "nearly all their support to one party," Rose and Urwin again demanded a great deal to establish regional effects. Although this strict criterion conformed to their major interest in studying separatist threats to national units, a more flexible approach would certainly have detected regional influences in

party support in many more cases. Of course, more flexible methods would have produced problems in disentangling regional effects from the effects of other variables that are confounded with regional boundaries.

Region and Religion.   Ersson, Janda, and Lane (1985) designed a study to separate regional effects on party support from the effects of social factors. They analyzed votes cast by region for 93 parties in 16 Western nations over three successive elections ranging from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. Their regional data included variables on employment in industry and agriculture, distribution of income, religion, and ethnic structure. They sought to assess the explanatory potential of regions versus the other social factors through two modes of analysis.

One mode used the regions in each country as nominal variables in a one-way analysis of variance, using the votes cast for each party over all three elections as the dependent variable. In this simple test, region emerged as a very potent independent variable, explaining an average of 75 percent of the variance in party support for all 16 countries.[2] The strongest regional effects were observed in Belgium, where 91 percent of the variance in party voting across 30 districts was associated with individual districts. In fact, region explained more than 60 percent of the variance in every country except Spain (48 percent) and Greece (40 percent).

The other mode of analysis used ecological data on three to five social variables (depending on the country) in ordinary multiple regression to predict the results for the same three elections. Taken together, these social factors explained only an average of 40 percent of the variance in party support for all 16 countries. Again, the variables worked best for Belgium, where five regional indicators of industrial employment, farming activity, income, religion, and Dutch language explained an average of 71 percent of the variance in votes cast for six parties. These factors worked poorest in Greece, where three indicators of industrial employment, farming, and wealth explained only an average of 6 percent of the variance over four parties.

Commenting on the superiority of region over the other social variables in predicting to party support, the authors noted that region was not merely a spatial variable but a stand-in for political tradition and a host of other hidden factors, some of which interact with one another. When used to analyze party support, region substitutes for a complex mix of variables. Even if the mix of variables were known, it would probably exceed the capabilities of ordinary multiple regression. Rather than wondering why a set of three to five social variables explains only 40 percent of party support, one might wonder why it explains so much.

The authors analyzed the patterns of the largest coefficients in all 93 regression analyses to determine which social factors had the greatest effects on party support. They found that religion and industrial employment were present as cleavage dimensions in most West European countries (Ersson, Janda, and Lane, 1985: 186). Interpreting percent employed in industry as a surrogate for social class, Ersson, Janda, and Lane—using very different methodology—thus confirmed the conclusions of Rose and Urwin in identifying both religion and class as major bases of party alignments in Western societies.

Holonational Research on Party Support

In political sociology, cross-national analysis is usually limited to Western nations— Western Europe plus the Anglo-American democracies of Australia, Canada, New

Zealand, and the United States. Much can be learned from such comparative analysis across nations with similar cultures. But to extend our powers of analysis, we should also compare political systems across nations with different cultures. This requires using a sample of nations drawn from various cultural-geographical regions of the world. The anthropologist Raoul Naroll (1972) used the term "holonational" to describe cross-national studies that employ worldwide representative samples.

Comparative research can uncover problems in conceptualization and analysis that escape notice by scholars who focus on a given country. For example, survey research on voting behavior in the United States has employed a unidimensional scale of party identification (Democrats at one end, Independents in the middle, Republicans at the other) that ignores problems in measuring party identification in systems with more than two parties. As a result, the most widely used scale of party identification in the United States treats Independents as a middle category, which produces difficulties in analysis. Perhaps if the original measure had been developed in systems with more than two parties, we would now have better measures of party identification in the United States extending over a longer period of time.

Holonational research on support for political parties across different cultures very quickly uncovers problems of conceptualization and analysis. Some problems can be readily resolved; some cannot. But whether or not they can be readily resolved, confronting problems in cross-cultural analysis usually increases the generality of analysis.

The data for this holonational study of party support come from the International Comparative Political Parties (ICPP) Project (Janda, 1979). The ICPP Project surveyed 158 parties operating in 53 countries during 1950–62. Fifty of these nations were drawn at random in lots of five from each of ten cultural-geographical areas of the world. The other three nations—Britain, the United States, and Canada—were added to the sample for substantive reasons. All parties in each nation that won 5 percent of the legislative seats over two consecutive elections were included in the study. The parties were coded separately for two time periods (1950–56 and 1957–62) for 111 variables (Janda, 1980). This study focuses on only the 147 parties that existed in the later period and on only a few of the available variables.

