


Comparing Political Parties

by

Robert Harmel, Texas A&M University with
Kenneth Janda, Northwestern University



SETUPS

Cross-National and World Politics
Revised Edition, May 1978

Comparing Political Parties

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The data for this module are largely derived from the data which have been collected by the *International Comparative Political Parties Project* with Kenneth Janda as principal investigator. Also gratefully acknowledged is the use of some variables from Bruce Russett et al's *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* and Ted Robert Gurr's *Polity Persistence and Change* data set. Kay Lawson and William Keech provided many helpful comments and suggestions, as did C. William Hill, who field-tested the module at Roanoke College. Finally, we would like to acknowledge the assistance of Diane Dawsey of Texas A&M in making final data set revisions, and Robert Thompson's comments on an earlier version of the manuscript.

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Test editions of SETUPS were prepared by the faculty participating in the Workshop. Each SETUPS was reviewed by at least three qualified persons and tested in at least six classes. These evaluations were used by the authors and the editor in revising the modules.

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FOREWORD

SETUPS: American Politics launched the Association's effort to provide innovative instructional materials on recent research topics. In the preface to the revised editions of these SETUPS, published in 1975, we expressed the hope that students and teachers would find the materials useful. And many do: twenty thousand SETUPS have been ordered for classes in over two hundred universities and colleges in the United States, Canada, Australia and Europe.

Hence, it is with great satisfaction that we introduce a second series of SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics, for courses in comparative politics, international politics and methodology. The SETUPS in this series were prepared in the summer of 1975 by political scientists at a College Faculty Workshop, supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation and hosted by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan. We are indebted to the Consortium on several counts: Their rich archive is the source of most SETUPS data; their talented and industrious staff assisted SETUPS authors and continues to prepare and distribute the datasets with great dispatch.

Now we would encourage faculty working at their own institutions to continue to develop SETUPS units that can be field tested, reviewed and revised for general class use.

Evron M. Kirkpatrick
Executive Director
American Political Science Association
August, 1978

EDITOR'S PREFACE

SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics represents, in one sense, variation on a highly successful theme. The College Faculty Workshop, held in Ann Arbor in the summer of 1975, was consciously directed toward use of the *SETUPS: American Politics* as a model. A year's experience with the testing and evaluation of the first series had provided Sheilah Koeppen Mann, APSA project director, and Catherine Kelleher, workshop director from ICPSR, with a clear set of benchmarks in terms of style, format, and level of difficulty. Some of the key people were the same, most especially, the senior workshop consultants, William Buchanan of Washington and Lee University and Betty A. Nesvold, San Diego State University, who had been workshop directors for the first series. The technical support staff of the ICPSR were by then seasoned veterans in both the design and dissemination of data components for instructional purposes.

In other ways, however, the Cross-National and World Politics series involves some significant, even radical departures. The first is a variation of focus within the series. While the majority of volumes are still primarily intended for the introductory level, all strive for greater breadth and adaptability. Some are even specifically designed for upper-division students with at least some background in political analysis. Second, the evaluations of the American series revealed a felt need (most often among instructors in small schools or with very large classes) for more varied, flexible approaches to data analysis. Accordingly, a number of the volumes stress modes of analysis which, though quantitative, do not necessarily require computer use. A third shift is the direct incorporation in the text of numerous suggestions for further research. This is aimed not only towards stimulating the advanced student but also to emphasize the different types of questions which can be addressed to the same data base, and the chance to extend the data base to permit more rigorous testing and exploration.

Perhaps the most striking innovations, however, come in the creative responses of the workshop participants to the central dilemma of all cross-national analysis: the question of comparability across time and space. Every author had to wrestle with the problem of defining similar events; most worried long and hard about parallel indicators or congruent questions. A number found themselves engaged in a considerable amount of original research; working with the ICPSR staff to develop new data sets or drawing on unpublished research,

their own or that of generous fellow scholars. Still others faced the relatively novel challenge of including the United States as a country for comparison. In all, it was a learning experience for all the workshop participants, one which has implicitly enriched the materials for student use, but also has provided new insights for the field as a whole.

With the publication of *SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics* the SETUPS model now seems well launched. Individual teachers and researchers now have a variety of examples to guide their development of new instructional materials, either for their own use or for eventual distribution under the continuing APSA program. It would now seem appropriate to consider what other modes of instructional materials can be designed to meet the standards embodied in SETUPS series. There may be simpler approaches—as in data sets, instructional decks, research design exercise; there may be more complex structures—as integrated courses, linked modules, or more comprehensive networks combining materials development, instructor training, and student peer group diffusion. But all must serve the goal the SETUPS series have established: an introduction for undergraduate students to the conduct of research, to critical thinking about the relationship between evidence and inference, at the highest level of professional and instructional excellence.

Our personal debts in the implementation of the SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics are many. Our appreciation must go first to the workshop participants, all committed to the best in undergraduate teaching, and to the production of innovative materials on an impossible timetable. They are: Herb Asher, Ohio State; Donald Borock, Gettysburg College; John Campbell, University of Michigan; Terry Dungworth, Michigan State University; James Dyer, Texas A&M University; John Echols, University of Michigan; Lee Fennell, University of the Pacific; Karen A. Feste, University of Denver; Robert Harmel, Texas A&M University; Roger Harrell, California State University at Northridge; William Klecka, University of Cincinnati; Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Governor's State University; Daniel Nelson, Franklin and Marshall College; Bradley Richardson, Ohio State University; Jay Stevens, California State University at Long Beach; and Charles Taylor, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. Our appreciation, too, to the SETUPS support staff: Valerie Bunce, Karen Carty, Gretchen Fei, and John Stuckey, all of the University of Michigan. Thanks of special note to the ICPSR staff, particularly Eric Austin, Robert Beattie, Carolyn Geda, and Henry Heitoweit. Last, but hardly least, are two without whom *SETUPS: Cross-National and World Politics* would not have been possible: Buck Buchanan, comrade in arms, and Sheilah Koeppen Mann, project director extraordinaire.

Catherine M. Kelleher, Michigan
Betty A. Nesvold, San Diego State
Editors

To the Instructor

The purpose of this module is to introduce the student, as painlessly as possible, to the exciting enterprise of data analysis. Specifically, the module is designed to instruct the student in the production and visual interpretation of cross-tabulation tables. And because the module is a semi self-contained instructional unit, it is possible to use the module with a relatively minimal amount of classroom instruction. However, the module does not teach the student how to use data-processing equipment; it is left to the instructor to provide very basic skills necessary to use the computer (or card sorting device) in the production of cross-tabulation tables. In addition, we have found that in-class time can very profitably be spent in discussion of the concepts and hypotheses which are introduced here, as well as the results of the student's own experiences with the data.

Though the module "builds" as it progresses, both conceptually and analytically, it has been designed to maximize flexibility in its use in the classroom. In other words, though it is essential to use Chapters One and Two first, and in that order, Chapters Three through Five may be interchanged, if necessary, to fit the design of your course. Chapter One, which defines and discusses the functions of political parties, also engages the student in analysis of a 2X2 cross-tabulation table. Chapter Two distinguishes among various "types" of political parties, and invites the student to produce his or her own cross-tabs table, first manually and then with aid of data processing equipment. The exercises of Chapters Three through Five, which deal with party ideology, party decentralization, and party "success," provide the student with a number of opportunities to address hypotheses ("expectations") with the module's data set and the skills that are gradually being developed. Finally, Chapter Six provides a number of suggestions for additional student projects using the data of *Comparing Political Parties*.

While this module was designed primarily with undergraduate comparative parties courses in mind, it is also very well suited for use in American parties courses, given its many references to the American setting. And the testers and reviewers of the module have suggested that it would also fit comfortably into many general comparative politics courses.

Finally, it should be emphasized that the module does not assume any previous methodological training on the part of the student. And yet with your guidance in the use of the computer, the student should find the initial experiences with data analysis to be interesting and rewarding ones.

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CHAPTER 1.

Political Parties: The Mark of Modern Government

The Development of Political Parties. "The rise of political parties is indubitably one of the principal distinguishing marks of modern government," says E. E. Schattschneider, one of the foremost students of political parties. And as he suggests, though parties can be found in all but a very few countries today, modern parties as we know them are infants relative to other major political institutions.

At their genesis in the British Parliament of the seventeenth century, parties were not the mass organizations that we usually think of today, but instead were aristocratic factions which saw the need for form "blocs" to organize legislative voting along lines consistent with their shared interests. Parties in Britain did not begin to serve the electoral function that we tend to associate with today's parties until a major extension of the suffrage in 1867, which resulted in the need to educate and organize the mass of new voters. Candidates soon found that they could get far more returns from collective efforts than from spending their resources individually. So electoral committees came into being, and out of coordination among these electoral committees eventually developed mass parties.

But though parties had their roots in the factions of Britain's Parliament, many claim that the United States deserves the distinction as birthplace of the first modern parties, as well as the oldest. This is indeed ironic, since the founding fathers were extremely fearful of the "baneful," divisive effects of factionalism in the new country.¹ The earlier British experience loomed large as something to be avoided in the new land, where unity should be the watchword. Despite these fears, natural political differences were too strong and too important to be squelched. In the 1790s Alexander Hamilton, who believed that "the rich, the well-born, and the good" should rule, organized support for his economic plans which favored that group, and in effect founded the Federalist

¹In George Washington's Farewell Address, he argued against the "baneful effects of the spirit of party." The address is included in James D. Richardson, comp., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897*, Washington, D.C., 1900, Vol. 1, pp. 216-219. Excerpts are reprinted in Owens and Staudenraus (1965).

Party.² Later in the same decade, Thomas Jefferson participated in the formation of the opposition Republican Party, the party of the "common people." Though the Federalists won in the first electoral meeting of the two parties in 1796, the party quickly declined, due in large part to the lack of broad popular support. The Jeffersonian Republicans, on the other hand, grew in stature and for a short period after 1816 were effectively the only party in the United States. In 1824, however, this party itself split into several factions, each supporting a different candidate for the presidency. By 1828, the factions had organized themselves into two major groups, Andrew Jackson's Democratic-Republicans and John Quincy Adams' National Republicans. The Democratic-Republicans had already developed an electoral coalition of westerners, southerners, and states' rights northerners strong enough to replace incumbent Adams. The Jackson wing continued to enjoy success, and in 1840 dropped half of its name to retain the "Democratic" label by which the party is still known today. Thus evolved the oldest political party still in existence anywhere in the world.

Today there are political parties in all but a handful of countries. Most countries have multi-party systems, i.e., more than two parties; French voters, for example, have a choice among several parties. The United States and Britain are examples of a smaller number of countries with only two major parties. A number of one-party systems are a very recent development in Eastern Europe and some new nations of Asia and Africa. Given their relative youth as a political institution, it is certainly legitimate to wonder why so many modern political systems are characterized by the institutionalization of political parties. Simply put, why have political parties become so popular? What functions do they perform for the society and the polity?

Functions of Political Parties. Parties perform several functions for the political system and/or the party's members and followers. Four functions which are often singled out for discussion in the comparative government literature are: education, aggregation, communication, and recruitment of governmental leaders. In systems where parties compete with each other for office, it is often to the advantage of the party, as well as the political system in general, to *educate* the voters on the qualifications of the candidates and the major issue positions of the parties. Electoral campaigns and other on-going party activities are expected to contribute to a more informed citizenry, better able to make wise choices at the polls. In systems of only one party, on the other hand, education may take the form of propaganda aimed at keeping the present leaders in power. This propaganda often includes reference to the importance of citizen support for the party's activities. Since the single party is always in control of the political system, this has the effect of contributing to stability of the polity in general.

Another function is to *aggregate interests*, i.e., to bring together people of

²Quoted in Ebenstein *et al.* (1967), p. 317.

varying backgrounds and wants to work as a group for translating their shared interests into policy proposals. Parties vary in the extent to which they perform this function. In two-party systems like the United States, the parties must aggregate broadly in order to obtain the majority of votes that are usually necessary to win an election. Hence, the coalition of Blacks, Southerners, and Catholics that we find in the Democratic Party! If the U.S. were a multi-party system, on the other hand, perhaps separate parties would pursue the special interests of each of these groups. In multi-party systems, where there is normally an electoral system that rewards parties getting far less than 50% of the votes, each of the parties is primarily concerned with getting and keeping a hard core of voters who are committed to its particular issue positions.

In such systems it is far more common and accepted to resolve all important disagreements *among* parties rather than *within* them. Intra-party aggregation is perceived to be of less importance than solidarity among the ranks and is normally replaced by inter-party aggregation when it becomes necessary to build a ruling coalition in parliament. Just as the number of parties in competitive systems is related to the extent to which the parties are aggregative, the single parties of most one-party systems perform a "unification" function consistent with their unique relationship of party and state. Marxist-Leninist ideology presumes that the socialist state serves the real interests of all of its citizens. As hand-maiden of the state, Communist party machinery is calculated to obtain the allegiance of *all* of the citizenry. And the single parties of many new nations were formed initially as parties of independence; that goal achieved, attention shifted to the problems of unifying, or "integrating," what were often very diverse populations. The party, symbolizing the achievement of independence, was the natural institution to spearhead unification. Both symbolically and as political educator, the party aided in stabilizing young political systems. In these ways, polities with only one party can benefit from the party's "unifying" capability while escaping the party competition that could challenge entrenched political leaders or have divisive effects on the resources necessary to establish a stable political system.

In addition to aggregating interests, parties of the so-called "competitive" party systems also have a responsibility to *communicate* or "articulate" their followers' interests and demands to the government. Either by actually participating in the government or by being a vocal opposition party, these demands must be communicated to the government as the first step in turning the demands into actions. In one-party systems, this form of "articulation" is usually replaced in large part by communication in the opposite direction, another function in which parties may participate. The government is thereby "linked" to the people, but now for the purpose of communicating to them the desires of the party leaders, rather than as a means of funneling citizen demands to the government. Such parties which communicate interests from the top downward, e.g., in East Germany, are often referred to as "transmission belts."

Though the extent and purpose of performing the functions of education, aggregation, and communication vary a good deal from party to party, and from party system to party system, it is still true that most parties perform these

functions in some manner and to some degree. While these functions can be performed by other devices such as pressure groups, there is an additional function which distinguishes parties from the rest: the *recruitment and selection of governmental leaders* who bear the party label. While pressure groups also educate, communicate, and aggregate, they don't actively attempt to place their own members in government office. Since this is the one function that all parties share, we find this to be a meaningful way of defining *political party*, i.e., as "an organization which has as one goal the placement of its avowed representatives in government positions."³

In this discussion of party functions, we have suggested that parties in one-party systems are on average quite different from other parties in the extent to which they perform the functions of education, aggregation, and communication; these functions may even take on a different character and purpose in one-party systems. And in the next chapter we shall consider the very different approaches that parties may take to the fourth function, leadership selection. But this does not mean that parties in one-party systems are too different to be meaningfully compared with competitive parties. As long as all of the organizations that we consider to be "parties" share the common goal of seeking office, and so long as we use concepts in our analysis that can be applied to all types of parties, then it is possible to compare parties of all systems, regardless of the number. Hence, our analysis will include all types of party systems.

