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9 Primrose Paths to Political Reform: "Reforming" versus Strengthening American Parties

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According to Webster's *New World Dictionary*, "reform" means "improvement; correction of faults or evils, as in politics." Proposals for political reform therefore arise from the perception of political malpractice. What constitutes malpractice in politics depends on the polity, for perceptions of political evil vary substantially across different cultures. What may be acceptable and even admirable political behavior in the United States may be seen as a heinous crime against the people if practiced in China. Thus political reform must be interpreted with reference to space and time, country and era.

Within the United States, and perhaps within the Western world generally over the past hundred years, political reform has acquired an implicit meaning that is narrower than the dictionary definition. Not only are political reformers the correctors of political evils by definition, but the *type* of evil against which they fight is also specified. In this comprehensive analysis of political reform in America, Crotty notes that the reform experiments have demonstrated "a line of progression" which leads "toward an ever increasing democratization of political power." Observing that reform is in the American tradition, Crotty concludes:

> The trend and direction is clear and persistent. The emphasis is, and has been, on increasing the individual citizen's power over and responsibility for the collective political destiny.[1]

Political reformers in America wear democrats' robes and are entitled to all the rights and priviledges they symbolize. To resist political reform is, by definition, to resist the correction of evil—to resist the democratization of political power. Such semantics mean that those who claim the mantle of political reform also inherit the positive ideological symbols of our culture. Political reformers are granted license to display the mace of democracy as authority for their proposals. Like Mother's Day, political reform is difficult to criticize.

It is much easier to criticize "political engineering," which is Sartori's term for induced political change.[2] Not only is political engineering un-

shielded by democratic values, but its *cognitive* basis is emphasized by the term "engineering," which indicates that the state of knowledge of cognition—is critical to its success. Everyone knows that *physical* engineers, with all that precise mathematics, sometimes fail to build properly. What crazy results, we fear, might be produced by *political* engineers? Lacking an ideological defense and showing gaps in their theoretical flanks, political engineers are everyone's favorite intellectual opponents.

Political reform also has an engineering component, but its causal assumptions are usually obliterated by a surrounding halo of value symbols. It is not enough, however, to envision an improved state of affairs; one must know how to change social institutions to elicit the behavior desired. An assortment of assumptions about human behavior exists in every proposal for reform. But this cognitive or engineering component is seldom the focus of debate, which centers instead on implementing the value change, on the politics of replacing evil with good.

Because they are rooted so weakly in causal understanding, reform movements often are unproductive. Mindful of this problem, the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, a competently staffed and well-funded group organized to study and improve the functioning of state legislative institutions, warned that "good-government" movements, even with the best of intentions, have had dubious results.

> Their most common characteristic has been their addiction to the single-cure formula: If only we change this, or adopt that, all problems will be solved. The legislative reform movement itself has not been entirely free of this affliction. . . .[3]

Striving to avoid such causal simplicity in their own study, the Citizens Conference undertook a fourteen-month study, assembling "for the first time, a massive body of valuable information concerning the systems and operations of the 50 state legislatures."[4] The result was a series of recommendations intended to improve state legislatures and "to enable them to fulfill the expectations of the citizens of a democratic society."[5] The Citizens Conference concluded that this could be done through the development of more "professional" legislators, and they therefore recommended increasing legislators' salaries, increasing expense allowances, establishing retirement benefits, providing individual offices, and furnishing secretarial assistance—five of their seventy-three recommendations.[6]

These recommendations were made in 1971. There is some evidence that many of the reforms advocated by the Citizens Conference have been implemented in the years since.[7] But it appears that the impact of these recommendations has spawned another reform movement, also committed to developing more democratic legislatures. In 1978, the State Bar Association

in Illinois (a state whose legislature ranked third on the Citizens Conference evaluation scale) issued a report which proposed to counter the trend toward "full-time professional legislators" with the formation of a "citizen legislature" composed of part-time members more responsive to the public's needs.[8] Further contradicting the recommendations of the Citizens Conference, *this* reform proposal would eliminate annual sessions and limit the length of biennial sessions to six months. Although both proposals were advanced in the name of political reform and both purport to improve popular responsiveness, they offer diametrically opposed recommendations that reflect vastly different understandings of the workings of political institutions.

The basic point is that reforms may not only be unproductive but may actually be counterproductive. As Crotty warns,

> The results have not always been happy. "Reforms" over the years have had a curious way of rewarding the "elect"; that is, further institutionalizing the political and economic power of "them that has."[9]

Crotty further cautions that reforms also "in turn, can, and most often do, lead to totally unanticipated consequences."[10] If political reforms are often ineffective, if they usually produce new problems through unanticipated consequences, and if they sometimes actually impair the values they were intended to advance, why bother to promote the cause of political reform? Of course, the idea of reform—that man has the capacity to change his political environment—is rooted in the philosophy of the Enlightenment.[11] Rather than wring one's hands in the face of political evil, one is moved to do something about the situation. Reformers are optimistic enough to believe that what they do will improve rather than harm the situation. The extent to which their beliefs are realized, however, is the subject of some dispute.