Conceptualizing and Measuring Social Support

Support for political parties by social groups was assessed according to six potential dimensions of cleavage: (1) socioeconomic status (usually occupation), (2) religion, (3) ethnicity (including language and race), (4) region, (5) urban-rural, and (6) education. The particular groups coded within each of these dimensions varied from country to country, depending on both the historical circumstances of the country and the availability of data resources for coding the parties. Thus, in a Western country the religious groups might be "Catholic", "Protestant," or "Other," while in a Third World country the categories might be "Devout Muslim" or "Nominal Muslim". For all parties within a given country, however, the groups for any given cleavage were identical.

The procedure for scoring the parties on social cleavages can be described with reference to Table 1, which outlines the general case for any country. The columns at the top contained the categories for a given dimension in that country, and the rows contained the parties operating in that country. Party support is conceptualized as adult citizens who identify with the party, not just party members. There are two

Table 1. *Support for* n *Parties across* k *Social Groups.*

	Group$_1$	Group$_2$	....	Group$_k$	Total %
Party$_1$	xx	xx	.	xx	100
Party$_2$	xx	xx	.	xx	100
.			.		.
.			.		.
Party$_n$	xx	xx	.	xx	100
Total %	100	100	.	100	

(1) *Social Attraction* $= 1 - \dfrac{\dfrac{\sum\limits_{j=1}^{k} |X_j - \overline{X}|}{k} \Big/ \overline{X}}{\dfrac{2(k-1)}{k}}$,

Where k is the number of subgroups within the cleavage dimension included in the analysis; X_j is the proportion of the jth group's support given to the party; and $\overline{X}$ is the mean proportion of support for the party, calculated over all social groupings, k.

Method 1 is used to create a measure of *social attraction*, as defined by Formula 1. This measures the extent to which the party attracts supports evenly from each significant subgroup within any cleavage dimension. It ranges from 0.0 to 1.0, with higher values meaning higher attraction. A score of 1.0 is achieved only if there is *no* variation in the percentages of support received by the party from the different social groups in the analysis. A score of 0 results only if a party receives *all* the support of one group while winning *no* support from any other.

(2) *Social Concentration* $= \dfrac{\sum\limits_{j=1}^{k} Y_j^2 - 1/k}{1 - 1/k}$,

Where k is the number of subgroups within the cleavage dimension included in the analysis and Y_j is the proportion of the party's support coming from the jth subgroup of k groups.

Method 2 is used to create a measure of *social concentration*, as defined by Formula 2. This measures the extent to which party supporters are concentrated in specific subgroups within a cleavage dimension. It ranges from 0.0–when the party's support comes equally from the competing groups– to 1.0, when one group contributes all the party's supporters.

ways of assessing party support from this data table: (1) by computing support as a percent of the *group's* preferences for a party, or (2) by computing support from each group as a percent of the party's *total* preferences. Computing percentages by columns conforms to method 1; computing percentages by rows conforms to method 2.

Wherever possible, the ICPP Project used data from official records or sample surveys to score each party on each potential base of support. Although survey data were best for this purpose, such data, even when available, did not guarantee our scoring a party on a base of support. If the survey researchers did not think the social factor was politically important, it was usually omitted from the survey. In the absence of survey data, we used facts and statements in the literature to estimate party support.[3] Again, if authors did not regard a social factor as important, they tended not to mention it as a basis of party support. Although the lack of suitable data (particularly in Third World nations) undoubtedly decreased our overall ability to code parties for support, our success in scoring parties on social factors indicates the relevance of each potential social factor for party alignment.[4]

I will illustrate how the attraction and concentration formulas were applied with an example of two parties coded for religious support. Based on authors' comments in the literature on Indonesian politics in the early 1960s, I scored the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI) as attracting 7 percent of the Devout Muslims (Santri), 33 percent of the larger group of Nominal Muslims (Abangan), and 10 percent of the small minority professing "Other" religions.[5] When these figures were entered into the attraction formula, the PNI obtained a score of 0.50. This was higher than the attraction score of 0.34 obtained by the Muslim Scholars Party (Nahdatul Ulama, NU), which drew support less evenly from Devout Muslims (40 percent), Nominal Muslims (12 percent), and those of Other religions (virtually none).

When the data were recalculated to express the percent of the parties' support that came from each religious group, Devout and Nominal Muslims respectively accounted for 9 and 88 percent of the PNI, compared with 63 and 37 percent of the NU. Entered into the concentration score, these figures produce a value of 0.65 for the PNI and 0.30 for the NU. The PNI's higher score indicates that nearly all of its support was concentrated within a particular group, Nominal Muslims (a point I will discuss later).