Taking a Closer Look at One-Party Systems. While parties of one-party systems do share with other parties the goal of seeking office, it is also true that they go about attaining and keeping office in a far different way. In fact, the most distinctive quality of one-party systems is the lack of competition between parties. For this reason, we normally use the term "non-competitive one-party system." But is this term completely accurate? Or is there significant competition *within* the single parties of one-party systems?

Even in the early days of the United States, the "era of good feeling" (when the Jeffersonian Republicans were the sole party) was disrupted by not-so-good

³This definition was developed for the International Comparative Political Parties Project at Northwestern University. The components of the definition bear closer examination. A political party is defined first as an *organization*—implying recurring interactions among individuals with some division of labor and role differentiation. All organizations are acknowledged to have multiple goals; but to qualify as a political party, an organization must have as *one* of its goals that of placing its avowed representatives in government positions. Moreover, these individuals must be *avowed* representatives of the party, which means in practical terms that they must be openly identified with the party name or label. Finally, the term "placing" is interpreted broadly to mean through the electoral process *or* by designation (while preventing other parties from competing) *or* by forceful imposition (when a party subverts the system and captures the governmental offices). Some organizations may call themselves "parties" but yet not be oriented to providing governmental leadership, i.e., they do not pursue the goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions. Therefore, they do not qualify as parties under this definition.

feelings among four major factions that arose *within* the party. Though competition *among* parties was restricted by the lack of an opposition party, presidential aspirants from each of the four factions within the single party made for intense intra-party competition. The one-party system of Tanzania is often cited as a present-day example of the same phenomenon. Though the presidential election in Tanzania is something of a plebiscite, i.e., where the people vote either "yes" or "no" on the single TANU party's candidate, the party itself fosters competition at the stage of selecting the candidate.⁴

While free and open intra-party competition in one-party systems may indeed be limited to the above samples and but a very few others, what may be more common is intra-party opposition from factions which are strongly disfavored by the party leaders. One definition of faction is "any intra-party combination, clique, or grouping whose members share a sense of common identity and common purpose and are organized to act collectively—as a distinct bloc within the party—to achieve their goals."⁵ Though factions were supposedly abolished in the Soviet Union's Communist Party in 1921, they continued to structure politics among the party's elite. Khrushchev, who originally favored a very aggressive stance against the West and whose priorities were the development of heavy industry and armaments, shifted toward better East-West relations and increased production of domestic consumer goods. He encountered opposition within the Praesidium from staunch leftists. This rift culminated at the beginning of the 1957-62 period for which we have data, with the majority of the Praesidium voting for Khrushchev's ouster as party secretary. In spite of this strong opposition, the Central Committee supported Khrushchev, who remained in office and began the famous "anti-party" purge in which more than one-half of the leading Praesidium members were demoted. So in spite of the fact that factions had been formally banned within the party, opposition did materialize, not as "free and open intra-party competition" perhaps, but as a competing opposition nonetheless.

This is not meant to suggest that parties of one-party systems are the only ones that have factions. The Republican Party of the two-party United States was certainly factionalized during the early 60's; Barry Goldwater represented the Conservative wing, Nelson Rockefeller the liberal wing, and Richard Nixon represented the middle course. So parties in two-party systems can also have factions, and it is likely that parties of multi-party systems are not immune to intra-party rivalries either. What has often been suggested though, is that parties of one-party systems are *much more likely* to have factions than are parties of systems with more parties. Where competing voices are denied separate parties as

⁴Tanzania does not happen to be included in the accompanying data set, but it is still mentioned here since it is often cited as an example of a relatively democratic one-party system. For further information on the subject, see Milnor (1969, Chapter VII).

⁵This definition is from R. Zariski, "Party Factions and Comparative Politics: Some Preliminary Observations," in the *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 4 (February, 1960), p. 33.


vehicles for their interests, they might instead form factions within the one party that does exist. We might reasonably expect, then, that more parties from one-party systems have internal factions than is the case for systems of two or more parties.

Comparing Parties on Factionalism. Accompanying this module is a data set consisting of information describing 147 of the world's parties as they were during the period of 1957-62; included are the parties of 12 one-party systems, 13 two-party systems, and 28 multi-party systems. The data on these parties will aid our empirical comparison of competitive and "non-competitive" parties.

The data set includes one variable, FACTION, which allows us to confront our expectation with "facts," i.e., with empirical data. While factions may be formed around differences of ideology, party strategy for seeking office, stands on particular issues, or who should lead the party, the variable FACTION was coded in such a way that it most directly taps the last of these. Nevertheless, leadership factionalism is usually supplemented by other rifts as well, so other types of cleavages are also tapped indirectly.

The accompanying diagram (Diagram 1) is reprinted here from the codebook at the back of the manual, and is an example of the way in which some basic information is displayed for each of the variables in the data set. Next to the categories of "factional" and "non-factional" are the numbers of cases which fall into each of these categories. The frequency count for another category, "missing data," refers to the number of cases which were impossible to code on this variable; we can ignore those cases in all of our exercises, using only the cases for which we have data. Since each of the parties has been assigned one of the codes for each variable described in the codebook, it is possible to address some interesting questions about parties like the one that we have just discussed.

DIAGRAM 1
Example from Codebook



In our attempt to see whether there actually is a relationship between factionalism and the number of parties in a system, we began by simply counting the numbers of parties with and without factions in one-party systems, and then did the same for systems of more than one party. The numbers of each kind of party in each type of party system are displayed in a common short-hand form in Table 1. This type of table is called a "cross-tabulation" (or "cross-tabs") table, and the number (or "frequency") in each cell refers to the number of cases which have the characteristics specified by the labels at the top of the column and the side of the row. For instance, the number "6" in the lower left-hand cell indicates that six of the parties in one-party systems have leadership factions. With the information in Table 1, you should be able to answer the questions in Exercise 1, which are designed to help you address our expectation with regard to factionalism.

Facing Facts: Comparing Parties with Empirical Data. The comparison that you have just made between parties of single-party systems and those of systems with more than one party is an example of what we will be doing throughout the remainder of the module, i.e., taking questions or common suspicions about parties and confronting them with "facts."⁶ The facts of empirical parties research are measurements or "codes" on several variables that we can obtain by observing parties and their interactions. The codes that we have assigned are those listed for each variable in the codebook, beginning on page 51.

Some have claimed that comparative studies of parties must be restricted to one "type" of party, i.e., either those which are involved in inter-party competition or those which are not, since these types of parties are too fundamentally different to be compared together. As we have already noted, our definition of party is equally applicable to the parties of Western Europe and to the parties of Eastern European one-party systems. And as we have seen in the example of factionalism, if our concepts are basic enough, then we should be able to obtain comparable measurements of the variable for all parties in all countries of the world.

But while we will not treat parties from one-party states as totally distinct from other parties, we will treat party system and polity types as possible sources of explanation in many of the examples and exercises which follow. In other cases we will consider propositions to hold for all parties, regardless of the nature of the party system or the polity, and will suggest in Chapter Six how the

⁶While it is not a purpose of this module to consider the topic of statistical significance, those who are acquainted with the subject may be surprised to find that the association represented in Table 1, though appearing to be quite substantial, does not produce a Chi² value statistically significant at the standard .05 level. However, this lack of significance can be explained by the small number of one-party systems in the sample, resulting in very uneven column marginals and rendering the Chi² statistic incomparable to tables with more equal marginals. For a discussion of the sensitivity of Chi² to marginal distributions, see H. T. Reynolds, *Analysis of Nominal Data*, Sage University Papers #07-007, Beverly Hills: 1977.

TABLE 1

	Parties in:		Totals
	Systems of One Party	Systems of More than One Party	
Has No Faction	6	86	92
Has a Faction	6	41	47
Totals	12	127	139

EXERCISE 1

Given the information in Table 1, answer the following questions:

- a) How many of the parties from systems of *more* than one party are factionalized?

- b) By dividing the answer to *a* by the *total* number of parties in systems of more than one party, compute the proportion of parties in such systems which are factionalized.

- c) What proportion of the parties in *one-party* systems are factionalized? _____
- d) What is the difference between the proportion of parties in one-party systems that are factionalized, and the proportion for the parties in systems of more than one party?

- e) Is the difference about what you expected? _____ Why? _____

- f) Do you think that the term "non-competitive one-party system" should be reconsidered? _____ Why? _____

reader might reconsider any or all of these propositions for particular "subsets" of parties.

While costs of obtaining data on *all* parties of the world would be far too great for a single project, data were collected for a representative sample of countries, and on all but the most minor of parties in these countries.⁷ Hence, while we do have data on 147 parties in 53 countries (see Table 2), small parties like the American Independent Party and the Liberal Party of Britain are not included. But though this sample does not include *all* parties in *all* countries, we feel quite safe in making generalizations about major parties on the basis of the large representative sample that we do have.

The time dimension for the data is the period 1957-62. These years do not represent six separate time points as they might in some other data sets, but instead are taken together as one single time "slice." So a given datum describes how the party looked or acted during the period 1957-62, which means that a particular piece of data may no longer apply to the party today. Though we are most precise in saying that our findings are for *our sample* of parties as they were *at that time*, we would probably not be too far wrong if we were to generalize the relationships that we uncover (as opposed to individual pieces of data) to the present. Some individual parties have changed or even disappeared since 1962, but the *patterns* among the concepts across parties are not likely to have changed substantially.

These data on parties and the countries in which they reside may be used to confront some of the important questions that have long been discussed in the literature on political parties, but which have yet to be adequately addressed with empirical data. Our approach of including a representative sample of *all* parties, rather than just parties in "Western Europe" or "autocratic systems," has been relatively uncommon, due partly to a lack of comparable data across all types of systems. For this reason and because our data on parties are part of a collection which has not yet been widely used, you are provided here with an opportunity to participate in truly original empirical research involving some of the major dimensions on which parties are usually compared, i.e., strategy (Chapter Two), ideology (Chapter Three), and structure (Chapter Four). You should be alert for discoveries which may not agree with statements in some of the familiar books on political parties. Finally (in Chapter Five), we will briefly

⁷in order to be included in the set of parties on which data were collected, a party had to achieve a given level of importance in national politics during the period covered by the data, defining importance in terms of strength among the population and stability of existence. Hence, the data set does not include data on *legal* parties which did not win at least 5% of the seats in the lower house of the national legislature in two or more successive elections from 1950 to 1962. Those *illegal* parties which did not meet another criterion, based on other indicators of support from the population rather than on legislative seats, were also excluded.

As for the choice of countries, a random sample of five countries was drawn from each of the ten geo-cultural areas. Though the United States, Britain, and Canada were not picked in the random draw, they were added later to bring the total to 53 countries.

consider a fundamental question for all who are interested in political parties: why is it that some parties are more successful than others?

TABLE 2
Countries Included in the Data Set, by Geo-Cultural Region

Anglo-American Culture/No. of Parties	Eastern Europe/No. of Parties
United States 2	Albania 1
Britain 2	Bulgaria 2
Australia 3	East Germany 5
Canada 4	Hungary 1
New Zealand 2	U.S.S.R. 1
Ireland 3	<u>10</u>
Rhodesia/Nyasaland 4	
India 2	Asia and the Far East/No. of Parties
<u>22</u>	Burma 3
Western Europe/No. of Parties	Cambodia 1
Austria 3	Indonesia 4
France 5	North Korea 1
West Germany 3	Malaya 5
Greece 4	<u>14</u>
Portugal 1	North Africa and Mid-East/No. of Parties
<u>16</u>	Sudan 3
Scandinavia and Lowlands/No. of Parties	Tunisia 1
Denmark 4	Lebanon 4
Iceland 4	Iran 4
Sweden 4	Turkey 2
The Netherlands 6	<u>14</u>
Luxembourg 4	West Africa/No. of Parties
<u>22</u>	Dahomey 3
Central America/No. of Parties	Ghana 2
Cuba 1	Guinea 1
Dominican Republic 1	Upper Volta 1
El Salvador 2	Togo 2
Guatemala 5	<u>9</u>
Nicaragua 3	Central and East Africa/No. of Parties
<u>12</u>	Central Afr. Rep. 1
South America/No. of Parties	Chad 2
Ecuador 5	Congo-Brazzaville 2
Paraguay 3	Kenya 2
Peru 5	Uganda 3
Uruguay 2	<u>10</u>
Venezuela 3	
<u>18</u>	

CHAPTER 2.

Strategies for Attaining Office

Three Basic Strategies. The two major parties of the United States seek office by participating in open elections, but the single party in the Soviet Union stays in constant control of the government and other parties are banned. In the autocracy of Paraguay, the party in power is opposed by two parties that would like to replace it by subverting the present government, with the Febreristas even willing to consider armed force if necessary. While these parties are all seeking the same goal, i.e., governmental office, they are obviously pursuing quite different means to attain that goal. The means are different enough that we might think of them as distinguishing three different types of parties, each following a different basic strategy for getting or keeping government offices.

Parties like those in the United States and most of the countries of Western Europe follow a "competitive" strategy. These parties try to attain office by competing openly in the electoral process in competition with other parties. They participate in such activities as nominating candidates, campaigning in elections, and registering voters. A relatively "pure" competitive party emphasizes the importance of free elections even when it is not successful in winning office.

Parties of one-party systems need not always follow a strategy of "restricting" competition, but such is usually the case. Restrictive parties, including the one party of the U.S.S.R. as well as one of the four parties in Indonesia, have presumed that they can attain (or maintain) government positions if opposition parties are non-existent. Targets of these parties are usually other potential parties or groups which might provide opposition to the restrictive party in power. The "restrictive" strategy usually includes such tactics as interfering with opposition advertising, harassing opposition party workers, candidates and voters, and falsifying voting tallies.

Not all parties seeking office by other than electoral means are restrictive parties. "Subversive" parties, which sometimes provide the only party opposition to restrictive parties, follow a strategy of attempting to subvert the whole political system (e.g., the Febreristas in Paraguay or the Tudeh Party in Iran). Naturally, the most immediate target of such parties is the party currently in power. Some of the tactics that are intended to remove the government include

boycotting elections (where elections are held), terrorizing the population, leading strikes and riots, and sabotaging the facilities of the government. Some parties go so far as to attempt assassinations or coups, or in some cases even engage in guerilla warfare. Once the old government is removed, the subversive party will usually attempt to shape the new government, naturally keeping many of the top positions for its own leaders.

Polity Type and Party Strategy. There is a relationship between being a democratic polity and having competitive parties, almost by definition. Likewise, no matter how one defines "autocratic," it would be rare to find an autocratic polity without a restrictive party. Because there is a certain "built-in" pattern between polity type and party strategy, we are most interested in those cases which may "deviate" from that pattern.

If we define "democratic" and "autocratic" polities solely in terms of the number or types of parties that a country has, then we would rule out the possibility of any "rare cases" (also referred to as "deviant cases," since they deviate from the expected pattern). If the "democratic" polities were defined as "having at least two competitive parties, and no restrictive or subversive parties," then there could be no one-party democracies. If "autocratic" polities were defined as those "having a single restrictive party," then polities such as East Germany, with its dominant restrictive party plus four dependent parties, would not be considered an autocracy. Neither would countries with a strong restrictive party and a couple of small but potentially effective subversive parties. Obviously, definitions based only on the number or types of parties would be far too limiting.