The more cautious advocates of political reform recognize its limitations and even its dangers. They persist in their advocacy because they reject the passive, accepting role assigned to the citizen by Burkean conservatism, which holds that existing institutions are the best institutions. Instead, their preference is for action over inaction. Crotty says that the relevant questions to ask of an existing institution are: "Why does it perform in the manner it does? Who benefits and who loses? What can, or should (or should not) be done about it?"[12] The less cautious advocates of political reform ask the same questions, but they find answers more quickly. They are attracted to prevailing value symbols in the liberal-democratic tradition and tend not to look beyond those symbols to underlying causal structures. Eager to right wrongs, impatient with theory building and testing, responsive to value symbols, they are too easily led down the primrose path of political "reform" that is ineffective, unpredictable, or counterproductive.

This chapter warns against the seductive appeal of political reform. It does so by examining the simplified assumptions about human behavior that are commonly involved in reform movements. It then selects party reform for closer analysis, illustrating how reformers have failed to deal with the theoretical incompatibility of different values in their reform agenda. It argues that reformers, in their zeal for "democratizing" individual parties, have actually infringed on the democratic functioning of the party system. Finally, it proposes some political engineering for the American party system that is unlikely to be recognized as party reform in the contemporary sense of decentralizing control but is nevertheless intended to correct a fault or evil of our political system that interferes with popular control of government.

Simplifying Assumptions in Reform Proposals

All attempts at understanding human behavior in any systematic or theoretical fashion involve simplifying assumptions. Standard criteria in the philosophy of science even favor theorizing from a parsimonious set of simple assumptions. But the philosophy of science also recognizes a tradeoff between parsimonious theory and empirically accurate theory.[13] Reform movement, however, tend to emphasize simplicity while slighting empirical consequences. This simplicity can be detected in reformers' assumptions about human behavior (the cognitive component of reform) as well as in their assumptions about the values they are pursuing (the normative component).

True to their roots in Enlightenment philosophy, reformers tend to have faith in the capacity of human beings to better their conditions. In the realm of politics, this leads to an idealized conception of the citizen, who is seen as a rational person acting with a thorough knowledge of issues, candidates, offices, and government operations. In the terminology of contemporary "rational-choice" theory, such reformers assume that individuals act so as to maximize their preferences in a world of "perfect information."[14] Accordingly, reformers have an individualistic, "direct-democracy" orientation, favoring proposals that enlarge the decision-making opportunities and responsiblities of individual citizens. This orientation conforms to the reform movement's emphasis on democratization; therefore, to oppose proposals that enlarge the decision-making opportunities for individual citizens is to be against "reform."

But the world as we know it is not one of perfect information. And as Downs has pointed out, the modification of this single condition can have profound consequences for political behavior. In the real world of imperfect information, Downs observes that "citizens do not always know what the government or its opposition has done, is doing, or should be doing to serve their best interests."[15] Moreover, information needed to overcome this ignorance is costly to acquire. Those with greater resources can acquire more information and thereby gain political power. Thus reforms provide options to citizens who may neither employ them equally nor employ them equally well. The net result is that "democratizing" reforms may not have democratic consequences in the sense of making government more accountable to the people.

This result may be illustrated with reference to one of the most sacred principles of the liberal-democratic tradition: election of public officials. The keystone of democratic theory is that popular control of government is achieved through direct election of government leaders. As rational actors in a world of perfect information, voters are expected to judge the actions of their government, determine who is responsible for which outcomes, and selectively vote to reward and punish those officials who do and do not behave according to their preferences. In this world, there is no limit to voters' abilities to exercise these judgments, and—assuming no behavior costs in the process—direct election may extend to all government officials without adverse consequences for popular control of government.

The legacy of direct democracy and the assumptions of perfect information and rational voters can be seen in American state-and local-government institutions. Voters are given the opportunity, or saddled with the responsibility, of electing scores of public officials. It is not atypical to have separate elections for governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, treasurer, attorney general, and other state executive offices; at the county level, it is common to elect separately the sheriff, treasurer, clerk auditor, coroner, assessor, and other obscure but important officials. In a world of perfect information, voters could be expected to make rational judgments about the performance of all these public officials. But in a world of imperfect information, more elections often mean more confusion and less control of government, as public officials entrench themselves in office because of family connections, ethnic identities, sports prowess, good looks, or some other non-task-related mark of distinction, while government responsibility becomes divided and actually divorced from targets for public retaliation.