Except at the extremes of certain limiting conditions, the attraction and concentration measures are free to vary independently of each other, thus offering two different perspectives from which to evaluate the social bases of party support. Social attraction can be conceived as a measure of party "heterogeneity," and parties high on attraction can be regarded as socially "diverse" or "catch-all" in nature. Social concentration, on the other hand, is a measure of party "homogeneity," and parties high on concentration can be regarded as socially "cohesive," in the sense used by Rose and Urwin (1969). As expected, these measures are negatively related empirically.[6]

As Figure 1 illustrates, we scored more parties for support on occupation and region than for any other social factor. In the case of occupation, this probably reflects the pervasiveness of social class in party politics, as Lipset contended. In the case of region, the high incidence of scoring undoubtedly reflects the existence of electoral data from official records. To some extent, our success in scoring parties according to urban–rural divisions also comes from election results published for major cities.

We were much less successful in scoring parties for religion and education, and least successful by far in scoring parties for ethnicity. With education, we usually suffered from the lack of hard data or an absence of writers' comments on its relevance to party cleavages. Religion and ethnicity are a different story, however. Even lacking good data, writers usually stated whether parties were divided by the communal factors of religion and ethnicity. Whenever writers mentioned these factors as bases of party division, we scored the parties from their statements.

Because the lack of writers' comments about religious bases of party support implies the lack of cleavage, religion appears to be less important than occupation in differentiating parties throughout the world. That is, religion appears to be unimportant when judged by the criterion of pervasiveness (frequency of mention). By that criterion, region—not religion—appears to rival occupation in importance.

Scholars regard the social composition of a party as important because they assume that the structure of social support affects party policies and actions. Whether either regional or religious support for political parties affects their positions on regional or religious issues remains to be demonstrated. We will consider first the case of regionalism.

Figure 1. *Success in coding parties on six bases of social support (1957–1962).*

Regionalism in Party Support and Policies

Region is a difficult variable to use in cross-national analysis, because regional categories—e.g., north, Bavaria, highlands, Stockholm—are inherently nominal and are not comparable across countries. Consequently, I avoided analyzing support by specific region and followed the standard approach used by Rose and Urwin, assessing the overall pattern of regional support. My analysis differed, however, by studying a much wider set of countries and by relying on the attraction and concentration scores generated from the ICPP Project. These scores measured whether parties (1) attracted their supporters equally from all regions (however the regions were determined for each country), or (2) had their support concentrated within a single region.

Regionalism in Party Support

To interpret the parties' scores on these measures, we need some benchmarks. The most appropriate ones are the parties' scores for the same measures on the other potential bases of social support. As shown in Figure 2, regionalism is not a powerful differentiator among political parties across nations. Compared with their scores on occupational groupings, for example, political parties attract support more evenly across regional categories and have less support concentrated within any particular regional category. Among the social differentiators, only education shows as little potential for political cleavage among political parties.

   This finding for 122 parties across 45 nations reinforces the findings of Rose and Urwin in their study of Western parties. Although regionalism is pervasive in its

Figure 2. *Indices of party support on six social bases.*

effects on support for political parties, those effects are not very strong when compared with the effects of other potential differentiators. The relative weakness of regionalism in party politics can be explored further by assessing the effect of regionalism on the political issue of national integration.

Regionalism and National Integration

The parties in the ICPP Project were scored on thirteen different issues: (1) government ownership of means of production, (2) government role in economic planning, (3) redistribution of wealth, (4) social welfare, (5) secularization of society, (6) support of the military, (7) alignment with East–West blocs, (8) anticolonialism, (9) supranational integration, (10) national integration, (11) electoral participation, (12) protection of civil rights, and (13) interference with civil liberties. Factor analysis showed that all but two of these issues could be subsumed under two factors: Marxism (representing an economic orientation), and Liberalism (representing a social order dimension).

Quite understandably, the issue of "national integration," which is most relevant to our interest in regionalism, did not relate to either Marxism or Liberalism. Lipset and Rokkan define the issue of national integration as "the conflict between the central nation-building culture and the increasing resistance of the ethnically, linguistically, or religiously distinct subject populations in the provinces and the peripheries" (1967: 14). This concept focuses on the party's predisposition towards the preservation or reduction of distinctive cultural and regional characteristics, exclusive of class.

National integration focuses on the functional and symbolic authority advocated by the party, specifically whether national or subnational influences predominate.