We opt instead for Ted Robert Gurr's definitions based on the relative "openness" of decision-making in the polity.¹ The essential characteristic of democracy is not just the number of parties in the system, but *the presence of multiple institutionalized centers of power, some of which are open to widespread participation on the part of citizens.* The essential quality of autocratic polities, on the other hand, is *the institutionalized monopolization of power and political activity by the state.* By these definitions, parties provide only a clue to the type of polity; we must look also at the means of selecting the national governmental leader (competition, by birth, etc.), whether decision-making is centralized in the national government or spread around to include more localized centers of power, the number of everyday activities that are controlled by the government, the extent to which citizen participation is allowed or even invited, and the degree to which the executive can be constrained by other governmental institutions like the legislature. We have considered these five "indicators" before making a judgment as to whether a

¹Ted Robert Gurr, "Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971," *American Political Science Review*, 68 (December, 1974), pp. 1482-1504.

given polity should be described as essentially "democratic" or essentially "autocratic."²

A democratic polity is one which would have a number of these characteristics: competitive leadership selection, decentralization of power, a limited amount of governmental activity in people's every-day lives, institutionalized citizen participation, and a number of "checks" on each branch of the government by the others. An autocratic polity would be characterized by selection of leaders through other than competitive means, centralization of power, broad governmental activities affecting the lives of the population, restricted participation by the citizenry, and an executive relatively free to act on his own wishes without interference from other governmental bodies. Of the 53 polities in our sample, 21 are basically democratic and 20 have a large number of autocratic characteristics.

Though we have not defined polity types solely on the basis of parties, there is still a certain "built-in" relationship between type of political system and type of party. Democratic polities, which by definition are likely to favor competition among political groups, naturally tend to harbor competitive parties as well. And autocratic polities, which restrict competition, are much more likely to have restrictive parties. While subversive parties might be found in either type of system, they are probably more likely to arise in situations where the only means of removing the party in power is by subversive tactics.

The numbers of each type of party in each type of polity are displayed in the cross-tabulation format in Table 3. Looking down the columns, we are not at all surprised, given the definitional relationship, that the largest number of parties in democratic systems are competitive and the largest number in autocratic systems are restrictive. Looking across the rows, we are also not surprised that most of the competitive parties are in democratic polities and all restrictive

²Of course, it is really more accurate to view "democracy" and "autocracy" in terms of degrees rather than either-or states. Indeed, Gurr's own data were originally coded as degrees rather than "types." However, we have opted for the simpler classification in order to simplify the analysis.

TABLE 3
Polity Type and Party Strategy

Party Strategy	Type of Polity		Totals
	Democratic	Autocratic	
Competitive	68 ^a	6 ^b	74
Restrictive	0 ^c	22 ^d	22
Subversive	1 ^e	6 ^f	7
Totals	69	34	103

parties are in autocracies, or even that more subversive parties are in autocratic polities than in democratic polities. But what is perhaps the most interesting is cell *b* which indicates that there are six parties with competitive strategies in basically autocratic polities.

When we examine the particular circumstances of these six "deviant" parties, however, we find that the apparent incongruity can be explained. The Nicaraguan Conservative Party participated in national elections during our 1957-62 period only to keep the guise of democracy alive in that country. Actually, the party was no more than loyal opposition to the dictator in power. The Iranian People's Party and National Party were both born with the Shah's blessing, and he effectively controlled the programs and activities of both parties. Only the Iranian National Front was a true opposition competitive party, winning only one seat to the Majlis in the 1961 election under harrassment from the government. The experience of these four parties in Nicaragua and Iran suggests that even the roles of competitive parties can be molded, or mold themselves, to fit the autocratic tendencies of the polity. A fifth "deviant" party, the Chadian Progressive Party, participated with increasing success in elections during our period, winning control of the government, and in 1962 banning all opposition parties. The sixth case, the United Party of Ghana, attempted to survive competitively during the period of our data, but was gradually forced out of existence (by 1964) as the restrictive Convention People's Party consolidated its power. So each of the "deviant" cases can be explained by its particular historical and political circumstances.³

³This attempt to explain the deviant cases has served to help us understand why competitive parties might exist in autocratic regimes. It is important to recognize that we have actually found it necessary to add to our original explanation in order to cover all of the cases. One must be cautious not to "explain away" deviant cases simply to save a "pet" theory.

TABLE 4
Types of Polities and Types of Parties, by Geo-Cultural Region

Geo-Cultural Region	Country	Types of Parties*	Type of Polity
Anglo-American	United States	C-C	Democratic
	United Kingdom	C-C	Democratic
	Australia	C-C-C	Democratic
	Canada	C-C-C-C	Democratic
	New Zealand	C-C	Democratic
	Ireland	C-C-C	Democratic
	Rhodesia/Nyasaland	S-M-M-M	Neither***
	India	C-C	Neither

TABLE 4 (continued)

Western Europe	Austria	C-C-C	Democratic
	France	C-C-C-C-C	Democratic
	West Germany	C-C-C	Democratic
	Greece	C-C-C-C	Democratic
	Portugal	R	Autocratic
Scandinavia and Lowlands	Denmark	C-C-C-C	Democratic
	Iceland	C-C-C-C	Democratic
	Sweden	C-C-C-C	Democratic
	The Netherlands	C-C-C-C-C-C	Democratic
	Luxembourg	C-C-C-C	Democratic
Eastern Europe	Albania	R	Autocratic
	Bulgaria	R-R	Autocratic
	East Germany	R-R-R-R-R	Autocratic
	Hungary	R	Autocratic
	U.S.S.R.	R	Autocratic
South America	Ecuador	C-C-C-C-M	Neither
	Paraguay	R-S-S	Autocratic
	Peru	C-C-C-C-C	Neither
	Uruguay	C-C	Democratic
	Venezuela	C-C-C	Democratic
Central and Latin America	Cuba	R	Autocratic
	Dominican Republic	R	Autocratic
	El Salvador	R-M	Neither
	Guatemala	C-C-C-C-S	Neither
	Nicaragua	C-S-M	Autocratic
Asia and the Far East	Burma	C-C-M	Democratic
	Cambodia	M	Autocratic
	Indonesia	C-R-M-M	Neither
	North Korea	R	Autocratic
	Malaya	C-C-C-C-S	Democratic
North Africa and the Mid-East	Sudan	R-S-S	Autocratic
	Tunisia	R	Autocratic
	Lebanon	C-C-C-C	Neither
	Iran	C-C-C-S	Autocratic
	Turkey	C-M	Democratic
West Africa	Dahomey	C-C-M	Neither
	Ghana	R-C	Autocratic
	Guinea	R	Autocratic
	Upper Volta	R	Autocratic
	Togo	C-R	Neither
Central and East Africa	Central African Republic	R	Autocratic
	Chad	C-R	Autocratic
	Congo-Brazzaville	C-R	Neither
	Kenya	C-C	Neither
	Uganda	C-C-C	Democratic

*Key: C—Competitive; R—Restrictive; S—Subversive; M—Mixed.

**Twelve of the polities have too few of the "democratic" or "autocratic" characteristics to be classified as either of these two polity types.

The Geographical Distribution of Party Strategies

In Exercise 2 you are asked to state your own expectations, and complete your own cross-tabs table, with regard to the distribution of party strategies among the "western," "eastern," and "third world" zones.

EXERCISE 2

The polities of what can be roughly called the "Western European" (including Anglo-American, Western European, and Scandinavian and Lowlands) geo-cultural area are, for the most part, democratic and with long traditions of open elections. What type of party might you expect to predominate in this geo-cultural zone?

Polities of the "Eastern European" geo-cultural zone are primarily autocratic regimes. On the basis of what we have already learned about the relationship of polity type and party strategy, which strategy would you expect to occur the most often among the parties of Eastern Europe?

The polities of the remainder of the world (South America, Central America, Asia, and Africa), essentially the group of countries which have been commonly referred to as the "third world," include both entrenched autocracies and newly-independent polities attempting autocracy, democracy, or some mix of the two. How would you characterize your expectations concerning the frequencies of each type of party strategy in this portion of the world?

Using the information from Table 4, fill in the cells of this cross-tabs table, designed to summarize the data in a much less complex and more easily-readable form:

Party Strategy	Geo-Cultural Zone*		
	Western European	Eastern European	Other
Competitive			
Restrictive			
Subversive			

*Note that the Western European "zone" includes Anglo-American, Western European, and Scandinavian and Lowlands countries.

Given your expectations as you stated them above, are any of the cell frequencies surprising to you? _____

Explain your answer. _____

If any of the cell values seem to indicate "deviant" cases, try to identify these cases from the information in Table 4. Write a brief paragraph in which you specify which cases they are, and see if you can begin to explain them on the basis of the information in the table.

EXERCISE 3

In Exercise 2, you completed a cross-tabs table by counting the numbers of cases sharing certain pairs of characteristics (e.g., "Eastern European" and "restrictive"). Even though the task was a relatively simple one, you undoubtedly found it to be more time-consuming than you would have liked, and perhaps even "got lost" and made a mistake in the counting. For the remainder of the exercises, you will be told by your instructor how to use a high-speed machine (i.e., computer or card-sorter) to produce tables for you. The machine will, in essence, search through the data set for you, counting the cases for each cell of the table as it goes along. Naturally, you have to "tell" the machine what you want the table to look like, and your instructor will help you to do that correctly.

Just for practice, use the machine now to produce another table like the one you have just completed. In other words, have it produce a cross-tabs table with values of ZONE across the top, and values of STRATEGY down the side. You will find the descriptions for ZONE and STRATEGY in the Codebook.

OPTIONAL EXERCISE: American Parties Reconsidered

Earlier we suggested that the two major parties in the United States are competitive parties, i.e., they basically follow a competitive strategy to place their representatives in office. Can you identify instances in U.S. political history when parties have employed tactics which might better be described as subversive or restrictive? You don't have to limit your answer to the two major parties or to electoral politics at the national level.

CHAPTER 3. Party Ideology

The Pragmatic and the Programmatic. The Democratic and Republican Parties in the United States are often described as "pragmatic" and "non-ideological," offering little electoral choice since both travel the "middle of the road." In other countries, socialist parties and parties of the right are said to be more "ideological" or "programmatic" in nature. In fact, all parties are expedient to some extent, and all have ideologies of one kind or another. The basic distinction is one of emphasis.

The pragmatic party "stands for" good government in general, taking stands that reflect the best interest of the party and/or society at the time, with little regard for consistency or whether the position happens to lead to the left or the right. The result may be a hodge-podge of issue stands, though extreme positions in either direction are rare. This pragmatic type of party is well suited to aggregating varied interests, since many groups can find something to their liking.

The programmatic party shares its pragmatic counterpart's interest in winning elections, though the emphasis is on the party's "principles." Often, though, a hard ideological line is not synonymous with losing elections; the right combination of political and social circumstances can allow the programmatic party to have its principles and pursue them too. One student of comparative politics has stated quite concisely the common belief about the relationship of "party system" and ideological tendencies:

Principled parties thrive best in multi-party situations, where success can be based upon appeal to a fixed and ideologically homogeneous clientele. Parties in two-party systems, on the other hand, are forced to aggregate a more diverse clientele because political success consists of winning a plurality of the total vote (or majority of the seats in the legislature). (Mayer, 227.)

We will confront that belief with data later in this chapter. Whether or not this particular relationship stands the test of the data, though, it remains true that programmatic parties have been viable political forces in many systems; Guinea's Democratic Party and Sweden's Social Democratic Party are but two examples.

Whether a party is ideological or non-ideological can have effects not only on its own level of success, but also upon the electoral process in general. One major

function of ideology in competitive party systems is to clearly associate a party with a given set of issue positions with which it can consistently be identified. This reduces the voter's "costs" by removing the need to study each party on an issue-by-issue basis before each election, and hence facilitating a rational voting choice. It also makes it easier to hold the party accountable once its representatives have been elected to office. The pragmatic parties' ever-changing "platforms" are much more easily forgotten than the principles of their programmatic counterparts.

Ideological Position: The Left-Right Continuum. While there are a number of ideological continua along which parties may be compared, the most common in the literature is the left-center-right continuum, which basically consists of positions on Marxist principles. One definition of ideology is "a general value structure and immediate political goals."¹ For the left-right continuum, the value structure is based largely on the role that the government should play in society in general and in the economy in particular. The immediate political goals for leftist parties might be characterized by issue positions favoring a strong governmental role in the economy, a major re-distribution of wealth from rich to poor, a social welfare program, and secularization of society by hampering institutionalized religion. Rightist parties tend to favor a *laissez faire* economic role for the government and official support of religion, and tend to oppose re-distribution of wealth and social welfare. Not all ideological parties of the left or right necessarily take all of the relevant set of issue stands, but every ideological party does support most of these positions.

The accompanying data set includes a variable IDEOLPOS on which 127 of the parties are coded. After studying a party's positions on the six issues of Table 5, the party was assigned an over-all "ideological position" score. As arrayed in Diagram 2, each party was assigned one of five codes ranging from "far left" to "far right." By this left-right coding procedure, parties that fall at either end of the continuum are the most "extreme" ideologically; "centrist" parties are those which are the most ideologically neutral.

Ideological Position and the Number of Parties. Since two-party systems require parties that can aggregate successfully in order to tally the large proportion of votes necessary to win elections, it has often been suggested that the only effective parties in this type of system are pragmatic parties. In fact, many have argued that Goldwater's 1964 defeat and McGovern's in 1972 demonstrate the disastrous effects of forgetting the necessity to aggregate; these candidates were perceived to be too "ideologically extreme" by the mainstreams of their parties. It is argued that ideological parties are much more likely to arise in multi-party systems, where a small but hard core of dedicated followers is

¹This definition is from F. Gross, *The Revolutionary Party*, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974, p. 78.


often enough to attain some measure of electoral success. In the 1962 election in France, for instance, the Gaullist Party received a plurality of only 32% of the votes. The Popular Republican Movement (M.R.P.), Radical Socialists, and Socialists each received about 10%, and the Communist Party polled 22%. The M.R.P. received 8% of the seats in the Parliament, the Radical Socialists 9%, the Socialists 14% and the Communists 9%; the leading Gaullists captured 50% of the seats. Though the Gaullists were clearly the most successful, each of the more "ideological" parties had enough committed support to achieve some representation in the legislature.

If there is indeed a relationship between the number of parties in the system and the likelihood that it includes ideological parties, then this should be evident in a cross-tabs table. In the previous chapter we used a cross-tabs table to highlight "deviant cases," when we knew that there would be a strong relationship for definitional reasons. Here we employ a more common use of this summary device, i.e., to determine whether an expected relationship actually does exist in spite of no definitional "built-in" relationship. In this case the

TABLE 5

Leftist Party Positions	Rightist Party Positions
1. Favors governmental ownership of the means of production.	1. Favors private ownership of the means of production.
2. Favors a strong governmental role in economic planning.	2. Favors decentralized economic decision-making.
3. Favors a major re-distribution of wealth from the rich to the poor.	3. Opposes re-distribution of the wealth.
4. Favors social welfare through public assistance.	4. Opposes governmental social welfare programs.
5. Favors secularization of society.	5. Favors institutionalized religion.
6. Favors international alignment with the "Eastern bloc."	6. Favors alignment with the "Western bloc" of nations.

DIAGRAM 2



emphasis is primarily on the pattern itself, and only indirectly on deviants from that pattern.