Reformers often fall prey to the seductive maxim that if some is good, more must be better. If direct election of public officials is the key to democracy, so this logic goes, then more elections mean more democracy. This leads to the second type of simplifying assumption in reformism: value maximization. United in their support of a given value, reformers are inclined to absolutist thinking in the pursuit of that value. When "democratization" or "participatory democracy" are watchwords of the movement, its logic—and the social dynamics among militants within the movement—

demand that actions be interpreted with respect to the attainment of this value. There is little room for value relativism, in which the movement's objective is thoughtfully evaluated within a matrix of competing values and decisions about what constitutes goal achievement. In the language of rational-choice theory once more, a "maximizing" mentality takes precedence over a "satisficing" mentality. In fact, the dynamics of the movement's leadership ensure that the maximizing mentality will drive out the satisficing mentality. One way to lose stature within any movement is to be seen as "soft" on the issue. As George Wallace reportedly said in the 1960s, after a political defeat by a segregationist in Alabama, he would never be "out-seg'd" again.

The perfect-information and value-maximization assumptions tend to assure that activist reformers are not outflanked by others on the value of democratization, interpreted as decentralized control and direct participation in government. But a special issue arises when the movement becomes attached to any second value. The imperative of value maximization implies that this value too is to be pursued without limit; but limits arise when, as inevitably occurs, both values cannot be maximized simultaneously.[16] It is usually easy to construct a hypothetical situation that pits any given value against another; but hypothetical conflicts are not likely to trouble the committed activist, who does not want to choose between cherished values if it is unnecessary. Yet real-world situations can also generate genuine conflicts, although they may not be noticed. If they are noticed, they require soul searching and some form of resolution, which may lead to modification of the movement and also to individual defections. If unnoticed, genuine value conflicts are certain to produce ineffective, unpredictable, or dysfunctional impacts of the movement. Such value conflict is inherent in many of the reforms proposed by American political parties.

The Record of Party Reform

It cannot be said that party reform has been ineffective in the sense of having had little impact on party politics. On the contrary, the record of party reform during the past century reveals a pattern of extensive activity resulting in substantial changes in party practice. But however great the impact, the results have tended to be different from the intentions of the reformers. Ranney's extensive study of party reform in America concludes that "the actual consequences of party reform are, in the future as in the past, likely often to disappoint their advocates, relieve their opponents, and surprise a lot of commentators."[17] In part, this is due to the ambivalent attitudes that Americans hold toward political parties. Although they recognize that party competiton is indispensible to democratic government,

Americans have nonetheless been suspicious of parties acting as private organizations in pursuit of the public interest. Ranney states that as parties became especially important after the Civil War, reformers sought to "put them in their place" through legal regulations, a process that peaked in intensity during the Progressive era of the late 1890s and early 1900s. "By 1920 most states had adopted a succession of mandatory statutes regulating every major aspect of the parties' structures and operations."[18]

The antiorganizational bias of party reform was obvious among the Progressives, who saw parties as interfering in the direct relationship between citizens and their government.[19] To varying degrees, this bias extends throughout the history of party reform, with antiorganizational sentiments resurging to Progressive peaks during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Wilson reminds us, "The phrase 'New Left' came to mean, in part, a commitment to political change that would be free of the allegedly dehumanizing consequences of large organizations."[20] Madron and Chelf observed that a central belief of this reform philosophy was that "the ills of society and government, including whatever ails our parties, will be cured by massive doses of direct democracy, or, in the terms of the modern-day populist, participatory democracy."[21]

Thus it is incorrect to say that party reform failed to deliver on its intentions because it was not guided by an overall theme. In fact, there was an underlying theme to much of the party-reform movement during our history. That theme was the familiar one of greater democratization, greater opportunities for involvement of individual citizens in party affairs. In their Twentieth Century Fund study of parties as avenues for citizen participation in politics, Saloma and Sontag hailed the Progressives' efforts to "advance citizen participation through a direct attack on the power of the party 'organization'" but lamented their failure to offer a solution to the problem of participation in the parties:

> They gave citizens a broad new kind of access through the direct primary but they provided no incentives for citizens to participate in the work of the party organizations themselves and in fact consciously undercut party functions and organizational effectiveness.[22]

Saloma's and Sontag's own prescription for reform some eighty years later is the creation of "citizen parties" that feature "broad citizen participation in politics and continuing citizen influence in the direction of government."[23]

Under the dominant antiorganizational orientation of party reform, parties came to be valued not as social *organizations* of political activists but as inanimate *vehicles* for citizen participation. Parties were regarded as aggregations of individuals rather than as true social groups. This orientation clearly conforms to the individualism in American culture and the

pluralism of American politics, but it also denies the potential for political parties to be organizational forces in politics and raises questions about the role that parties should play in government.