Table 2. *Issue of National Integration: Codes and Results*

Stance toward National Integration	Code		Number of Parties
PRO-strong	+5	*Extreme nationalist:* Advocates obliterating subnational authority, completely assimilating all segments into a national political culture	23
	+4	Intermediate score	4
PRO-moderate	+3	*Nationalist:* Advocates predominance of national authority structures and combined with reluctant toleration of some expression of regional authority	25
	+2	Intermediate score	5
PRO-weak	+1	*Nationalist/localist:* Advocates dominance of national authority structures and symbols, combined with recognizing subnational distinctions *and* an effort to accommodate them, for example, through differential legislation	29
Neutral	0	Or stance is ambiguous or contradictory	10
CON-weak	−1	*Federalist:* Advocates vitual sharing of decision making authority between national and subnational power centers	13
	−2	Intermediate score	3
CON-moderate	−3	*Confederationist:* Advocates sacrifice of some subnational authority to a confederal government, maintaining distinct schools, law enforcement agencies, and the like	4
	−4	Intermediate score	0
CON-strong	−5	*Separationist:* Advocates perpetuating subnational autonomy through secession	3
		Total number of parties scored	119

The extreme nationalist position advocates obliterating subnational loyalties, whether regional, ethnic, linguistic, traditional, or some combination thereof. The Kemalist revolution led by the Turkish People's Party in the 1920s followed such a program, Turkifying ethnic minorities and revitalizing the Turkish nation through political, legal, and educational reform.[7] The extreme disintegrative position on this issue is the assertion of subnational autonomy, that is, separatism.

A total of 119 parties operating during 1957–62 were coded for their stance on national integration according to the categories in Table 2. The mean score of all 119 parties scored on national integration was 1.67, suggesting that most parties favored national unity and that few tended towards separatism.

Data on regional support were available for 99 of these 119 parties, permitting a broad test of the relationship between the parties' regional support and their positions on national integration. Cleavage theory predicts that parties that are regionally heterogeneous would tend to favor national integration more than parties that are regionally homogeneous. The observed correlations between the two measures of regional support and national integration were low, but both coefficients were in the expected directions ($r = +0.33$ for regional attraction and $r = -0.32$ for regional concentration). These correlations conform to cleavage theory, demonstrating a significant, but limited, effect of regional patterns of party support on the positions taken by parties on the issue of national integration.

Squaring the correlation coefficients calculates the proportion of variance in one variable explained by the other. By this measure, only about 10 percent of the variance in parties' positions on national integration can be explained by either the homogeneous or heterogeneous nature of their regional support. Combining the two support measures in multiple regression analysis did not materially improve the explanation. Presumably other factors, such as the *particular* regions that supported parties in particular countries, would explain additional variation if they could be brought into the analysis somehow. That is not easy across nations, due to the idiosyncratic nature of the regional variable. Later, however, I will explore the explanatory effects of particular *religious* groups on issue positions.

Overall, this analysis conforms to the findings of Rose and Urwin and those of Ersson, Janda, and Lane. They detected regional effects in party support in almost every country. "Region," however, is primarily a surrogate for other social factors—class, religion, ethnicity, and so on. In its extreme form, political regionalism can produce separatism, and separatist parties, when they exist, can threaten national integration. Fortunately for government stability, separatist parties are not common. Although regionalism is pervasive, previous studies showed that regionalism is not a critical factor in support of political parties. This study shows that when regionalism is measured by homogeneity or heterogeneity of party supporters, it is also limited in explaining parties' position on national integration.

Religion in Party Support and Policies

Religion is also a difficult variable to use in cross-national analysis. Like regionalism, it is primarily a nominal variable whose categories depend on the history of the country. Unlike regionalism, however, religion offers some basis for comparability of categories across nations. For example, Catholicism, Islam, and major Protestant denominations are prominent in several nations. Unfortunately, there are many variations on religious themes, making religion a challenging variable for cross-national analysis, particularly holonational analysis.

Religion in Party Support

As reported previously in Figure 1, religion is not a pervasive differentiator of party support. Only 76 of the 147 parties in the 1957–62 time period were coded on religious categories. However, when religion *is* politically relevant, it is a powerful differentiator. The attraction and concentration scores graphed in Figure 2 show that parties tend to attract support less evenly across different religions than different occupations, and that parties have more support concentrated within particular

religions than occupations. Parties show more cleavage in support on religion than on any other differentiator except ethnicity. However, ethnicity was coded for only 45 parties and was distinctly limited in its effects.

These findings for religious support of political parties across cultures support previous research cited for Western nations: religion is a pervasive basis of party support with pronounced effects on political alignments. The present research extends the study of religion in party support by examining more closely the patterns of support across Western and non-Western nations.

Religion and Secularization of Society

"Secularization of society" was one of the thirteen issues on which parties were scored in the ICPP Project. Although factor analysis identified secularization as one of seven issues in a Marxism factor, it had the lowest average intercorrelations with the other six and correlated only 0.50 with the underlying factor. Thus the parties' positions on secularization of society often varied from their positions on the other issues, such as ownership of the means of production, economic planning, and so on.

Presumably, the religious structure of party support explains the parties' positions on this issue, which reflects what Lipset and Rokkan called "the conflict between the centralizing, standardizing, and mobilizing nation-state and the historically established corporate privileges of the Church" (1967: 14). They note that "parties of religious defense" resisted attempts by secular parties "to create direct links of influence and control between the nation-state and the individual citizen" (1967:15).