In Table 6 we have included not only the relevant frequencies in each cell, but also the "column percents." This allows us to state our findings as we usually do our expectations, in terms of proportions. For instance, if our expectations in this case are upheld by the data, then we should find a larger proportion of parties being ideological in multi-party systems than in two-party systems.² Following the normal procedure of comparing column percents across rows, we find some surprising results. Contrary to our expectations, a smaller proportion of parties in two-party systems are non-ideological (18.2% as compared to 26.6% for multi-party systems), and slightly larger proportions are moderately and even highly ideological than is the case for the multi-party systems. Apparently the relationship of "number of parties" and "ideological position" is not as strong, and not even in the same direction, as students of politics have long believed.

How may we account for this? Much of the literature, and so far we ourselves, have acted as though a centrist position can be equated with "pragmatic" and far left or far right positions with "programmatic." But there is another component of pragmatism that ideological position does not adequately tap, ideological consistency. Even though a party may be legitimately labelled as moderately or even highly leftist or rightist, its set of issue positions may still include some inconsistencies put there to please the electorate; such a party may

²Because our expectations concern two- and multi-party systems, we do not report figures for one-party systems in the following tables. But for the record, we had sufficient information to make judgments for 10 of the 12 parties in one-party systems; one is far right, one is center, three are moderate leftist, and five are far left.

TABLE 6
Ideological Position and the Number of Parties

Ideological Position	Number of Parties	
	Parties of Two-Party Systems	Parties of Multi-Party Systems
Non-ideological	4 18.2%	25 26.6%
Moderately Ideological (Moderate Left or Moderate Right)	9 40.9%	35 37.2%
Highly Ideological (Far Left or Far Right)	9 40.9%	34 36.2%
Totals	22 100.0	94 100.0

n = 116

be more "pragmatic" than a centrist party whose positions are consistently centrist.

Ideological Consistency and the Number of Parties. The concept "ideological consistency" refers to the extent to which a party supports issue positions all of which fall at the same point on an ideological continuum. An ideologically consistent party is one whose stands on all issues are rightist, all leftist, or all centrist, with only a few minor exceptions. On the basis of the party's positions on the six left-right issues of Table 5 (page 00), each party has been coded as "inconsistent," "moderately consistent," or "very consistent." While there is a strong relationship between ideological position and level of consistency, Diagram 3 indicates that it is possible for a party to be both centrist and consistent, or both ideological and inconsistent. Even basically Marxist parties may stop short of accepting the "ideological extras" of secularization and alignment with the Eastern bloc. In some countries, religious traditions are so strong that leftist parties either softpedal their secularism or ignore it altogether and quietly make peace with the dominant religious leaders. In other countries, practical economics, geographical location, or historical circumstances may result in uncharacteristic international ties.

If the need to aggregate compels the parties of two-party systems to "shop around" for popular issue positions, then we might expect these parties to be more ideologically inconsistent than their counterparts in multi-party systems, regardless of the over-all ideological position. Table 7 indicates that the relationship which does exist is not as predicted. Parties in multi-party systems are just as likely as parties in two-party systems to be inconsistent.

TABLE 7
Ideological Consistency and Number of Parties

Ideological Consistency	Number of Parties	
	Parties of Two-Party Systems	Parties of Multi-Party Systems
Very Consistent	8 40.0%	24 27.9%
Moderately Consistent	5 25.0%	28 32.6%
Inconsistent	7 35.0%	34 39.5%
Total	20 100.0%	86 100.0%

n = 106

DIAGRAM 3

Examples of Ideological Consistency and Inconsistency: Positions on Six Left-Right Issues*

	Leftist Position	Center	Rightist Position	Leftist Position	Center	Rightist Position
Ideological Consistency:						
Government ownership	x				x	
Economic planning	x					x
Redistribute wealth		x			x	
Social welfare	x					x
Secularization	x			x		
East/West alignment	x				x	
		Communist Party of the Soviet Union, leftist and consistent			Malayan Chinese Association, centrist and consistent	
Ideological Inconsistency:						
Government ownership	x					x
Economic planning		x				
Redistribute wealth			x			
Social welfare	x					x
Secularization				x		
East/West alignment			x			
		French Socialist Party, leftist and inconsistent			Australian Liberal Party, centrist and inconsistent	


*The original ICPP data set uses 11-point scales for each of the six issues; the left-right dimension is based on that original coding scheme.

On the basis of Tables 6 and 7, it now appears that pragmatic parties are just as likely to arise in multi-party systems as in systems with only two parties. While a need to aggregate in two-party systems may be a factor in the ideological content of some parties, it is apparently not the dominant factor in many. Other factors from the social environment, political context, and particular historical circumstances may impinge on the would-be impact of the aggregative need. At the same time, such factors may overrule the propensity for parties of multi-party systems to be programmatic. A two-party system with an extremely homogeneous society may produce programmatic parties that are still sufficiently aggregative; and an otherwise programmatic party may adopt uncharacteristic positions for certain issues on which many voters have very strong opinions.

At the "System" Level: Ideological Distance and the Number of Parties. Though the number of parties in the system may not have the expected relationship to the ideological positions of individual parties, it may still be related to the diversity of parties within the party system. It has often been suggested that multi-party systems do a much better job of representing a broad range of ideological positions than do two-party systems, since each of the parties in a two-party system must appeal to a broad constituency and, in large part, to the *same* constituency. Both parties are drawn to the central ideological tendency of the population, regardless of where that central tendency may be on the left-right continuum. In systems where the society itself, or at least that portion which is politically active, tends toward one end of the ideological continuum, both of the parties might have to share that ideological tendency to remain viable. Examples of such systems, where the two major parties have shared the same non-centrist ideological position, are India with two leftist parties, Uruguay with two moderately leftist parties, and El Salvador with two moderately rightist parties.

Based on the individual ideological positions of the parties in a system, we have assigned an "ideological distance" score for each party system (i.e., country). This score takes into account the positions of the parties which are farthest apart in the system. If all parties in the system are at the same ideological position, then the system is assigned a code of "no distance," regardless of the number of parties in the system. If, on the other hand, the system contains both far left and far right parties, then it is assigned a "maximum distance" code. This notion of ideological distance is a valuable concept in that it suggests both the importance of ideology in inter-party politics and the likelihood that citizens with differing ideological concerns can find direct representation of their interests by one of the parties in the system. Where major segments of the population are left unrepresented by the parties, other political devices may have to be employed to articulate their interests.

DIAGRAM 4
Ideological Distance Categories, with Examples



EXERCISE 4

Using the variables IDEODIST and NUMBER2, and considering our expectations concerning a relationship between ideological distance and number of parties, do the following exercise. (Note that IDEODIST is in the "PARTY SYSTEM" data set rather than the "PARTY" set which is used for all other exercises. Here we are analyzing the characteristics of the 53 party systems, rather than the 147 individual parties.)

a. Complete the following cross-tabs table:

Ideological Distance		Number of Parties		
		2 Parties	3 or 4 Parties	5 or 6 Parties
No Distance	(1)			
	(2)			
Middle Distance	(3)			
	(4)			
Maximum Distance	(5)			

b. Does the table suggest that there is an association between number of parties and ideological distance? _____ in the expected direction? _____
Are you surprised by any of the results? _____

Elaborate. _____

c. Summarize the findings of this chapter concerning the expected relationships between ideology and the number of parties in the system. In particular, does the number of parties seem to have an important effect on the ideological content of parties? of party systems?

CHAPTER 4. Party Structure

Party Structure: The "Levels" of Party Organization. Although we are primarily concerned in this module with "national" parties, i.e., those that hope to attain national offices, the internal structures of national parties often involve organization at many other levels as well. In the United States, for instance, sub-units of the two major parties exist at the levels of the state, county, locality, and even precinct or ward. Some have called the American national parties "confederations" of state parties, since in many respects the national organs exist only at four-year intervals when state delegations meet in conventions to select presidential nominees. In many ways the party structure in the United States parallels the federal structure of the government itself.

But not all parties with local sub-units reside in federal systems. The British Conservatives are organized locally and in "area councils"; the Labour Party has 11 "regional councils" as well as local organizations. In France, the basic structural unit is the commune, and most parties also have "federations" between the local and national levels. And of course, Communist parties also have small organs primarily at the level of the cell.

While it is theoretically possible for a national party to be organized at the national level only, most have found it useful or even necessary for their purposes to maintain localized sub-units as well. In some parties, the local units exist only to carry out or communicate the decisions that are made at a higher place in the party hierarchy; but in other parties, the local and/or regional levels are involved more directly in the making of important party decisions including the choice of policies that the party will pursue, the selection of party leaders and candidates, and the ways in which the party's funds will be expended.

Structure and the Distribution of Party Power. Students of parties have been interested in party structure from two different perspectives. One is a concern with the ways in which parties meet their organizational, i.e., "administrative," needs. This interest focuses on structure, *per se*. Another concern, and our primary interest here, is with varying structures as means of actually distributing party decision-making authority, and not just the administration of decisions made elsewhere.

This distinction is similar to the common distinction between "formal" federalism and "effective" federalism. A government is formally federal if its

constitution says that it is federal, i.e., if it "looks" federal. But it is effectively federal only if there is an actual distribution of power among the levels of government. In this sense the Soviet Union is *formally* federal because its constitution says so, but it is not *effectively* federal; likewise for Austria, Venezuela, Burma, and Malaya in our sample of countries.

In much the same way, we cannot rely solely on a party constitution or charter to convey the actual distribution of power within the party structure. Our codings are instead based on expert judgments as to the actual "centralization" or "decentralization" of power among the levels of the party structure, with a party considered "centralized" if all of the important decision-making takes place at the national level, regardless of the number of levels at which those decisions are applied. By this criterion the U.S. parties are decentralized. The parties in Britain and especially the Soviet Union are not, despite their multi-leveled organization.

There are at least two motivations that a party might have in seeking or maintaining decentralization of power. One stems from a very pragmatic approach to party politics. In societies as diverse as the United States, relatively independent regional organizations may be necessary for the maintenance of a viable national party with equally viable regional and local components. For instance, some have argued that it could mean political suicide at the state and local levels if the national Democratic Party required all of its sub-units to "toe the line."¹ According to this argument, only a large dose of local autonomy has been able to preserve the coalition of "northern liberals" and "southern conservatives."

But the problems of party politics in the United States are in some ways unique to federal systems, where electoral battles are fought on both regional and national levels, and not all decentralized parties share precisely those concerns. Decentralization may be appealing for another more "philosophical" reason as well; it offers the promise of taking the party power to the people. Local organization without local power allows for party activity, but local organization *with* power invites participation on a higher plane. In this sense, the concept of centralization/decentralization captures the essence of participation: how many individuals are, or even can be, involved in the high level decision-making of the party?

But while democratic philosophy might laud the wider participation offered by decentralization, the more limited participation of centralization has some endearing qualities as well. Within that old cliché, "too many cooks spoil the broth," lies a bit of wisdom which is applicable to the relative merits of large and small numbers of decision-makers in political parties. Where the decentralized party may benefit in some ways from a diversity of opinions and approaches, the centralized party offers promise of greater efficiency accompanied by a single, more coherent party program.

¹We must note, however, that the national Democratic Party has flexed its muscles since 1968, and has achieved state compliance to its "guidelines" for selection of delegates to national conventions.

Party Origins and the Distribution of Power. Given its importance for understanding the inner-workings of parties, it is little wonder that much effort has been expended in trying to explain decentralization of party power. The question is quite simply: Why are some parties decentralized while others are not? Maurice Duverger, whose work has inspired the study of parties, suggested that one factor may be a party's "place of origin"; more parties which were initially formed inside the legislature could be expected to be decentralized than parties formed externally.² He reasoned that "insiders" who formed parties were usually motivated by the need for legislative voting blocs and electoral organizations, while "outsiders" were often motivated by ideological goals which required unanimity within the ranks and often resulted in attempts to overthrow the government rather than to replace it by electoral means. Hence, the insiders would form a party reflecting the needs to "unify diversity" within the population and maintain local electoral organizations, while the outsiders would be drawn to the cohesiveness and discipline provided by a centralized party. If Duverger's explanation for the variance in centralization/decentralization is correct, then we would expect a larger proportion of parties with "inside" origins to be decentralized than parties with "outside" origins.

Tables 8 and 9 present cross-tabulations of the place of origin (i.e., inside or outside the legislature) with decentralization of power in two important areas of party decision-making: the selection of the party's national leader and decisions about the spending of party funds. In either case, if the decisions are made primarily at the local or regional levels of the party, it is coded as "decentralized." Otherwise, the party is coded as "centralized."

Not only is our expectation left unsupported by both tables, but what association does exist for leadership selection (see Table 8) is in the opposite direction from that suggested by Duverger's would-be explanation. We expected

²See Duverger (1963), "Introduction: The Origin of Parties." Also, for a more detailed discussion of Duverger's argument, see LaPalombara and Weiner (1966), especially pages 7-14.

TABLE 8
Decentralization of Leadership Selection and Place of Origin

Fund Allocation	Party Origin	
	Inside	Outside
Decentralized	20 ^a 32.3%	26 ^b 41.3%
Centralized	42 ^c 67.7%	37 ^d 58.7%
Totals	62 100.0%	63 100.0%

total n = 125

a higher column percent in cell *a* than in cell *b*; the findings are just the opposite.

Apparently inside/outside origin has not been as important in determining party decentralization as Duverger's argument would lead us to expect. It would seem that whatever impact place-of-origin might have is over-ruled by factors pulling the party structure in another direction.³ In the United States, for instance, the Republican Party is decentralized in spite of the fact that it was born out of a series of meetings of anti-slavery "outsiders" in 1854. In this case, we might look to the federal system or to the country's large size or population as more potent factors than party origin. Having found evidence to contradict Duverger's explanation for party decentralization, we will take a closer look at some of these alternative explanations.

Size of the Country and the Distribution of Party Power. There are compelling reasons for expecting that the physical area of the country might affect decentralization of parties. The larger the country, the less able a few centrally-located leaders will be to make all of the decisions for the party; the party may see the need to decentralize the decision-making structure in order to stay in touch with all segments of the population. So large areas are likely to create a need for decentralization in order to (1) administer the party's business more efficiently, (2) "cover the field" more effectively by staying in contact with, and inviting the participation of, many diverse groups and regions, and (3) allow some decisions, and primarily those of the most local concern, to be made locally. Though this certainly does not suggest that small countries will *need* centralized parties for opposite reasons, it does suggest that parties in small countries may not have as many reasons to have decentralized structure as do the parties of large countries.

³Another alternative explanation for the lack of association is rooted in the ages of the parties. Perhaps there is an initial effect of place-of-origin, as Duverger suggested, but that effect may lessen substantially during the life of the party.

TABLE 9
Decentralization of Fund Allocation and Place of Origin

Fund Allocation	Party Origin	
	Inside	Outside
Decentralized	17 50.0%	20 47.6%
Centralized	17 50.0%	22 52.4%
Totals	34 100.0%	42 100.0%
total n = 76		

We have categorized parties as being on the "smaller" or "larger" halves of the countries in the sample. Tables 10 and 11 display the associations of this "size" variable with decentralization of leadership selection and fund allocation. The associations are not only in the expected direction, but are quite strong as well. Parties of the large countries are indeed more likely to have decentralized structure than are parties of smaller countries.