Debate about the proper role for parties in American politics crystallized years ago with the publication of "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," a report of the Committee on Political Parties of the American Political Science Association (APSA).[24] The report criticized the existing parties as being too fragmented and decentralized, and it contained proposals to restructure the parties to produce *responsible* party government, meaning that voters would be able to hold the party in charge of the government accountable for governmental policies. After its appearance in 1950, the APSA report gave rise to a substantial body of literature, most of it critical of the APSA proposals, not to mention its scholarship.[25] Those who criticized the desirability of the responsible-party model as an alternative to the existing party system saw virtue in the fragmentation and decentralization of existing parties, defending our existing parties in terms of a "pluralist" party model. Pomper's study of the APSA report's critics notes "their relative satisfaction with the state of the nation, a satisfaction derived from their pluralist bias. . . ."

> Defenders of the American parties believed that the party system had achieved not only stability, but also some measure of justice through the "invisible hand" of pluralist politics.[26]

Times have changed. In the present era of the politics of scarcity, political scientists are less supportive of pluralist politics—the free play of groups competing for government favors—and notions of the responsible-party school are being revived within the context of party reform.[27] But unless party reformers come to grips with the theoretical issues that they have avoided over the years, future attempts at party reform are also likely to have unpredictable and unsatisfactory impacts.

Four Theoretical Problems in Party Reform

Why is the record of party reform so poor in achieving its intended results? In an important sense, of course, party reform *has* been successful: the organizational aspects of political parties have declined in importance, and their aggregative character has heightened. Wilson finds that "Parties, as organizations, have become, if anything, weaker rather than stronger" and concludes that "Parties are more important as labels than organizations."

> Sometimes the right to use that label can be won by a candidate who participates in no organizational processes at all—as when a person wins a primary election by campaigning as an individual rather than as an organizational representative.[28]

Pomper concurs: as the party became "the vehicle for individual ambition rather than collective efforts," the devotion to the party as an entity decreased."[29] It may even be that we are approaching the culmination of the Progressives' dream, as Burnham sees us nearing "*the liquidation of the political party as an action intermediary between the voter and the candidate.*"[30]

But if the decline of party organization is a victory for party reform, it is a Pyrrhic victory, for other values have fallen in the battle for democratization. Ladd states, "In fact, the changes seem more to have deformed than reformed the parties. They have left the system on the whole less representative, less competitive, less able to govern."[31] Kirkpatrick believes that party reform has advanced the "class interests" of the reformers, those with greater education, higher incomes, and professional occupations.[32] Most importantly, the decline of parties as organizational forces frustrates, rather than enhances, popular control of government. Burnham states the argument succinctly:

> It seems fairly evident that if this secular trend toward politics without parties continues to unfold, the policy consequences will be profound. To state the matter with utmost simplicity: political parties, with all their well-known human and structural shortcomings, are the only devices thus far invented by the writ of Western man which with some effectiveness can generate countervailing collective power on behalf of the many individuals powerless against the relatively few who are individually—or organizationally—powerful.[33]

Few seem satisfied with the weakened state of American parties after decades of party reform. Citizen participation in politics seems no better without strong parties than with them. The quality of public policy, of citizen influence on government, seems unimproved. Something is missing.

Indeed, something has been missing from the theory of party reform throughout most of its history and it is this omission that leads to the empty feeling arising when one surveys the wreckage of party organization. The theory of party reform simply did not provide adequately for the importance of party organization, and centralization of *power*, within the framework of democratic government. Lost in the pursuit of democratization, in the "opening up" of parties, in the decentralization of power within the parties, was consideration of how parties were to be *effective* in their government roles. To engineer for effectiveness, however, requires specifying authority patterns, creating positions of power, and entrusting power to officials. Such topics, however, do not fit with the democratizing ideology

of party reform, especially when reformers, such as Saloma and Sontag, viewed the "traditional parties" as

> effectively closed political organizations whose operations frustrate broad citizen participation in politics. For the most part a handful of party notables, key officeholders and party professionals actually control the party organizations within the states and at the federal level.[34]

When the watchword is opening up the party, when the problem is seen as too much centralization of power, the movement does not invite considerations of organizational effectiveness.

Under the pluralist party model, of course, extreme decentralization of power is compatible with party effectiveness. This model attaches little significance to "party" beyond its function as a label for the use of individual candidates. With the rise of mass media and new campaign technologies, even the campaigning functions of parties are no longer important, and a party can be suitably "effective" to a candidate simply by lending its label and not interfering in the election process.[35]

There is evidence, however, that party reformers do *not* embrace this pluralist model but favor political parties that take clear positions on issues and seek to carry out their policies. In short, they favor aspects of the responsible-party model that stress the policy orientation of political parties. This side of the contemporary reform movement can be seen in analyses of reformers as party "amateurs" rather than party "professionals."[36] While party amateurs focused primarily on what they, along with Saloma and Sontag, saw to be the closed nature of American parties and advocated reforms aimed at opening the parties, Soule and Clarke state that amateurs also were concerned with party policy:

> Internal party democracy and the acceptance and encouragement of the largest possible base for participation were given unequivocal acceptance by amateurs. In this sense, intra-party democracy was a salient factor in the motivation of amateur Democrats. Policy goals for the party were conceived to be largely programmatic and were intended to offer clear alternatives to the opposing party. The amateur placed his highest political priorities on intra-party democracy and the party's commitment to specific substantive goals. . . .
>
> In contrast to the amateur, whose chief rewards for political participation tend to be somewhat abstract and intangible, the conventional or professional party activist wanted to win elections and thus provide the inducement which followers require for participation.[37]

According to this standard conceptualization of reformers as amateurs, party reformers were committed to not one but two goals: (1) intraparty democracy and (2) programmatic parties.[38] The potential for conflict between these two values gives rise to the first, and most important, of four theoretical problems confronting party reformers.

Programmatic Parties versus Intraparty Democracy

Maximizing intraparty democracy, especially in the sense used by reformers, inevitably conflicts with the development of a programmatic party, which can be defined (following Lawson) as one that "sets out an integrated long-range plan of action, addressing itself to both present needs and future goals."[39] To be effective, and thus to survive as an organization, a programmatic party must also demonstrate concerted action to implement its program in government decisions. Such cohesion in government can be realized only if one of two conditions prevails: Either party members in government share a high degree of consensus on the policies to be promoted, or party leaders have the capacity to elicit compliant behavior from party office holders through organizational inducements.

It is obvious that American parties do not qualify as programmatic, but this is less the result of ambiguity in their convention platforms than of the knowledge that the parties will not, or cannot, deliver on their campaign pledges. Studies by Pomper and Tufte, among others, indicate that the Democrats and Republicans do adopt distinctive ideological positions on many social and economic issues in their party platforms.[40] But both fail as programmatic parties because of their inability to command behavior from party office holders in support of party positions.[41] Given the highly factionalized nature of both parties,[42] party-supportive behavior will not come automatically from a high degree of consensus on policies to be promoted. It must come, if at all, through organizational inducements, through a greater degree of centralization of power within the party as a social organization—precisely what most reformers have abhorred.

The conflict between decentralized authority (as an expression of intraparty democracy) and political effectiveness is an established proposition in party theory. A quarter of a century ago, Duverger observed:

> Democratic principles demand that leadership at all levels be elective, that it be frequently renewed, collective in character, weak in authority. Organized in this fashion, a party is not well armed for the struggles of politics.[43]

In contrast, Duverger noted that the "democratic centralism" of Marxist parties equipped them especially well "for very careful control by the centre of the implementation of decisions."[44] More recently, Blondel has generalized the point: "centralization increases with the programmatic character of the party."[45]

Findings from a cross-national study of political parties support the basic theory.[46] Two components of the strength of party organization—complexity of organization and centralization of power—were correlated with two components of programmatic parties—legislative cohesion and doctrinism—for a sample of sixty-two competitive parties operating in democratic nations. These two pairs of components were correlated in a canonical model, which computes the maximum correlation between the best linear combination of the organization variables and the best linear combination of programmatic variables.[47] The results are given in table 9-1, which shows that the more complex the party organization *and* the greater the centralization of power, the more likely it is that parties will display high legislative cohesion *and* be guided by some established body of principles in their character.

Although both theory and data indicate that organization and centralization are instrumental to programmatic parties, American party reformers avoid acknowledging the relationship or acting on its implications. Data collected at the 1972 Democratic and Republican conventions were analyzed for differences between proreform and antireform delegates, who were distinguished by their warm or cold feelings toward "leaders in party reform activity."[48] As reported in table 9-2, proreform delegates in both parties were more likely than the antireform delegates to be strongly in favor of selecting a nominee who was strongly committed on the issues, and

Table 9-1
Canonical Analysis Relating Components of Strength of Organization to Components of Programmatic Parties

	Canonical Coefficients	
Components of strength of organization:		
Complexity of organization[a]	0.95	Canonical correlation between both sets of component variables = 0.62 (sig. 0.001) $N = 62$
Centralization of power[b]	0.35	
Components of programmatic parties:		
Legislative cohesion[c]	0.43	
Extent of reliance on party doctrine[d]	0.80	

[a]Complexity of organization was measued by a six-item scale with a reliability of 0.82.

[b]Centralization of power was measured by an eight-item scale with a reliability of 0.83.

[c]Legislative cohesion was measured by a single score estimating the average cohesion of the party in accordance with the Rice index, for which 100 means that 100 percent of the party's legislative delegation voted together and 0 means that the delegation usually split 50-50.

[d]Reliance on party doctrine was measured by a single five-point item which estimated the extent to which the party appealed to a written body of doctrine or principles in party decisions.