The religious variable becomes politically critical in the presence of an institutionalized church. Thus the issue is blunted in India not only by the traditional Hindu view, separating religious and secular authority, but also by the fact, as Weiner has put it, that "since Hinduism has no church, the power of the Brahmin was that of an individual rather than of an institution" (1960: 161). The Islamic tradition, by contrast, makes no distinction between religious and secular life. Hence, although "Indian and Ceylonese politicians continue to exploit Hinduism and Buddhism with little fear that an organized Hindu or Buddhist clergy or church will displace them . . . Pakistani politicians must handle the religious issue with great care . . ." to avoid the creation of an Islamic state (Weiner, 1960: 162).

The secularization variable measures the party's posture towards the privileges of the church. Among the various views of secularization proposed by Broughton and Rudd (1984), it conforms best to their concept of "laicization." Parties were coded for stances ranging from support for government expropriation of church property or official discouragement of religious practices at one extreme to a preference for a state religion at the other. Intermediate categories express the party's attitude towards state support of the church. The coding scheme and the success in coding the parties is detailed in Table 3. A total of 111 of 147 parties operating during 1957–62 were coded on secularization of society. The mean score of all 111 parties scored was −0.67, almost at the middle point of the scale but slightly opposed to secularization.

To assess the effect of religious basis of support on the issue of secularization of society, I analyzed the 64 parties scored on both religion and secularization.[8] Each party's score on secularization of society was correlated with the measures of attraction and concentration over all relevant categories of religious support within each country. According to the theory of cross-cutting cleavages, parties that attract

Table 3. *Issue of Secularization of Society: Codes and Results*

Stance toward Secularization	Code		Number of Parties
PRO-strong	+5	Advocates expropriation of church property or official discouragement of religious practices	6
	+4	Intermediate score	3
PRO-moderate	+3	Advocates abolition of parochial educational systems or punitive taxation of church property	11
	+2	Intermediate score	3
PRO-weak	+1	Advocates removal of state aid to parochial schools, clergy, or church operations or taxation of church property at non-punitive rates	10
Neutral	0	Or stance is ambiguous or contradictory	14
CON-weak	−1	Takes generally benevolent attitude toward religion; advocates exemption of church property from taxation	18
	−2	Intermediate score	6
CON-moderate	−3	Advocates state monetary support of parochial schools, clergy, or church property	32
	−4	Intermediate score	1
CON-strong	−5	Advocates establishing a state religion; imposes a system of laws based on religious prescription	7

Total number of parties scored   111

support evenly from various religions will tend to have higher secularization scores than those whose support is uneven. Also, parties whose supporters are concentrated among particular religions will tend to have lower secularization scores than those whose composition is spread over religions. The observed coefficients were low but in the expected directions: for attraction, $r = +0.39$, and for concentration, $r = -0.33$.

These results were similar to those obtained when analyzing regional effects on national integration. But the low values for secularization in particular illuminate a problem in using any formula that aggregates party support over groups without identifying the particular groups that heavily influence the aggregate score. Because nominal Muslims accounted for 88 percent of its supporters, the Indonesian PNI received a higher religious concentration score than the NU, mostly a party of devout Muslims. What appears to be a straightforward test of cleavage theory, using measures of social attraction and concentration to predict party positions on related issues, really misclassifies parties that deviate from the assumed pattern of group influence.

A Step Further: The Effects of Specific Religious Groups

So far, I have relied on aggregate measures of attraction and concentration to assess regional and religious effects on the issues of national integration and secularization of society. Because regional categories cannot be compared across countries, the effects of regionalism cannot be examined much further. But religious categories *do* have some cross-national comparability. If, as assumed, the structure of social support affects party policies, the parties' scores on support from comparable religious groups should be able to explain their positions on secularization of society, even across cultures.

I know of no previous attempt to assess the effects of religious support on party positions across cultures, so this step in the analysis was frankly exploratory. Figure 3 illustrates the problem of studying religion across nations by graphing the religious composition of the 24 nations in the ICPP study whose 76 parties were coded for religious support. The nations are arranged in decreasing order of percent Christian and roughly in increasing order of percent Muslim. The presence of Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist nations in this holonational study complicates cross-national analysis, overwhelming the simple Catholic/Protestant categories applied to mostly Christian Western nations.

Figure 3. *Variety in religions across the world.*

Sources: Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators, II* (Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1973); and *The Worldmark Encyclopaedia of the Nations* (New York: Worldmark Press, 1960).