Polity Decentralization and the Distribution of Party Power. The United States, where party organization parallels the government's effective federalism (i.e., decentralization), is often cited as an example of what appears to be a more general phenomenon. It would seem that decentralization is like the proverbial rabbit; it tends to propagate the species. It may be argued that if a polity is characterized by a dispersion of power, its parties are likely to organize in the same way in order to cover all centers of power. David Truman, a student of American politics, has put the underlying argument this way:

TABLE 10
Decentralization of Leadership Selection and Area

Leadership Selection	Area	
	Small	Large
Decentralized	14 23.3%	32 48.5%
Centralized	46 76.7%	34 51.5%
Totals	60 100.0%	66 100.0%
Total n = 126		

TABLE 11
Decentralization of Fund Allocation and Area

Fund Allocation	Area	
	Small	Large
Decentralized	11 33.3%	26 60.5%
Centralized	22 66.7%	17 39.5%
Totals	33 100.0%	43 100.0%
Total n = 76		

CHAPTER 5.

Party Success: Who Gets What and Why?

The Who, the What, and the Why. Harold Lasswell has said that the study of politics is the study of who gets what, when and how. In our study, political parties have been the *who* and governmental office has been the most immediate *what*. Parties seek to obtain and continue in office in order to affect society through the making of governmental policy. Yet only 65 of the 147 parties in our sample held the position of governmental leader (e.g., presidency or prime ministry) at any time during the six-year period covered by our data; for the other 82 parties this "top prize" remained an elusive goal. It is a fact of party politics that some win and others must lose; but it is also a fact that some win more consistently than others. The previous three chapters may hold some clues to how or *why* some of the who's are more consistent in getting the what's.

Party strategy may be one factor in determining which parties eventually attain office. In a democratic system where competition is the most obvious way to seek office, it is logical that competitive parties should succeed more often than restrictive parties, which seek to abolish competition. In fact, we even found that there are no parties following the restrictive strategy in democratic polities. In autocratic systems, on the other hand, where restricted competition is characteristic of the polity itself, success is usually limited to the single restrictive party that governs the polity. In those cases where the government is struggling to maintain a facade of open government, however, it may suit the controlling party to invite minimal cabinet participation on the part of more competitively oriented parties. Subversive parties, which by their nature seek to overthrow the government rather than to work within it, seldom attain their "all or nothing" goal in either type of polity, though this does vary somewhat according to the geo-cultural region. A peculiarity with subversive parties, of course, is that they lose the subversive identity once they do attain office, by definition.

The ideological stance of the party may also be related to its ability to attain office. Though we have found that the expected relationship between number of parties and pragmatism is far from substantiated by the data, it is still reasonable to assume that some types of systems are more prone to reward pragmatic than programmatic parties, while programmatic parties may be more successful in other types of systems. Where the political and social circumstances are such that aggregation of a wide array of interests is required in order to win elections,

it is likely that a pragmatic party will be more successful than its programmatic counterpart(s). But where the bulk of the population is ideologically aware, programmatic parties may be the more successful.

The structure of the party may also affect its chances to succeed. Parties in large two-party systems may require decentralized structure in order to aggregate many diverse interest groups which are often regionally concentrated. On the other hand, parties can also be hampered if decentralization is carried to the extremes of inefficiency and inconsistency.

A party's strategy, ideology, and structure may all be factors in its level of success in attaining office. Another important factor may be the way in which the party is treated by the political institutions and those who control them.

Government Discrimination. France under DeGaulle altered its electoral system in 1958, some say to help the Gaullist Party at the expense of the more extremist parties including the Communists. In the Rhodesia/Nyasaland Federation, enfranchisement policies discriminating against native Africans strongly favored parties of European origin during our time period of 1957-1962. In India, the Communist Party has been harassed by government-imposed travel restrictions and limitations on its meetings, as well as an intensive anti-Communist propaganda campaign. The Communist Party of Cuba had been declared an illegal party during the Batista regime, but upon Castro's take-over it was declared the only legal party.

These are but a few examples of the ways in which governments have discriminated with regard to parties, favoring some and/or hampering others. On the negative side, discrimination may run the gamut from relatively moderate measures such as gerrymandering districts or otherwise altering procedures for determining election outcomes, to establishing or maintaining a discriminatory electoral system, to the much less subtle forms of prohibiting the party from using communications media or declaring the party illegal. On the positive side, a party may be given extraordinary access to the media, or at the extreme, it may even be declared the only legal party in the country.

Government Discrimination and Party Success. Sometimes the discriminatory practices are blatant attempts to keep certain parties from, or in, power; at other times they are less intentional. Whatever the motives, Table 12 is a clear indication that discrimination was related to the party's likelihood of attaining the office of governmental leader during our time period. Parties that were favored by the government's institutions were considerably more successful than even those parties toward which the government was "neutral," and in turn the latter were more likely to succeed than parties that the government dis-favored. It appears that one of the rewards that a victorious party may receive is the ability to make policies which will enhance its chances of remaining in office; discrimination does seem to have some effect.

Though the actual importance of the office of governmental leader varies widely from country to country, it is usually *assumed* to be an important office and so is considered to be a major party "prize." Nevertheless, it is a very

strenuous criterion as a measure of success, normally restricting the "successful" to only one party at a given time. A less demanding indicator is the party's ability to gain at least one seat in the cabinet at some time during our 1957-62 time period. Especially in multi-party systems, cabinet participation can be an effective means of affecting governmental decisions, and often indicates that the party has at least the potential for other successes as well.

EXERCISE 6

Complete the adjoining table by cross-tabulating CABPART and DISCRIM:

Success	Direction of Discrimination toward Party		
	Negative	Neutral	Positive
No Success			
Success			

Is discrimination related to success in obtaining cabinet participation? _____

Are you surprised by either the size or the direction of the relationship? _____

Elaborate. _____

TABLE 12
Government Leadership Success and Discrimination

Success	Direction of Discrimination toward Party		
	Negative	Neutral	Positive
No Success	38 90.5%	37 61.7%	7 15.6%
Success	4 9.5%	23 38.3%	38 84.4%
Totals	42 100.0%	60 100.0%	45 100.0%

Total n = 147

"competitive parties."¹ Similarly, you may wish to reconsider propositions presented in this module, or other propositions of your own, for a subset of parties which share the same basic strategy for attaining office. To obtain the necessary data set, select out those cases whose STRATEGY code is that of the party type in which you are interested. Then test your expectations with this subset of data.

The same type of thing can be done with POLTYPE, to select out only those political systems which are autocratic, or only those which are democratic. Variable INDEP can be used to pick out the "old" or "new" polities of the world. Alternatively, you may want to study the parties of one or more particular geo-cultural areas in more depth, especially if your course emphasizes one such set of countries. Variables REGION or ZONE may be employed for this purpose.

- b) A question which has been of much lasting interest to students of parties is why some countries have more parties than others. In Chapter Three we sought explanation *from* the number of parties, but we have only alluded to some of the many explanations *for* this variable. You may want to pursue some of them on your own.

Duverger (1963, especially Book II, Chapter One) has suggested that electoral systems are related to the number of parties in the system. (See also Milnor, 1969.) While our data set does not include data on the type of electoral system, Blondel (1969) has included such data at the back of his book. With the aid of Table 1 in the module, it would be possible to test Duverger's expectation.

Others have suggested that newly independent polities will be likely to have a very few parties, and probably only one. (See Lipset, 1959, and LaPalombara and Weiner, 1966, especially pages 29-33). It often takes time for new countries to develop the resources that are important for party formation. This suggests that it might be valuable to cross-tabulate INDEP with the number of parties.

For similar reasons, you may wish to consider the level of economic development as one explanation for variance in the number of parties. (Again, see Lipset, 1959, and LaPalombara and Weiner, especially pages 19-21.) Gross national product per capita is often used as one indicator of economic development, and is included in the data set as GNPCAP.

Because we are interested in analyzing the "party system" or country, rather than the individual party, we must turn to the "PARTY SYSTEM" data set for any of these projects. This data set is based on the 53

countries in the sample, as opposed to the 147 parties of the "PARTY" data set.

These projects are only suggestive of the types of analyses that can be carried out with the data, and they are certainly not exhaustive. Other projects might be suggested by additional reading on parties; the bibliographic section may provide some helpful guidance.

¹These findings are reported in "Social Aggregation, Articulation, and Representation of Political Parties: A Cross-National Analysis," delivered by Robin Gillies and Kenneth Janda at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association in San Francisco, California.

Suggested Readings

There is a vast literature on political parties, in which the novice can quickly become lost. So while this brief essay and the list of references which follows are far from exhaustive, they are only intended as guides to those works which might provide good starting points for further reading. Most of the works themselves have quite extensive bibliographies which should prove helpful to the more interested readers.

General Comparative Government Texts. Some general comparative government texts have particularly good treatments of political parties. Among them are Hitchner and Levine (1971) with concise treatments of ideological content and the varied natures of party systems, Deutsch (1974) with an especially good treatment of the key concepts in the study of parties, Beer and Ulam (1973) with discussions of the roles that parties play in each of the four countries (Britain, France, Germany, and Soviet Russia) covered in the book, and Almond *et al.* (1974) emphasizing the functions and organizations of parties as well as the development and significance of different types of party systems. Jean Blondel (1969) devotes over 100 pages to parties and party systems; included are discussions of parties' social bases and structures (including decentralization), and the significance of different numbers of parties as well as some possible explanations. Blondel also includes some parties data in the data set printed at the back of his book. Eckstein and Apter's reader (1963) includes a section of five pieces on political parties with David Apter's introduction; all in all, a good and relatively fast way to get a summary over-view of the study of parties up to and including the early sixties.

General Comparative Parties Books. Duverger (1963) was originally published in 1951 and since that time has inspired the comparative study of parties. Along with a much-discussed categorization of parties by membership style, the book includes discussions of the origins, leadership, and strength of parties as well as the relationship of party to government. In a detailed treatment of "number of parties" is included the classic argument that type of electoral system affects the nature of the party system. Robert Michels' book (1915) is aptly described by its title, except to note that its discussion of the "iron law of oligarchy" has

itself become a classic of parties research. The Macridis (1967) collection begins with an introductory essay on the history, functions and types of parties and includes nine articles on a broad array of topics including factions and one-party systems. LaPalombara and Weiner (1966) is an excellent collection focusing on the development of political parties and their role in political development in general; the opening article by the editors, concentrating on the origin and development of parties, is indeed a very good place to start. Lawson's recent (1976) comparative analysis of the U.S. Democratic Party, the Democratic Party of Guinea, and the French Gaullist Party also investigates more general issues in the comparative study of political parties. Sartori's first volume (1976) of a two-volume study probes deeply into the interactions of parties in party systems and the types of parties that are likely to emerge under different conditions. Janda (forthcoming, a) provides a conceptual framework for the comparative analysis of parties, with separate chapters on each of the 12 major concepts related to the internal organization and external relations of parties.

Geo-Cultural Areas. Some books emphasize the parties of one particular geo-cultural area. Epstein (1967) deals in-depth with the western democracies, covering the varying circumstances of party development and the differing roles that parties play among these countries. Schapiro (1972) deals with forms of opposition in the Soviet Union and other European one-party systems. While Almond and Coleman's (1960) treatment of developing areas is a more general work, many pages are devoted to the nature and functions of parties and party systems in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Near East, and Latin America.

While books which focus on American politics and parties are not strictly comparative, their discussions of party structures and functions are often of more general interest. Among these are Ranney and Kendall (1956), V. O. Key (1964), Herzberg and Pomper (1966), and Owens and Staudenraus (1965). Other recent works with American parties as primary focus include Sorauf (1972), James (1974), Madron and Chelf (1974), Chambers and Burnham (1975), Gelb and Palley (1975), Feigert and Conway (1976), and Crotty (forthcoming). Ebenstein *et al.* (1967) is an American government text that includes cross-national comparisons in its treatment of American parties. Janda (forthcoming, b) also focuses on American parties, but brings findings from comparative analysis to bear throughout.

Special Topics. Other books are topically-oriented, and are of particular interest to students of parties only because parties are in some way intertwined in the general topic. Duchacek's (1970) book on federalism is an example; it is listed here because of its discussion, though brief, of parties in decentralized politics. Milnor (1969) is included because of its excellent treatment of the varied types of electoral systems, which play so prominently in much of the literature seeking to explain differences in party systems. The Lipset article (1959) is suggestive concerning the "social requisites" of competitive party systems along with other democratic institutions.

Overviews and Bibliographic Surveys. Mayer (1972) includes a chapter titled "The Search for a Theory of Parties" which is an excellent summary of the recent literature. Apter's article in Apter and Eckstein (1963), Schlesinger (1968), Eckstein (1968), and Crotty (1970) are also invaluable as guides to and through the parties literature.


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Codebook

EXAMPLE



PARTY Data Set, n = 147

Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #
V1	PARTY ID Party identification. A three-digit code developed for the International Comparative Political Parties Project. (See list of parties at end of Codebook.)	1-3
V2	COUNTRY Identifies the country of the party, and is the same as the first and second digits of PARTYID plus 1.	4-5
V3	REGION Identifies the region in which the country resides. Same as the first digit of PARTYID plus 1.	6-7

PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53

V1 COUNTRY Col. 1-2
V2 REGION Col. 3-4

PARTY Data Set, n = 147

Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #
	22 1—Anglo-American	
	16 2—West Central Europe	
	22 3—Scandinavia and Benelux	
	18 4—South America	
	12 5—Central and Latin America	
	14 6—Asia and Far East	
	10 7—Eastern Europe	
	14 8—Middle East and North Africa	
	9 9—West Africa	
	10 10—Central and East Africa	
V4	ZONE	8
	Combines one or more regions into one zone.	
	60 1—"Western European" Zone: Regions 1, 2, and 3	
	10 2—"Eastern European" Zone: Region 7	
	77 3—"Asian, Latin, and African" Regions 4-6 and 8-10	
V5	STRATEGY	9
	Party strategy. The basic orientation of the party toward the goal of holding office.	
	100 1—Competitive	
	26 2—Restrictive	
	9 3—Subversive	
	12 0—Other than above: "Mixed" strategy	
V6	AGE	10-12
	Age of the party. Number of years that the party has been in existence, through 1962.	
V7	FACTION	13
	Leadership factionalism.	
	92 1—Does not have a leadership faction	
	47 2—Does have a leadership faction	
	8 0—Missing Data	
V8	IDEOLPOS	14
	Ideological position on a left-right continuum.	

PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53

Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #
	8	
	5	
	5	
	5	
	5	
	5	
	5	
	5	
	5	
V3	ZONE Col. 5	
	18	
	5	
	30	

PARTY Data Set, n = 147

Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #
	30 1—Far left	
	29 2—Moderate left	
	30 3—Center	
	19 4—Moderate right	
	19 5—Far right	
	20 0—Missing data	
V9	IDEOLCON	15
	Ideological consistency.	
	36 1—Very consistent	
	35 2—Moderately consistent	
	44 3—Inconsistent	
	32 0—Missing Data	
V10	ORIGIN	16
	Place of party origin, whether inside or outside of the government.	
	75 1—Inside	
	71 2—Outside	
	1 0—Missing Data	
V11	NATLEAD	17
	Decentralization of national leadership selection.	
	46 1—Decentralized	
	80 2—Centralized	
	21 0—Missing Data	
V12	ALLOFUND	18
	Decentralization of fund allocation.	
	37 1—Decentralized	
	39 2—Centralized	
	71 0—Missing Data	
V13	GOVLEAD	19
	Success in obtaining the office of government leader.	
	82 1—No success	
	65 2—Held at least once during the period	
	0 0—Missing Data	
V14	CABPART	20
	Success in obtaining representation in the cabinet.	
	44 1—No success	
	102 2—Held at least one position	

PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53

Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #
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PARTY Data Set, n = 147			PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53		
Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #			
	at least once during the period				
	1 0—Missing Data				
V15	DISCRIM Government discrimination toward the party.	21			
	42 1—Negatively discriminatory				
	60 2—Neutral				
	45 3—Discriminatory in favor of the party				
	0 0—Missing Data				
V16	POLTYPE Nature of the political system (from Gurr).	22	V8 POLTYPE Col. 10		
	71 1—Basically democratic		21		
	36 2—Basically autocratic		20		
	40 0—Missing Data or Other than above		12		
V17	NUMBER Number of parties in the party system, by the ICPP inclusion standards.	23	V4 NUMBER Col. 6		
	12 1—One party		12		
	26 2—Two parties		13		
	33 3—Three parties		11		
	40 4—Four parties		10		
	30 5—Five parties		6		
	6 6—Six parties		1		
V18	NUMBER2 Recoded NUMBER.	24	V5 NUMBER2 Col. 7		
	26 1—Two parties		13		
	73 2—Three or Four parties		21		
	36 3—Five or Six parties		7		
	12 0—One party (missing)		12		
V19	NUMBER3 Recoded NUMBER.	25	V6 NUMBER3 Col. 8		
	12 1—One party		12		
	135 2—Two or more parties		41		
V20	NUMBER4 Recoded NUMBER.	26	V7 NUMBER4 Col. 9		
	26 1—Two parties		13		
	109 2—More than two parties		28		
	12 0—One party (missing)		12		

PARTY Data Set, n = 147			PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53		
Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #			
V21	POLDEC <i>Effective</i> decentralization or centralization of the polity (from Gurr).	27		V9 POLDEC Col. 11	
	21 1—Decentralized			7	
	126 2—Centralized			46	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V22	FEDERAL Whether or not the polity is <i>formally</i> federal.	28		V10 FEDERAL Col. 12	
	36 1—Federal			12	
	111 2—Unitary			41	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V23	AREA Land area of the country (based on World Handbook data).	29		V11 AREA Col. 13	
	73 1—Smaller countries			27	
	74 2—Larger countries			26	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V24	POP Population of the country (based on World Handbook data for 1961).	30		V12 POP Col. 14	
	66 1—Smaller populations			27	
	81 2—Larger populations			26	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V25	GNPCAP Gross national product per capita (based on World Handbook data for 1957).	31		V13 GNPCAP Col. 15	
	19 1—Very high (\$1200 and above)			6	
	32 2—High (\$600-1199)			9	
	26 3—Medium (\$300-599)			9	
	28 4—Low (\$150-299)			11	
	42 5—Very low (under \$150)			18	
V26	INDEP Period of polity independence (from Gurr).	32		V14 INDEP Col. 16	
	50 1—Pre-1940			16	
	97 2—Post-1940			37	

PARTY Data Set, n = 147			PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53		
Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #			
	at least once during the period				
	1 0—Missing Data				
V15	DISCRIM Government discrimination toward the party.	21			
	42 1—Negatively discriminatory				
	60 2—Neutral				
	45 3—Discriminatory in favor of the party				
	0 0—Missing Data				
V16	POLTYPE Nature of the political system (from Gurr).	22	V8 POLTYPE Col. 10		
	71 1—Basically democratic		21		
	36 2—Basically autocratic		20		
	40 0—Missing Data or Other than above		12		
V17	NUMBER Number of parties in the party system, by the ICPP inclusion standards.	23	V4 NUMBER Col. 6		
	12 1—One party		12		
	26 2—Two parties		13		
	33 3—Three parties		11		
	40 4—Four parties		10		
	30 5—Five parties		6		
	6 6—Six parties		1		
V18	NUMBER2 Recoded NUMBER.	24	V5 NUMBER2 Col. 7		
	26 1—Two parties		13		
	73 2—Three or Four parties		21		
	36 3—Five or Six parties		7		
	12 0—One party (missing)		12		
V19	NUMBER3 Recoded NUMBER.	25	V6 NUMBER3 Col. 8		
	12 1—One party		12		
	135 2—Two or more parties		41		
V20	NUMBER4 Recoded NUMBER.	26	V7 NUMBER4 Col. 9		
	26 1—Two parties		13		
	109 2—More than two parties		28		
	12 0—One party (missing)		12		

PARTY Data Set, n = 147			PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53		
Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #			
V21	POLDEC <i>Effective</i> decentralization or centralization of the polity (from Gurr).	27		V9 POLDEC Col. 11	
	21 1—Decentralized			7	
	126 2—Centralized			46	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V22	FEDERAL Whether or not the polity is <i>formally</i> federal.	28		V10 FEDERAL Col. 12	
	36 1—Federal			12	
	111 2—Unitary			41	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V23	AREA Land area of the country (based on World Handbook data).	29		V11 AREA Col. 13	
	73 1—Smaller countries			27	
	74 2—Larger countries			26	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V24	POP Population of the country (based on World Handbook data for 1961).	30		V12 POP Col. 14	
	66 1—Smaller populations			27	
	81 2—Larger populations			26	
	0 0—Missing Data				
V25	GNPCAP Gross national product per capita (based on World Handbook data for 1957).	31		V13 GNPCAP Col. 15	
	19 1—Very high (\$1200 and above)			6	
	32 2—High (\$600-1199)			9	
	26 3—Medium (\$300-599)			9	
	28 4—Low (\$150-299)			11	
	42 5—Very low (under \$150)			18	
V26	INDEP Period of polity independence (from Gurr).	32		V14 INDEP Col. 16	
	50 1—Pre-1940			16	
	97 2—Post-1940			37	

PARTY Data Set, n = 147

Var. #	Variable label and description	Column #
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PARTY SYSTEM Data Set, n = 53

V15 IDEODIST Col. 17

Ideological distance between the system's two parties whose ideological positions are farthest apart. (Not available on PARTY data set)

5	1—No distance
5	2—
8	3—Middle distance
6	4—
6	5—Maximum distance
23	0—Missing Data and One-party systems

Parties in the Data Set

(With party identification number)

American Democratic Party (001), American Republican Party (002), British Labour Party (011), British Conservative Party (012), Australian Labor Party (021), Australian Liberal Party (022), Australian Country Party (023), New Zealand National Party (031), New Zealand Labour Party (032), Canadian Liberal Party (041), Canadian Progressive Conservative Party (042), Canadian New Democrat Party (043), Canadian Social Credit Party (044), Irish Fianna Fail (051), Irish Fine Gael (052), Irish Labour Party (053), Rhodesian and Nyasaland United Federal Party (071), Rhodesian and Nyasaland Dominion Party (072), Northern Rhodesian African National Congress (073), Malawi (Nyasaland) Congress Party (074), Indian National Congress (081), Indian Communist Party (082), Austrian People's Party (101), Austrian Socialist Party (102), Austrian Freedom or Liberal Party (103), French Popular Republican Movement (111), French Radical Socialist (112), French Socialist Party (113), French Gaullist Party (114), French Communist Party (115), West German Christian Democratic Union (121), West German Social Democratic Party (122), West German Free Democrat Party (123), Greek Liberal Party (141), Greek National Progressive Union of Center (142), Greek Rally/National Radical Union (143), Greek United Democratic Left (145), Portuguese National Union (171), Danish Social Democratic (201), Danish Moderate Liberal (202), Danish Conservative Party (203), Danish Social Liberal (204), Iceland Independence (221), Iceland Progressive Party (222), Iceland People's Union (223), Iceland Social Democratic Party (224), Swedish Social Democratic Party (241), Swedish Center Party (242), Swedish People's Party (243), Swedish Right Party (244), Netherland Roman Catholic People's Party (261), Netherland Labor Party (262), Netherland Liberal Party (263), Netherland Anti-Revolutionary Party (264), Netherland Christian Historical Union (265), Netherland Communist Party (266), Luxembourg Christian Social Party (271), Luxembourg Socialist Party (272), Luxembourg Democratic Party (273), Luxembourg Communist Democratic Party (273), Luxembourg Communist Party (274), Ecuadorian National Velasquista Federation (351), Ecuadorian Conservative Party (352), Ecuadorian Liberal Party (353), Ecuadorian Socialist Party (354), Ecuadorian Concentration of Popular Forces (355), Paraguayan Febrerista Party (361), Paraguayan Colorados (362), Paraguayan Liberal Party (363), Peruvian Movement of National Unification (371), Peruvian Christian Democratic Party (372), Peruvian Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana (373), Peruvian Popular Action Party (374), Peruvian Democratic Movement (375), Uruguayan Colorado Party (381), Uruguayan National Party (392), Venezuelan Republican Democratic Union (391), Venezuelan Christian Social Party (392), Venezuelan Democratic Action (393), Cuban Popular Socialist Party (414), Dominican Republic Dominican Party (421), El Salvador Revolutionary Party of Democratic Reunification (431), El Salvador Renovating Action Party (432), Guatemalan National Democratic Movement (441), Guatemalan Christian Democratic Party (442), Guatemalan Revolutionary Party (443), Guatemalan National Democratic

Reconciliation (444), Guatemalan Labor Party (447), Nicaraguan Nationalist Liberal (471), Nicaraguan Conservative Party (472), Nicaraguan Traditionalist Conservative Party (473), Burmese "Stable" AFPFL (502), Burmese "Clean" AFPFL (503), Burma Workers/National United Front (504), Cambodian Popular Socialist Community, Sankum (511), Indonesian National Party (531), Indonesian Moslem Scholars Party (532), Indonesian Communist Party (533), Indonesian Masjumi (534), Korean Workers' Party (561), Malayan United National Organization (581), Malayan Chinese Association (582), Malayan Indian Congress (583), Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (584), Malayan Communist Party (585), Albanian Workers' Party (601), Bulgarian Communist Party (611), Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (612), East German Socialist Unity Party (631), East German Christian Democratic Union (632), East German National Democratic Party (633), East German Liberal Democratic Party (634), East German Democratic Peasants' Party (635), Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (641), USSR Communist Party (671), Sudanese Natital Unionist Party (741), Sudanese Independence Party (742), Sudanese Southern Liberal Party (743), Tunisian Neo-Destour (751), Lebanese Progressive Social Party (761), Lebanese Constitutionalist Bloc (762), Lebanese Philanges (764), Lebanese Nationalist bloc (765), Iranian People's Party (771), Iranian National Party (772), Iranian Tudeh Party (773), Iranian National Front (774), Turkish Republican People's Party (781), Turkish Democratic Party (782), Dahomey Republican/National Party (802), Dahomey Democratic Union (803), Dahomey Northern Ethnic Group/Democratic Rally (804), Ghanian Convention People's Party (811), Ghanian United Party (812), Democratic Party of Guinea (821), Upper Volta Voltaic Democratic Union (871), Committee of Togolese Unity (891), Democratic Union of the Togolese Populations (893), Central African Republic (911), Chadian Progressive Party (921), Chadian Social Action Party (922), Congo-Brazzaville Democratic Union for the Defense of African Interests (931), Congo-Brazzaville African Socialist Movement (932), Kenya African National Union (961), Kenya African Democratic Union (962), Uganda People's Congress (981), Uganda Democratic Party (982), Uganda Kabaka Yekka (983).

Important Information for the Instructor

Thirteen variables supplied in the data set for *Comparing Political Parties* are based on information originally coded for 17 variables in the International Comparative Political Parties Project (ICPP). In order to provide the students with data in a form that could be easily utilized in constructing and interpreting cross-tabulation tables, it was necessary to "collapse" much of the original information into dichotomies and trichotomies. Because you might be able to make use of the greater information contained in the original codings, either for your own use or for additional projects for your students, the developers of the module have prepared this supplement which, after briefly describing the ICPP data project, presents coding information and data for the 17 ICPP variables used in this module. In order to facilitate the transition between the module and these additional data, a copy of the coding rules for the module's data set is also attached.

The International Comparative Political Parties Project

The ICPP Project began at Northwestern University in 1967, with Kenneth Janda as principal investigator. Since its inception, the goal of the project has been "the first comprehensive, empirically based, comparative analysis of political parties throughout the world." Toward that end, the project has since collected and coded information on 100 variables representing 10 major concepts (goal orientation, governmental status, institutionalization, social support, autonomy, issue orientation, coherence, involvement, degree of organization, and centralization of power). The entire ICPP data set is distributed through the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, P.O. Box 1248, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106.

The sample of countries covered by the ICPP Project is a stratified random sample of all countries in the world, with five selected randomly from each of 10 geocultural areas, and the United States, Britain, and Canada added later for obvious reasons of personal and professional interest. In order to be considered a political party for this study an entity had to pass two tests. First, a party must meet the definition of "an organization which pursues as at least one of its goals

the placement of its avowed representatives in governmental positions." In addition, the party had to pass a minimal test of "importance" (roughly 5 percent of the lower house seats in two successive elections for legal parties, and 10 percent of the popular support over five years for illegal parties). In the 53 countries of the sample, 147 parties met these requirements for the 1957-1962 time "slice" of the ICPP data. (It should be noted that a party is given only *one* score for each variable for the entire six-year period; each score represents how the party looked or acted during the period "as a whole.") These 147 parties constitute roughly 50 percent of the parties in existence world wide at the time.

The data themselves are judgmental in nature, the results of comprehensive literature searches for all of the parties in the sample. Codes were initially assigned to each party on the basis of coders' reviews of the literature on the party. Pairs of coders were used to assess inter-coder reliability, which was quite high with a mean product-moment correlation of .79 between 557 pairs of codes. Additionally, the semi-final codings, with textual explanations, were reviewed by country experts; many of their comments and suggestions for changes were incorporated in the final data set used for the module.

The Relationship of the SETUPS Variables to the ICPP Variables

In the ICPP Project, each of the major concepts listed on the left in the below scheme are measured by multiple variables, only some of which have been chosen for the purposes of this module. Those are listed on the right. In the original study and data set (see Janda, *Comparative Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*, in press), these variables are measured on multi-point ordinal or even interval scales. To simplify analysis in this module, however, these variables have usually been collapsed through recoding into the categories specified in the SETUPS codebook. The original codes for these variables are specified below following very brief descriptions of the variables themselves. Thorough discussions of the conceptual basis of the variables and issues in their operationalization are contained in *Comparative Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey*.

Institutionalization	Year of Origin (V101)
	Governmental Discrimination (V201)
Governmental Status	Government Leadership (V202)
	Cabinet Participation (V203)
	Outside Origin (V203)
	Ownership of Means of Production (V501)
	Government Role in Economic Planning (V502)
Issue Orientation	Distribution of Wealth (V503)
	Providing for Social Welfare (V504)
	Secularization of Society (V505)
	Alignment with East/West Blocs (V507)

Goal Orientation	Open Competition (V600)
	Restricting Competition (V610)
	Subverting the Political System (V620)
Centralization	Selecting the National Leader (V902)
	Allocating Funds (V904)
Coherence	Leadership Factionalism (V1004)

Original Codes for ICPP Variables Selected for SETUPS Module

VARIABLE #101: "Year of Origin"

Parties were originally scored for the year in which they were formed, and this information was used to create the AGE variable in the SETUPS module. In this instance, no recoding was done. The value computed is the age of the party in 1962, the last year of our time period.