Table 9-2
Comparison of Non-Reform- and Reform-Oriented Delegates to the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions

	Democratic Delegates		*Republican Delegates*	
Attitude Item	*Anti-reform (%)*	*Pro-reform (%)*	*Anti-reform (%)*	*Pro-reform (%)*
Percentage who strongly favored "selecting a nominee who is strongly committed on the issue"	36	73	32	47
Percentage who expressed great interest in "decisions on the party's platform"	44	59	52	67
Percentage who favored "minimizing the role of the party organization in nominating candidates for office"	28	64	12	27

Note: The numbers of antireform and proreform delegates vary from item to item, but the percentages are based on approximately 175 antireform and 900 proreform Democratic delegates. For the Republicans, there are about 180 antireform and 150 proreform delegates. See note 48.

also more likely to register great interest in decisions on the party's platform. However, they were also more than twice as likely to favor minimizing the role of the party organization in nominating candidates for public office.

Despite the importance reformers attach to the party's role in promoting issues, they are reluctant to equip the party with an organizational capacity to mobilize support for issue positions among office holders. This reluctance is rooted in a belief that organizational power is incompatible with intraparty democracy, which is the *second* theoretical problem confronting party reformers.

Democratic versus Centralized Parties

In keeping with the tradition of pluralist democracy in the United States, American reformers tend to interpret party democracy primarily in terms of the decentralization of power.[49] In this view, democracy is equated with a partitioning of authority, expressed in such institutions as the separation of powers, plural executives, and staggered terms of office. But there is an alternative conception of democracy, majoritarian democracy, which not only allows for the centralization of government authority but actually requires it. Under the majoritarian conception, government institutions must be able to carry out the will of the majority once it is clearly expressed. Extreme partitioning of political authority, as practiced in the United States,

clearly runs counter to the theory of majoritarian democracy, however well decentralization accords with pluralist democracy.

It is peculiarly American that reformers have chosen to advance party "democratization" by weakening the party organization. Wright has interpreted the normative issue concerning the proper role of party in government in terms of two alternative models—the *rational-efficient* model and the *party democracy*—that correspond to the "pluralist" and "responsible" party models that we have already discussed.[50] The rational-efficient model, favored by Americans, is briefly summarized as having "exclusively electoral functions" and being "pragmatically preoccupied with winning elections rather than with defining policy." In contrast, Wright sees the party-democracy model, which views parties as "more policy-oriented, ideological, and concerned with defining policy in an internally democratic manner involving rank-and-file member participation," as favored by European social scientists.[51]

Despite their commitment to party democracy, Europeans seem to be able to bring into harmony the values of policy orientation, member participation, and party organization. Wright states, "In the Party Democracy model, organization is of crucial importance; in the Rational-Efficient model, organization is of much less importance."[52] Organization becomes important in the rational-efficient model only to the extent that it is related to the mobilization of voters at election time and the winning of elections. But the party-democracy model involves members continually in party activities beyond campaigning, as members seek to provide input to party policy making. Party organization then bcomes critical in providing for intraparty communications, procedures for reaching decisions, techniques for carrying out party policy, and recruitment of party leaders.

Note that this party-democracy model does not necessarily imply decentralization of power. Just as majoritarian democacy relies on majority rule—and enough centralization of government power to carry out the will of the majority—party democracy in this sense allows for centralization of power within the party. While an important requirement in the party-democracy model is membership involvement in party policy making, the model also presumes that the party organization will have the power to execute decisions once made. Otherwise, there is no point to participation in policy making.

It is clear that American party reformers value rank-and-file participation in policy making. Proreform delegates to both 1972 national conventions strongly favored "encouraging widespread participation in making most party decisions" by a margin of more than two to one over the antireform delegates.[53] But reformers seem not to have thought as far as the next step. How are party decisions, reached through mass participation, going to be executed? It would be hoped that party members who opposed the final party decision would accept the outcome and cooperate in its execution. Yet even a mass-participation party cannot trust voluntary cooperation alone; it must have some power to induce cooperation. By neglecting to provide such powers to the party organization, reformers negate their efforts to provide for mass participation. It is as if they believe that mass participation is a *sufficient* condition for party democracy. A broader conception of party democracy, however, would provide for the execution of the decisions as well as participation in the decisions.