Figure 4. *Coding parties on support from 29 religious groups.*

Figure 4 graphs the 29 distinct religious categories coded for all the parties for which we have data.[9] The most common category, Catholic, applied to 34 parties in eleven countries. The undifferentiated Muslim category also was heavily used, figuring in 17 parties in seven countries. Other categories, such as the Druze and the Maronite Christians in the Lebanon, are largely idiosyncratic to a country. These categories were attached to only the four Lebanese parties. In fact, the Lebanon's four parties also accounted for the appearance of the Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims and the Orthodox and Greek Catholic categories.

A Devotional Theory of Party Positions on Secularization

Little theory exists that predicts which of the 29 nominal categories of religious groups would favor or oppose secularization. Within any type of religion, however, one can theorize that the parties' positions on secularization would depend on the religious devotion of their supporters: *the more devout the religious supporters of a political party, the more they oppose secularization.*

This general theory implies separate sets of hypotheses for each type of religion. Unfortunately, the ICPP data limits the distinctions that can be made among the devotion of supporters within religious types. For example, one is hard-pressed to assess religiosity among the seven diverse groups of Protestants listed in Figure 4. Similarly, one cannot easily claim that Buddhists are more devout than Hindus. The only meaningful distinctions in religiosity in the ICPP data apply to Catholics and

Muslims. Consequently, I formulate only two sets of hypotheses for testing with the available data.

For Catholics, the theory translates as *the more devout the Catholicism of party supporters, the more opposed the party is to secularization of society.* The data allow testing four hypotheses consistent with this theory:

> 1. Parties supported by Devout Catholics oppose secularization more than parties supported by Moderate Catholics.
> 2. Parties supported by Moderate Catholics oppose secularization more than parties supported by Nominal Catholics.
> 3. By implication, parties supported by Devout Catholics also oppose secularization more than parties supported by Nominal Catholics.
> 4. Parties supported by undifferentiated "Catholics" oppose secularization less than Devout Catholics but more than Nominal Catholics.

Devotion to Catholicism was measured differently depending on the country, but it usually reflected frequency of church attendance.

For Muslims, the theory becomes, *the more devout the Islamic orientation of party supporters, the more opposed the party is to secularization of society.* The data allow testing four parallel hypotheses:

> 5. Parties supported by Devout Muslims oppose secularization more than parties supported by Nominal Muslims.
> 6. Parties supported by Nominal Muslims oppose secularization more than parties supported by Non-Muslims.
> 7. By implication, parties supported by Devout Muslims will also oppose secularization more than party supported by Non-Muslims.
> 8. Parties supported by undifferentiated "Muslims" will oppose secularization less than Devout Muslims but more than Nominal Muslims.

Devotion to Islam among party supporters was assessed by authors' comments on each party system.

The Analysis of Religious Effects on Secularization

Ordinary regression analysis was used to estimate religious effects on secularization. The first step involved computing the proportion of a party's support that came from each religious group. This procedure conforms to computing percentages by rows in Table 1. It is the basis of the ICPP measure of concentration, and it follows the procedure that Rose and Urwin used in assessing party cohesion. To emphasize the dominant position of majority groups in a party, however, the proportions of the party's support from each group were squared, which gave extra weight to larger groups.[10]

If the religious group did not apply to a party, the party's score for that variable was set to 0.0 rather than treated as missing. In this way, all parties coded for religion were coded for *each* of the 29 religious groups. However, a group would be activated in the analysis only if the party's support from that group were greater than zero. In a sense, the religious groups were treated like so-called dummy variables in regression analysis, except that the religious support variables ranged in decimal values from 0.0 to 1.0, not just the binary values of 0 or 1. Although there were 29 groups, fewer than six contributed to the support of any particular party.

As anyone who has done regression analysis knows, a researcher has many options in executing the analysis and often conducts many analyses before choosing one to report. Virtually all the analyses conducted tended to support the hypotheses, but with different coefficients and degrees of fit in explaining secularization. Obviously, with 29 variables and only 64 parties coded for secularization, there is considerable potential for high explanation.[11] One analysis that used all the religious variables accounted for 87 percent of the variance in parties' positions on secularization of society.[12]

The analysis reported here eliminates some of the line-fitting consequences of using many variables by combining religious categories in keeping with the hypotheses to be tested. Thus, the Maronites in the Lebanon were eliminated as a distinct variable and were put in the generic "Catholic" category.[13] This change, which affected only the four Lebanese parties, raised the number of generic Catholic parties from 34 identified in Figure 4 to 38. Similarly, the Sunni, Shi'ite, and Druze brands of Islam in the Lebanon and the Answar and Non-Answar sects in the Sudan were put in the generic "Muslim" category. This second change, which affected only seven parties (four Lebanese and three Sudanese), dropped five more variables and raised the number of generic Muslim parties from the 17 parties identified in Figure 4 to 24. Finally, the Sikhs, who were coded for only two Indian parties, were put into the Other religious group.[14] Overall, these changes tended to decrease the explained variance by eliminating party-specific variables from the analysis.