VARIABLE #201: "Governmental Discrimination" (Mean = .497, N = 147)

Governments can discriminate in favor of or against a party by promoting or opposing its activities. Five different types of activities were identified and given signs and weights relating to their negative or positive character and the severity of the discrimination. A party was assigned the *sum* of these signed weights from the following coding scheme, but to a maximum value of ± 16 .

- 16 Prohibiting candidates from ballots; invalidating all its votes; declaring the party illegal; jails its leaders
- 8 Prohibiting party operation of communications media; newspapers, radio, TV, mails
- 4 Harassing or threatening interference with party meetings, campaigns, business activities, employment or party members
- 2 Denying access to government-owned mass media or imposing censorship on party use of the mass media but not preventing its use
- 1 Discriminatory provisions of electoral system, including blatant gerrymandering, severe legal requirements for appearing on ballot, altered procedures for determining election outcomes
- 0 Government is neutral or indifferent towards the party; makes no apparent attempt either to interfere with or to support the party
- +1 Discriminatory provisions of the electoral system favor the party over the other given parties
- +2 Given discriminatory access to government-owned mass media; exempted from government censorship
- +4 Promotes party meetings of campaigns by providing funds, advertising of facilities
- +8 Party operated newspaper or radio/TV station is regarded as an authoritative government voice
- +16 Party is declared the only legal one; establishment of a one-party state; opposition parties banned

VARIABLE #202: "Governmental Leadership" (Mean = .325, N = 147)

Parties were scored for the percentage of time they held the leadership of the government, usually the office of prime minister or president, depending on the system. The count was in terms of years, with any amount less than a year counted as a whole year in the numerator. The denominator was the number of years possible in the time period. This was usually 6 for 1957-62, but adjustments were made for some countries. (E.g., for France, it was 5 for 1958-62, corresponding to the formation of the Fifth Republic.)

VARIABLE #203: "Cabinet Participation" (Mean = .518, N = 146)

Some parties are not strong enough to win leadership of the national government (measured by variable #202), but they are able to gain access to governmental policy making by entering coalitions with other parties. We scored parties for the percentage of time they participated in a governing coalition, following the same scoring rules as reported for variable #202.

VARIABLE #207: "Outside Origin"

This variable related to Duverger's distinction between parties formed "inside" the legislature and those formed "outside." Our operationalization involves a much finer set of categories, however. We assigned the *lowest* (i.e., the most "inside") code applicable from the following list.

Freq.		
10	1	Formed by the incumbent chief executive to legitimate his leadership or consolidate his support
4	2	Formed by indigenous leaders for independence who emerge in control of the government upon the end of foreign control without having wrested control through revolution (which would make the leaders "outlawed" by the government in power and "outside" the government as in code 11 below)
5	3	Formed by the chief executive to promote limited party competition
32	4	Formed by groups of legislators currently holding office
9	5	Formed by current government officials—other than the chief executive or legislators, includes appointed officeholders, municipal and state officials
15	6	Formed by prominent, socially respected, private citizens
7	7	Formed by former governmental officials, whether elected or appointed, includes municipal and state officials
35	8	Formed by leaders of major legal social organizations (includes other major legal parties)
9	9	Formed by leaders of minor legal social organizations (includes other minor legal parties)
5	10	Formed by private citizens with no special organizational roots in society

12	11	Formed by leaders of outlawed social organizations, or formed by outlawed personalities, revolutionaries
3	12	Formed by nationals of another country
146		

VARIABLE #501: "Ownership of the Means of Production"

Relying on party documents and observers' statements, we rated the parties on their positions concerning government ownership of "basic industries" like lumber, mining, steel, communications, transportation, and utilities. Three basic positions—"strong," "moderate," and "weak"—were identified on the PRO and CON sides of the issue. Intermediate scores (i.e., even-numbered values) were assigned in the case of discrepancies between party "program" and "practice."

Freq.		
16	5	PRO-strong Strongly favors government ownership; advocates government ownership of all basic industries; advocates government ownership of means of production generally
4	4	
26	3	PRO-moderate Favors government ownership; advocates government ownership of some basic industries but not all; advocates acquiring some industry not under government ownership
7	2	
15	1	PRO-weak Accepts some government ownership but mainly favors more government regulation; advocates active regulation of production and marketing activities of basic industries; advocates stronger regulation
6	0	Neutral Includes ambiguous or contradictory positions
25	-1	CON-weak Accepts some government ownership; opposes ownership spreading to all basic industries; opposes government acquisition of a given industry not under government ownership; accepts current government regulations
6	-2	
19	-3	CON-moderate Opposes government ownership; opposes ownership in principle for any basic industry; advocates returning a given government-owned industry to private ownership; advocates weaker regulations
1	-4	
8	-5	CON-strong Strongly opposes government ownership; opposes even government regulation of production and marketing activities of industries other than minimal requirements for health, safety and honesty; urges repeal of present regulations
133		

VARIABLE #502: "Government Role in Economic Planning"

Employing the same approach as described under variable #501, we assessed the parties' positions toward centralization of economic decision making in the national government.

Freq.		
20	5	PRO-strong Advocates government prescription of the level and nature of resource allocation, commodity production and distribution. Often represented by the promulgation of "five-year plans" and the like
9	4	
45	3	PRO-moderate Favors an active government role in the development or construction of sectors of the economy (e.g., restriction of capital

18	CON-weak	Takes generally benevolent attitude toward religion. Advocates exemption of church property from taxation
6	-1	-2
32	CON-moderate	Advocates state monetary support of parochial schools, clergy, or church operations
1	-3	-2
7	CON-strong	Advocates establishment of a state religion; imposition of a system of laws based on religions prescription
111	-7	

VARIABLE #507: "Alignment with East/West Blocs"

Employing the approach described under variable #501, we assessed the parties' orientations toward the two major power blocs in the post-war era. The PRO position is linked to alignment with the East; the CON position to alignment with the West. For our time period, we were not troubled by conflicts between the USSR and Red China, which was treated as an Eastern bloc country in our scoring.

Freq.	PRO-strong	Supports entering or maintaining formal military alliance with countries in the "Eastern" bloc
10	5	
1	4	
3	PRO-moderate	Favors accepting military or economic aid, but does not advocate formal military alliance with the USSR
7	3	
7	PRO-weak	Party documents or spokesmen express favoritism toward the USSR or opposition toward the U.S., although the favoritism stops short of entering alliances or agreements with the USSR
21	1	
21	Neutral	Eschews relations with either power or dispenses praise or blame toward both sides, without apparent prejudice, or accepts aid equally from both sides; advocates policy of neutralism; alliance with both sides
10	0	
7	CON-weak	Party documents or spokesmen express favoritism toward the U.S. or opposition toward the USSR, but the favoritism stops short of urging alliance or acceptance of economic aid
21	-1	
4	-2	
4	CON-moderate	Favors accepting military or economic aid, but does not advocate formal military alliances with the U.S.; accepts alliance but urges rapprochement with USSR
50	-3	
134	-4	
50	CON-strong	Supports entering or maintaining formal military alliances with countries in the "Western" bloc
134	-5	

VARIABLE #600: "Open Competition Orientation"

For the purposes of the ICPP Project, parties are defined as organizations that pursue a goal of placing their avowed representatives in government positions (although they can pursue other goals as well). "Placing" should be broadly interpreted to mean through the electoral process or outside of it. Thus, while this goal is common to all parties by definition, their orientations toward that goal may be quite different. Variable #600 reflects the extent

to which parties pursue this goal through a strategy of open competition in the electoral process, which is one of three possible "pure" strategies for achieving the stated goal. The other two are dealt with in variable #610, "restricting party competition," and variable #620, "subverting the political process."

A party's reliance on open competition in the electoral process was scored in accordance with the following weights. This scoring was done in conjunction with variables #610 and #620 to insure that the sum of the orientation scores equals the arbitrary value of 4.0 (some parties are scored in .5 increments, producing decimal values).

Freq.	21	0.0	Not oriented to open competition in the electoral process: the party's strategy for placing its members in government posts likely involves either restricting competition from opposition parties or subverting the political process; a mixture of the two is unlikely but possible
	1	.5	
	14	1.0	Generally speaking, the party's strategy is not oriented to open competition in the electoral process, but it does show isolated signs of being electorally competitive with other parties; e.g., it may occasionally propose candidates for elections although it may boycott the elections; it may make some effort to nominate candidates that would be expected to draw support from certain publics in competition with opposition groups, although it may not allow the opposition groups to compete
	11	2.0	Orientation to open competition in the electoral process plays some role in the party's overall strategy: the party may nominate candidates but it does not rely on the electoral process to place its members in government positions
	3	2.5	
	15	3.0	Orientations to open competition in the electoral process plays the major role in the party's overall strategy: the party nominates candidates and campaigns actively to win votes, but it often tries to restrict the activities of other parties or to disrupt society for its own campaign ends
	11	3.5	
	71	4.0	Relies exclusively on open competition in the electoral process
	147		

VARIABLE #610: "Restrictive Orientation"

A party's reliance on a strategy of restricting party competition was scored in accordance with the following weights. This scoring was done in conjunction with variables #600 and #620 to ensure that the sum of the orientation scores equals the arbitrary value of 4.0 (some parties are scored in .5 increments, producing decimal values).

Freq.	92	0.0	Not oriented to restricting party competition: the party's strategy for placing its members in government posts involves either open competition with other parties or subverting the political process
	8	.5	
	11	1.0	Generally speaking, the party's strategy is not oriented to restricting party competition, but party members engage in occasional instances of disrupting, invalidating, or proscribing opposition activities
	4	1.5	
	6	2.0	Restricting party competition plays a minor role in the party's

		overall strategy: the party may hamper opposition activities but its overall strategy is not dominated by these restrictive procedures
9	3.0	Restricting party competition plays the major role in the party's overall strategy, but it employs other strategic considerations in pursuing its goal: e.g., make some effort to nominate candidates who would be expected to draw support from publics in competition with opposition groups
1	3.5	
16	4.0	Relies exclusively on restricting party competition to achieve its goal: this may be done in concert with other parties on an oligopolistic basis
<u>147</u>		

VARIABLE #620: "Subversive Orientation"

A party's reliance on a strategy of subverting the political process was scored in accordance with the following weights. This scoring was done in conjunction with variables #600 and 610 to insure that the sum of the orientation scores equal the arbitrary value of 4.0 (some parties are scored in .5 increments, producing decimal values).

Freq.		
120	0.0	Not oriented to subverting the political process: the party's strategy for placing its members in government posts involves either open competition with other parties or restricting party competition
6	.5	
9	1.0	Generally speaking, the party's strategy is not oriented to subverting the political process, but party members engage in occasional instances of destructive or disruptive acts against the government. These acts are significant in their importance but run counter to party strategy
3	2.0	Subverting the political process plays a minor role in the party's overall strategy: the party may engage in subversive acts, but its overall strategy is not dominated by these subversive actions
5	3.0	Subverting the political process plays the major role in the party's overall strategy, but it employs other strategic considerations in pursuing its goal; e.g., it nominates candidates although it may boycott the elections
4	4.0	Relies exclusively on subverting the political process to achieve its goal
<u>147</u>		

VARIABLE #902: "Selecting the National Leader"

This variable isolates the set of procedures used to select the national leader, who is at the minimum the person who acts as the primary spokesman of the party in the country's communications media. We are less interested in the "democratic" or "oligarchical" character of the selection process than in the numbers and credentials of people who participate in the selection. The higher the score on the following set of codes, the more "centralized" the leadership selection.

Freq.		
3	0	No national party leader can be identified
	1	The leader is selected by vote of party identifiers or supporters
1	2	He is selected by vote of party members, as smaller group than above

32	3	He is selected by a national convention or congress, the delegates to which represent regional or local party organizations
10	4	He is selected by the parliamentary delegation of the party
7	5	He is selected by a national convention or congress, the delegates to which are appointed or primarily determined by the national party organization
8	6	He is selected by the national executive committee or party council subject to ratification by some lower levels of the party
31	7	He is selected by the national executive committee or party council without further review of the decision; include change in leaders as a result of "power struggles" within the top leadership group
34	8	He is selected by his predecessor; include the situation in which the party was created by the incumbent leader and no apparent means for transferring leadership have been established
<u>126</u>		

VARIABLE #904: "Allocating Funds"

This scale incorporates a number of combinations of levels of party organization in the collection and allocation of funds. The higher the level at which the funds were both collected and distributed, the greater the centralization of power in the party. The highest level applicable was coded:

Freq.		
5	0	Responsibility for collecting and allocating funds is diffused throughout the party; little or no structure is imposed on this aspect of party activity
0	1	Funds are collected and allocated primarily by local organizations—defined as constituency/county/municipal/commune level or lower
24	2	Funds are collected primarily at the local level but large amounts are transmitted upward for distribution by either the regional (state) or national organizations
3	3	Funds are collected by all levels of the organization but transferred to the regional level for allocation
5	4	Funds are collected primarily at the regional level and allocated by regional organizations
17	5	Funds are collected primarily at all levels of the party but large amounts are transferred to the national organization for allocation, or the national organ collects most but local organs collect significant amounts
22	6	Funds are collected primarily by the national organization, which also exercised responsibility for allocating funds
<u>76</u>		

VARIABLE #1004: "Leadership Factionalism"

The higher the score on this variable, the greater the degree of leadership factionalism. The party was given the highest score that applied from the following scale.

Freq.		
60	0	Leadership contests for control of the party either do not occur or

		they are so covert or so "inside" that they do not engage large number of party members in their outcome
16	1	Leadership contests for control of the party do emerge into view of party members, but factional tendencies are not evident
16	2	Leadership following are present, but factions cannot be clearly distinguished in the sense of labeled groupings with identifiable membership
7	3	Followers of a political leader have created a "small" faction within the party, but the faction does not have a formal organization of its own
8	4	Followers of a political leader have created a "small" faction within the party with some formal organization of its own
17	5	Followers of a political leader have created a "large" faction within the party—"large" defined as about 25% of the membership or more—but the faction does not have a formal organization of its own
15	6	Followers of a political leader have created a "large" faction within the party with some formal organization of its own
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Recoding of ICPP Variables for SETUPS Module

The variables named on the left were created for the SETUPS module by employing the ICPP variables on the right as indicated.

Module Variable	Coded as:
STRATEGY	Restrictive if BV610 is 2.5 or above Competitive if BV600 is 2.5 or above Subversive if BV620 is 2.5 or above
FACTION	Factionalized if BV1004 is between 3 and 6
IDEOLPOS*	Far right if the average of the six-issue orientation variables is between -5 and -1.95 Right if average is -1.94 to -.55 Center if average is -.54 to .55 Left if average is .56 to 1.95 Far left if average is 1.96 to 5.0
IDEOLCON*	Very consistent if average deviation of the six issues is 0.0 to 1.35 Moderately consistent if average deviation is 1.36 to 2.10 Inconsistent if average deviation is 2.11 to 4.00
ORIGIN	Inside if BV207 is between 1 and 6
NATLEAD	Decentralized if BV902 is between 0 and 4
ALLOFUND	Decentralized if BV904 is between 0 and 4
GOVLEAD	No success if BV202 is 0.0
CABPART	No success if BV203 is 0.0

DISCRIM Negatively discriminatory if negative value of BV201
Neutral if BV201 is 0.0
Positively discriminatory if positive value of BV201

*If less than four of the separate issue variables have valid scores, IDEOLPOS itself is scored as missing. Similarly, if less than five of the separate variables have valid scores, IDEOLCON is scored as having missing data.