If execution of party decisions requires strong party organization, the reform movement would rather not discuss it. *De*centralization of power has become such a positive symbol that it has become equated with intraparty democracy, and proposals for strengthening party organization have not been wlecome within the movement. So long as reformers interpret intraparty democracy in terms of decentralization of power, they will not develop parties that are able to execute the policies that reformers themselves work so hard to shape in party platforms. Hawley's critique of nonpartisan politics puts the issue squarely before us:

> *The Problem, then, is to strengthen parties and to democratize them at the same time. . . .*
>
> While it is necessary to make some trade-offs between a broadly based open party and one with substantial unity and discipline, being self-conscious about the duality of the goals of party reform may bring us closer than before to viable strategies for accommodating these two essential elements of a change-including party system[54]

Reformers' emphasis on decentralization of power as the prime requisite of intraparty democracy may be thought to reinforce the value of "representativeness," another desideratum of the reform movement. But again, reformers seem not to recognize the conflict between decentralization of power and representativeness; this constitutes the third theoretical problem confronting party reform.

Centralization of Power versus Representativeness

A major concern of the reform movement since the 1960s has been the unrepresentativeness of American parties, especially as reflected in the delegations to the nominating conventions. Comparing delegates to both party conventions in 1968 with characteristics of the total population and party voters, Parris notes that the "convention delegations did not accurately reflect the composition of either the national electorate or party voters" and contends:

> This demographic pattern is unfair. If the political parties are quasi-public institutions . . . , then they should reflect better their own constituencies. The major social characteristics of the delegations should more nearly correspond to those of the electorate and the party's own voters.[55]

Ranney's study of the reform movement attributes considerable clout to this "representative party structures" school, which—in contrast to the responsible-party school—holds that "the parties' greatest need is not more centralization or cohesion but more accurate *representation* of their rank-and-file members."[56] Within the Democratic party, of course, this value achieved expression in the Guidelines for Delegate Selection to the 1972 Convention, which required state parties to take "affirmative steps" to ensure that minority groups, young people, and women be represented at the convention "in reasonable relationship to their presence in the population of the State."[57]

It is common knowledge by now that the representation of minorities, youth, and women increased significantly for both parties between the 1968 and 1972 conventions.[58] The increased demographic representativeness within the Democratic party was attributed to state-party compliance with the national-party guidelines, while the Republican party's smaller increase was considered to be primarily a reaction to Democratic initiative.[59] We need to look more closely, however, at just *how* this increased representativeness was achieved. Did the increased demographic representation come about from *de*centralizing power to open up the party at the base, or did it actually result from a greater centralization of power at the national level?

The argument that demographic representation could be increased by opening up the party at the base assumes that the target groups—minorities, youth, and women—were prevented from participation in the past *because of* the existence of a power structure that kept them out. As Kirkpatrick put it, the assumption was, "*if there were no institutional barriers to their participation in party governance*, blacks, women and youth would be elected to the party's governing councils in rough proportion to their presence in the population." That is, their low representation in the past was not due to "such other attributes as ambition, interest, and skill."[60] Under this assumption, there is no conflict between decentralization of power and greater demographic representation. It is ironic, however, that the guidelines were implemented and greater demographic representation achieved as a result of an unprecedented acquisition and exercise of centralized power by the Democratic national party over the state parties, which faced refusal of seating at the convention for noncompliance.[61]

Contrary to the belief that decentralization of power within a social organization promotes demographic representation within party councils or among party candidates, there is strong evidence that *centralization* of

power produces greater representativeness. Of course, the results achieved by the Democratic National Committee in delegate selection for the 1972 convention themselves provide clear evidence of centralized power exercised to improve representation, but there is more. Impressionistic evidence to support the relationship can be recalled from practices of party machines in "balancing the ticket" to ensure the presence of the Irish, Italians, Jews, and other groups on the ballot. Perhaps more convincing support comes from a study by Jackson and Hitlin of the members of the Sanford commission, charged with formulating a charter for the Democratic party, and the delegates to the 1974 Democratic Mid-Term Conference. Jackson and Hitlin noted that the Sanford commission members, who were centrally selected by outgoing Democratic chairperson Jeanne Westwood and incoming Chairperson Robert Strauss, were somewhat more demographically representative of the population than the delegates to the mid-term conference, who were selected at the district level but *without* operation of the McGovern-Fraser guidelines. Jackson and Hitlin remark, "the implication is that one can more readily obtain a demographically balanced delegation using a centralized elite selection process rather than a pluralistic, uncoodinated process."[62] Finally, a study by Scott of the occupational composition of the legislative delegations of the thirty-two political parties in fourteen nations found a correlation of .57 between the centralization of power within the party and a measure of the extent to which the occupational composition of the party's legislators reflected the occupational composition of its rank-and-file supporters.[63] The more centralized the party, the more accurately its parliamentary delegation reflected the occupations of its supporters.