After combining various Catholic and Muslim groups into the generic categories and allowing for data peculiarities, the original 29 religious groups were reduced to 22. Finally, all 22 religious variables were entered into a multiple regression analysis of the positions on secularization of society taken by 64 parties. The resulting equation produced an R^2 of 0.57 with an adjusted R^2 of 0.34. Expressed in words, more than half the variance in party positions on the secularization issue can be explained by the proportions of their supporters who come from these religious groups.

Figure 5 plots the secularization scores assigned to each of the 64 parties against their scores predicted by their religious composition according to the regression equation. Two Marxist parties, the Albanian Workers Party and the Democratic Party of Guinea, were among those that deviated the most from their predicted score and towards secularization. The prevalence of Islam in Albania led to a high concentration of Muslims within the membership of the Workers Party, but communist ideology dictated the party's position on secularization. To a lesser extent, this was true in one-party Guinea, where the PDG was mostly Muslim. Some of the other parties that favor secularization more than expected by their religious makeup can also be explained by historical factors.

On the other hand, most of the parties opposed to secularization are close to the predicted regression line. Some obviously religious parties—the French Catholic MRP, Dutch Anti-Revolutionary Party, Dutch Christian Historical Union—fall neatly into place in the lower left-hand section of the plot. Note in particular the placements of the Indonesian Nationalist and the Indonesian NU (the PNI and Muslim Scholars' Party discussed earlier). The regression line reflects the strong presence of Nominal Muslims in the PNI and Devout Muslims in the NU, predicting the parties' positions on secularization almost exactly.

Given that there is considerable measurement error both in coding parties on issues and in scoring them on religious composition, this is a striking confirmation of the

Figure 5. *Assigned secularization scores regressed against predicted scores for 64 parties, $R^2 = 0.57$.*

assumption that the social composition of political parties affects their issue positions. Even more impressive is the pattern of beta coefficients produced by the regression equation. As shown in Figure 6, the coefficients in the shaded areas for Catholics and Muslims support all eight hypotheses generated by the devotional theory of party positions on secularization. The coefficients of -0.30 and -0.37 respectively associated with Devout Catholics and Devout Muslims state the standardized effects of these variables on secularization. For each standardized unit of increase in Catholic or Muslim support, parties tend to *decrease* -0.30 and -0.37 standardized units, respectively, in their support of secularization.[15]

Figure 6. *Effects of 22 religious groups on parties' positions on secularization of society.* *

R^2=0.57, adjusted R^2=0.34. *In some cases, the beta coefficients pertain to data coded for only a few parties. See Figure 4 for the number of parties coded for each religious group.

To help clarify the patterns in the regression equation, the coefficients for all the other groups have been ordered from large negative to large positive values.[16] The large and opposing effects of the Greek Catholic and Orthodox variables reflect the idiosyncracies of Lebanese politics and do not merit more general interpretation. The negative coefficients for most of the Protestant groups, which apply mostly to Western parties, suggest that parties with strong Protestant components tend to oppose secularization. The exceptions are parties that are strongly Anglican and those that are vaguely "Christian," which are exclusively in the Third World. The Buddhist and Hindu variables are tied solely to three parties in Burma and two in India—not enough to offer interpretations. Although the large negative coefficient for the Animist variable (coded for nine parties) is surprising, we expect the positive coefficients produced for No Religion and Other, for these groups are not thought to benefit from secularization.

These results, while theoretically satisfying, should be viewed as exploratory. The analysis needs to be replicated with more parties using better data. Because it may prove harder to score parties for secularization than for religious composition, the

initial effort might go into scoring the forty-seven ICPP parties that were coded for secularization but not for religious composition. Ideally, new research would be undertaken to score contemporary parties for both the dependent and independent variables. While this may be done with moderate effort for parties in Western countries, it is a major undertaking for parties in the Third World, which must be included to broaden the study of religious influences in politics.

Conclusion

Previous studies of the social bases of party support in Western nations suggest that region and religion are, along with social class, worthy of analysis. However, the variables of region and religion are more difficult than class to include in a cross-national analysis of the effects of social cleavages on political cleavages. Both variables are inherently nominal and resist comparison across nations. Comparability has been achieved in research by studying whether parties are regionally or religiously "homogeneous" rather than "heterogeneous," without paying close attention to the categories used in the analysis.

Following this basic approach, this holonational analysis of region and religion as bases of party support confirms the basic findings from the more limited analyses across Western nations. The influence of region on party support is pervasive but not particularly salient or critical. The influence of religion on party support is less pervasive but more salient or critical when it occurs. Both regional and religious homogeneity among party supporters predict modestly to parties' positions, respectively, on issues of national integration and secularization of society.