In the PARTY SYSTEM data set, IDEODIST was first computed as the difference between the highest and lowest average issue scores within the system. Countries with a difference-of-average of from 0.0 to 1.00 are coded as "1," those from 1.01 to 2.25 as "2," those from 2.26 to 3.00 as "3," those from 3.01 to 5.00 as "4," and those greater than 5.0 as "5." Countries were coded as missing IDEODIST values if they have only 1 party (12 cases), or valid IDEOLPOS scores for only 1 of 2 parties (4 cases), 2 of 3 parties (5 cases), 2 of 4 parties (1 case), or 1 of 5 parties (1 case).

ICPP Data for Sixteen Variables*

PARTYID	V201	V202	V203	V207	V501	V502	V503	V504	V505	V507	V600	V610	V620	V902	V904	V1004
1	1	33	67	5	-1	3	1	3	-1	-5	400	0	0	3	2	2
2	1	67	100	8	-3	-2	-2	-1	-1	-5	400	0	0	3	3	5
11	0	0	0	8	3	3	3	5	-1	-5	400	0	0	4	5	5
12	0	100	100	4	-2	2	-1	4	-1	-5	400	0	0	7	2	0
21	0	0	0	8	2	3	1	5	0	-1	400	0	0	4	4	1
22	0	100	100	4	-1	2	-1	4	0	-5	400	0	0	4	3	0
23	0	0	100	8	-1	2	-0	2	-0	-5	400	0	0	4	2	0
31	3	50	50	4	-2	-1	-2	-1	-1	-5	400	0	0	4	2	0
32	1	50	50	8	1	3	1	5	-3	-5	400	0	0	4	5	0
41	0	100	100	2	-1	3	3	3	0	-5	400	0	0	3	5	5
42	0	0	0	4	0	1	1	2	0	-5	400	0	0	3	4	1
43	0	0	0	8	2	4	4	5	0	-5	400	0	0	3	2	1
44	0	0	0	8	-2	1	0	1	-2	-3	400	0	0	3	4	6
51	1	100	100	5	-1	3	1	5	-3	-1	400	0	0	7	2	0
52	-1	17	17	4	-1	3	1	1	1	-3	400	0	0	3	2	0
53	-1	0	17	8	3	3	3	5	-3	-3	400	0	0	-0	-0	0
71	1	100	100	4	-1	-3	-5	-1	-0	-5	200	200	0	3	2	5
72	1	0	0	9	-3	-3	-5	-2	-0	-5	200	150	50	5	0	6
73	0	0	0	9	-0	-0	5	5	-0	-0	200	0	200	3	-0	6
74	-1	0	0	9	-0	3	5	5	-0	-0	100	0	300	3	5	0
81	1	100	100	9	3	5	3	3	1	0	400	0	0	3	4	0
82	-6	0	0	12	3	5	5	5	0	0	400	0	0	7	4	1
101	3	100	100	10	-1	1	-2	0	-3	-1	400	0	0	6	3	2
102	1	100	100	8	3	4	1	4	2	0	400	0	0	7	2	2
103	-3	0	0	6	-5	-5	-3	-3	3	-1	300	0	100	6	0	5
111	0	20	100	8	3	3	1	1	-3	-5	400	0	0	3	2	1
112	0	20	20	4	-1	0	-1	-1	2	-5	400	0	0	3	5	4
113	0	0	20	8	5	4	1	5	3	-3	400	0	0	7	2	3
114	0	100	100	7	-1	3	1	3	-3	-2	400	0	0	8	-0	2
115	-1	0	0	9	5	5	5	5	3	-5	300	0	100	7	5	0
121	0	100	100	8	-3	-1	1	3	-1	-5	400	0	0	3	6	5
122	0	0	0	11	1	1	1	3	-2	-5	400	0	0	3	2	2

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ICPP Data for Sixteen Variables (continued)

PARTYID	V201	V202	V203	V207	V501	V502	V503	V504	V505	V507	V600	V610	V620	V902	V904	V1004
123	0	0	33	6	-4	-4	-1	-1	1	-5	400	0	0	3	5	2
141	-1	0	0	1	-1	-0	1	3	-0	-3	400	0	0	7	-0	6
142	-1	0	0	4	-0	1	1	-0	-0	-3	400	0	0	-0	-0	1
143	1	100	100	5	-3	4	-3	4	-0	-4	300	100	0	8	6	0
145	-5	0	0	11	3	3	-0	1	-3	1	300	0	100	6	5	0
171	15	100	100	1	-5	3	-5	1	-1	-5	0	400	0	8	-0	0
201	0	100	100	8	2	3	1	3	-3	-4	400	0	0	4	6	0
202	0	0	0	4	-3	-3	-1	3	-3	-5	400	0	0	4	6	4
203	0	0	0	4	-5	-5	-1	3	-3	-5	400	0	0	4	6	0
204	0	0	100	4	1	1	1	3	-3	-3	400	0	0	4	5	0
221	0	67	67	4	-1	3	-0	5	-3	-5	400	0	0	7	-0	0
222	0	33	33	4	3	3	-0	5	-3	-3	400	0	0	-0	-0	0
223	0	0	33	8	5	4	3	5	-3	0	400	0	0	7	6	0
224	0	33	100	8	5	3	1	5	-3	-2	400	0	0	7	-0	6
241	0	100	100	10	3	3	3	5	0	0	400	0	0	6	2	0
242	0	0	17	9	-1	-1	1	-1	-2	0	400	0	0	3	2	0
243	0	0	0	4	-1	-2	-2	3	-2	-1	400	0	0	-0	2	0
244	0	0	0	4	-3	-3	-3	-1	-3	-1	400	0	0	5	2	1
251	0	83	100	4	-3	-1	0	-3	-3	-5	400	0	0	-0	2	3
262	0	33	33	8	2	2	3	5	-3	-5	400	0	0	6	-0	2
263	0	0	67	4	-3	-2	-1	1	1	-5	400	0	0	-0	-0	5
264	0	0	100	8	-3	1	-3	-4	-3	-5	400	0	0	3	6	1
265	0	0	100	4	-3	1	-3	-3	-5	-5	400	0	0	-0	5	2
266	-2	0	0	8	5	5	3	5	3	1	400	0	0	7	5	6
271	0	100	100	4	-3	-1	0	3	-3	-5	400	0	0	6	-0	-0
272	0	0	33	6	0	3	3	5	0	-5	400	0	0	7	-0	1
273	0	0	67	4	-5	-3	-0	-1	1	-5	400	0	0	7	-0	2
274	0	0	0	10	5	-0	-0	5	-0	5	400	0	0	7	-0	0
351	0	33	33	7	1	3	0	3	1	-5	400	0	0	8	-0	2
352	0	50	67	4	-5	-1	-3	-3	-5	-5	350	0	50	3	-0	1
353	0	0	0	11	-1	1	2	3	3	-5	400	0	0	3	-0	4

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ICPP Data for Sixteen Variables (continued)

PARTYID	V201	V202	V203	V207	V501	V502	V503	V504	V505	V507	V600	V610	V620	V902	V904	V1004
354	0	0	0	9	5	-0	5	3	5	5	350	50	0	-0	-0	-0
355	0	0	0	5	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	200	100	100	8	-0	2
361	16	100	100	1	-3	3	3	3	-1	-5	0	400	0	7	-0	4
362	-16	0	0	6	1	5	4	5	-0	0	100	0	300	6	2	6
363	-16	0	0	6	-3	0	3	1	-0	0	100	0	300	-0	-0	4
371	0	0	0	1	-1	-1	0	1	-1	-0	400	0	0	8	-0	0
372	0	0	13	6	1	1	3	-0	-0	-5	400	0	0	3	-0	1
373	0	0	0	11	3	3	3	3	3	-3	400	0	0	8	-0	0
374	0	13	13	6	3	3	5	-0	-0	-5	300	0	100	8	-0	5
375	0	88	88	6	-3	-3	-5	-0	-0	-5	400	0	0	8	-0	0
381	1	33	100	7	3	3	1	5	4	-5	400	0	0	0	0	6
382	1	67	100	1	2	3	1	3	3	-1	400	0	0	0	0	6
391	0	0	33	7	1	-0	3	-0	-0	-1	400	0	0	3	-0	5
392	0	0	83	5	-1	-0	3	3	-3	-3	400	0	0	3	5	0
393	0	83	83	11	3	5	3	3	0	-2	400	0	0	5	-0	6
414	16	0	25	10	3	-0	3	-0	3	5	0	400	0	7	-0	5
421	16	100	100	1	-1	3	-0	5	-3	-5	0	400	0	8	6	0
431	7	100	100	2	-2	1	1	1	-1	-4	50	350	0	5	6	4
432	-1	0	40	5	-2	1	1	1	-1	-4	200	0	200	5	-0	-0
441	7	38	75	1	-3	3	2	-0	0	-5	250	150	0	-0	-0	2
442	-4	0	0	6	1	4	3	-0	-4	-0	400	0	0	-0	-0	0
443	-7	0	0	6	-0	1	3	5	-0	-3	350	0	50	8	-0	2
444	7	63	63	5	-2	-5	2	3	0	-5	350	0	50	8	6	1
447	-16	0	0	11	5	4	5	-0	5	3	0	0	400	-0	-0	6
471	15	100	100	1	-3	-2	-3	1	-1	-3	200	200	0	7	6	4
472	0	0	-0	8	-5	-5	-0	-0	-3	-0	400	0	0	7	-0	-0
473	-16	0	0	7	-5	-5	3	-0	-3	-3	100	0	300	3	-0	0
502	-4	0	25	4	2	3	3	3	-3	0	400	0	0	-0	-0	0
503	-4	75	75	4	3	4	3	3	-5	0	400	0	0	6	-0	6
504	-4	0	25	4	4	5	4	-0	1	4	200	100	100	7	-0	3
511	15	100	100	1	3	5	3	-0	-5	0	200	200	0	8	-0	0

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ICPP Data for Sixteen Variables (continued)

PARTYID	V201	V202	V203	V207	V501	V502	V503	V504	V505	V507	V600	V610	V620	V902	V904	V1004
531	-7	17	33	8	4	4	5	-0	-1	1	100	300	0	3	6	2
532	-7	0	33	8	3	3	2	3	-5	0	200	200	0	3	6	0
533	-15	0	50	11	5	5	5	5	-1	3	300	100	0	7	5	0
534	-16	0	0	8	3	3	2	5	-5	-3	100	100	200	3	2	6
561	16	100	100	2	5	5	-0	-0	-0	5	0	400	0	7	5	0
581	6	100	100	7	-1	3	1	-0	-3	-3	350	50	0	3	6	0
582	5	0	100	8	-1	0	0	1	0	-3	350	50	0	7	6	2
583	5	0	100	9	0	1	3	0	-1	-3	350	50	0	2	2	5
584	-2	0	0	8	0	0	3	3	-5	0	400	0	0	5	2	1
585	-16	0	0	11	3	5	5	5	0	1	0	0	400	-0	6	0
601	16	100	100	12	5	5	3	-0	5	5	0	400	0	7	6	3
611	15	100	100	9	5	5	3	5	4	5	0	400	0	7	-0	3
612	1	0	100	3	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	400	0	-0	-0	-0
631	15	100	100	7	5	5	5	5	5	5	0	400	0	8	-0	1
632	-3	0	100	8	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	400	0	7	-0	0
633	-3	0	100	3	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	400	0	8	-0	0
634	-3	0	100	6	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	400	0	7	-0	0
635	-3	0	100	3	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	0	400	0	8	-0	0
641	16	100	100	11	5	5	3	3	5	5	0	400	0	7	-0	0
671	16	100	100	11	5	5	4	5	5	5	0	400	0	7	5	5
741	-16	0	0	6	3	3	-0	-0	3	0	0	0	400	8	-0	-0
742	-16	0	0	6	1	3	-0	-0	-3	-5	0	300	100	-0	-0	-0
743	-16	0	0	4	3	-0	-0	-0	3	0	0	0	400	-0	-0	3
751	16	100	100	8	3	3	3	3	2	-3	100	300	0	8	5	5
761	-8	0	50	6	5	5	3	5	1	1	300	100	0	8	-0	0
762	0	0	50	2	-3	-1	-3	-0	-2	0	350	50	0	8	-0	0
764	0	0	83	8	-1	2	1	2	-1	-2	300	100	0	8	-0	0
765	-6	0	50	6	-5	-3	-3	-3	-1	-3	350	50	0	8	-0	0
771	3	0	0	3	-0	-0	3	1	-0	-5	400	0	0	8	-0	0
772	7	0	67	3	-0	3	1	3	-1	-5	300	100	0	8	-0	0
773	-16	0	0	11	3	5	5	-0	-0	3	100	0	300	-0	-0	5

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ICPP Data for Sixteen Variables (continued)

PARTYID	V201	V202	V203	V207	V501	V502	V503	V504	V505	V507	V600	V610	V620	V902	V904	V1004
774	-7	0	0	8	3	3	2	2	-0	-3	300	0	100	8	-0	6
781	-6	0	0	1	3	3	-0	5	3	-5	400	0	0	3	2	3
782	6	100	100	4	-1	2	-3	5	-2	-5	200	200	0	3	2	0
802	6	50	100	4	1	3	-0	-0	-3	-5	250	150	0	8	6	0
803	-4	0	33	4	2	-0	-0	-0	-3	-5	350	0	50	8	6	0
804	6	67	67	4	-1	3	-0	-0	-3	-5	200	200	0	8	6	0
811	16	100	100	8	4	5	-0	3	-0	0	100	300	0	8	5	0
812	-16	0	0	11	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	300	0	100	-0	-0	-0
821	16	100	100	8	4	5	4	4	4	1	100	300	0	8	2	0
871	16	100	100	-0	3	3	-0	3	-0	-2	100	300	0	7	-0	5
891	8	100	100	8	-1	1	1	3	-0	-1	100	300	0	-0	-0	0
893	-16	0	0	8	-3	-0	-0	-0	-0	-0	400	0	0	-0	-0	5
911	16	71	100	4	0	3	3	3	-0	-1	100	300	0	5	-0	6
921	16	67	100	5	1	3	1	-0	-0	0	400	0	7	-0	4	5
922	0	0	67	4	-3	-3	-3	-1	-3	-3	400	0	0	0	-0	0
931	16	67	100	10	-1	0	3	-3	0	-2	100	300	0	8	6	0
932	-5	33	100	12	0	-0	0	0	-0	-0	300	100	0	8	-0	1
961	0	14	29	8	1	3	3	5	1	0	300	100	0	7	6	5
962	0	0	29	8	1	3	3	5	-0	1	300	100	0	8	-0	0
981	0	20	20	4	1	3	1	3	-1	0	350	50	0	3	0	2
982	0	20	20	8	1	2	1	-1	-3	-2	300	50	50	3	-0	1
983	0	0	20	5	-0	-0	-0	-0	1	-0	250	150	0	8	-0	0

*The following variables are reported here with two decimal places: V202, V203, V600, V610, V620. In all cases, -0 indicates missing data.