This study extends the analysis of party support beyond aggregate measures of social heterogeneity and homogeneity to explore the effects of particular religious groups in a party on its position on secularization. This approach, which tested eight hypotheses from a devotional theory of secularization, produced findings that were theoretically satisfying. A set of 22 variables, each representing a religious group, explained 57 percent of the variance in the parties' position on secularization. Moreover, all eight hypotheses were supported by the coefficients generated from the regression analysis. These exploratory findings invite additional cross-cultural research on the effects of religious support on parties' issue positions.

Notes

1. Their criteria were somewhat more involved than this. See the five points they list on pages 10–11.
2. The regions were nominal variables in a one-way analysis of variance, predicting to party strength in each of three elections. Eta-squared was used to estimate the percentage of variance attributable to regions.
3. My assistant and I estimated party support through fairly rigorous procedures. We first created a table with empty cells but with fixed totals for the rows and columns. The row totals reported the strength (in percent) of each party in the country, determined mainly from reliable electoral data. The column totals contained the strength (in percent) of each subgroup in the population, determined mainly from census data. We were forced to enter our estimates of party support as percentages of the entire society—such that the entries would sum appropriately to the row and column totals. This constraint ensured that our estimates were internally consistent and thus helped improve their accuracy.
4. The ICPP Project used still a third measure of social support, social reflection. See Gillies

and Janda (1975), Gillies (1979), and Janda (1980) for additional discussion of these measures and their application to the analysis of political parties.

5. I chose the Indonesian case to illustrate how parties were scored for religious composition in the absence of survey data. The Indonesian population was estimated to be 90 percent Muslim. The literature notes that the Santri, Devout Muslims, are greatly outnumbered by the Abangan, or Nominal Muslims. For coding purposes, I assumed a one-third to two-thirds split, but that was obviously a crude estimate. One source said that the Santri backed religious parties, such as NU and Masjumi, while Abangan voted for non-religious parties, such as PNI and PKI (Sjadzali, 1959: 48). Other sources (Kahin, 1952: 157; McVey, 1963: 158) corroborated these observations, which led to estimates of party support that were internally consistent with the scoring matrix of Table 1. (See Janda, 1980: 711.)

6. See Janda (1980: 145–47) for a discussion of the extent of interrelationships across the range of social dimensions.

7. The secularizing aspects of the movement are coded in the secularization variable, discussed in the next section.

8. The number of parties was reduced from 76 to 64 due to missing data on the dependent variable, secularization of society.

9. Two categories, Animist/Other and Non-Animist, were excluded. They only applied to one party, and it was excluded from the later analysis for lack of data on secularization.

10. Squaring proportions to measuring dominance or concentration is a common technique. A parallel analysis done with simple proportions produced similar results, but this analysis is theoretically more appropriate and the results are slightly more satisfying.

11. However, the number of variables is misleading. Although each of 29 different religious groups constitutes a variable in this analysis, most of these variables are coded 0 for any given party. In fact, the number of applicable variables ranges from two to six, for all parties in the analysis are coded for support from at least two groups, and no parties are coded for support from more than six groups.

12. This analysis was reported in Janda (1988). It included nearly all the religious groups plus four variables for the percent Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, and Orthodox in the nation's population. Despite using 31 variables to produce an R^2 of 0.87, the adjusted R^2 was 0.69.

13. In hindsight, the Greek Catholics also probably should have been placed in the generic Catholic group for this analysis, but they were treated separately.

14. The Sikhs, who were coded only for the Congress and Communist parties in India, had to be dropped from separate consideration due to instability of their regression coefficients from analysis to analysis. There simply were not enough observations on Sikhs as a group to warrant including them in this part of the study.

15. A standardized unit refers to a standard deviation. The statement in the text could be rephrased to say that an increase of one standard deviation in group support would result in -0.30 or -0.37 standard deviation changes in secularization. Figure 6 reports standardized (beta) coefficients in the regression equation rather than unstandardized coefficients because of wide differences in the number of parties coded for each religious group, which greatly affects the standard deviation for each variable. Note also that group support is measured in proportions *squared.*

16. Seven of the coefficients were significant at the 0.10 level, and five of these were significant at the 0.05 level. Given only 64 cases and 22 variables, I am less concerned about their significance levels and more concerned with their overall pattern in accordance with the eight hypotheses.

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Biographical Note

KENNETH JANDA is Payson S. Wild Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University. His major substantive interests divide between American government and comparative political parties. His latest book is *The Challenge of Democracy: Government in America* (1989, co-authored with Jeffrey Berry and Jeff Goldman). In comparative politics, his last book was *Parties and Their Environments: Limits to Reform?* (1982, co-authored with Robert Harmel). ADDRESS: Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, U.S.A.