Although it may seem counterintuitive that the presence of organizational control over the selection of party delegates or candidates can lead to more representativeness, the causal mechanism is readily understandable. Consider an extreme situation of very little party control over candidate selection, such as exists under the direct primary method of nominating party candidates for the U.S. Congress. The direct primary, which is virtually unique to the American political system, allows the maximum amount of individual initiative in seeking and obtaining party candidacy.[64] Ranney even ranks the direct primary as "the most radical of all the party reforms adopted in the whole course of American history," which "in most instances has not only eliminated boss control of nominations but party control as well."[65]

In the absence of party control, what factors come into play in securing the nomination? Personal characteristics become important, to be sure, and characteristics of a particular kind: wealth, social standing in the community, accommodative occupation. These are the factors that serve the ambitious contender for office in a situation of individualistic competition. It

should be no surprise that lawyers and businessmen have fared well in seeking party nominations for congressional elections. Over 80 percent of all members of the House of Representatives have for years come from one of these two occupational groupings, with lawyers alone usually accounting for 50 percent of the membership—by far the highest percentage in any of the twenty-two democracies studied by Pedersen.[66]

The growing importance of the mass media, particularly television, has even increased the importance of the individuals' social status in winning the nomination. As Joslyn's study of the impact of television on partisan politics observes:

> Recruitment, for example, is much less the party organization's business when an aspiring politician can appeal directly to the voters in whatever way desired (provided he or she has the money). The presence and expense of political television insures that the availability of wealth will be a factor rivaling ideological orthodoxy, previous party service and demographic characteristics in important when it comes time to select a party's nominee.[67]

Noting that reformers themselves tended to be socially privileged in terms of education, income, and occupation—coming mainly from the professions—Kirkpatrick concluded that party reform "rewarded persons with the skills, styles, and values of the reformers at the expense of others."[68] When the party has a more direct hand in determining candidacy, on the other hand, personal ambition, leisure time, and high social status become less important, and candidates can be recruited on the basis of policy commitment or other social attributes. Hence, weakly organized and decentralized parties tend to favor the selection of those who are equipped by wealth, education, and occupation to win out in direct appeals to party voters. This is not a formula for ensuring equal representation.

However important the value of representativeness is to the reform movement, its exact relationship to the function of political parties in government has not been clearly specified. The goal of equal representation has been accepted as an article of faith by party reformers, and little thought is given to any negative consequences of increased representativeness of either party. This failure to analyze thoroughly the effect of maximized representativeness on the party system gives rise to the *fourth* theoretical problem in party reform.

Representative Parties versus Programmatic Parties

It was never settled in the reform literature whether the party's leadership was to be representative of its membership or of the population in general.[69] The difficulty in basing representation on party members lies in the unusual nature of American parties, which unlike most other parties do not have a formal membership basis.[70] The psychological concept of party identification offers an alternative means of identifying the characteristics of party supporters, but its measurement is too problematic to serve as a standard for judging representation. Moreover, as American parties have come to be viewed as quasi-public institutions involved in "state action,"[71] there is reluctance to regard them in the European tradition as "organizations to further the interests of their members, particularly in class or economic terms."[72] In any event, the McGovern-Fraser guidelines called for representativeness of convention delegates in proportion to the presence of minorities, women, and youth in the total population of the state, not among Democratic party supporters.

What is the effect of such highly representative parties on the programmatic character of political parties? It can be argued that demographic representativeness, especially when it is achieved for both parties in the system, works against the emergence of programmatic parties, since parties then lose their social basis of distinctiveness. It is a working theory of political science that parties advance issues favored by the groups that support them.[73] If the reform movement within each party were to succeed in maximizing demographic representation, so that each party was equally representative of the major social groupings with respect to ethnic composition, sex, age, and other key categories like education and religion, what would be the social basis for distinguishable party positions on issues? Would it be possible to produce anything *more* than Tweedledum and Tweedledee parties if they did not differ in their social bases? If the two parties mirrored the social composition of the national population equally well, one would expect them also to converge on the issues. By reflecting the heterogeneity of society, the parties would become catch-all parties which, as Kirchheimer contends, become vague on the issues—the antithesis of programmatic parties.[74]

The conflict between representative and programmatic parties is only the last of the four theoretical problems confronting party reformers. It joins the other difficulties—the conflict between programmatic parties and intraparty democracy, the confusion between democratic and decentralized parties, and the conflict between decentralized parties and representativeness—to confound the efforts of reformers to improve the practice of partisan politics in the United States. By failing to grapple explicitly with the theoretical issues underlying the realization of their values, the reform movement has wrought much change in party operations but little progress toward popular control of government.

Strengthening American Political Parties

In my view, the party-reform movement, throughout most of its history, has incorrectly diagnosed the disease in the body politic and has dispensed the wrong medicine for the illness. To the extent that party reformers have prescribed doses of decentralization of power, their treatment was akin to bleeding a patient whose problem was loss of blood. The evidence is strong that American parties not only are characterized by their decentralization but are among the most decentralized parties in the world.[75] In contrast to the antiorganizational orientation of most party reform, what is needed is more organization and more centralization of power within the national parties. This is why I speak of *strengthening* the parties rather than "reforming" them.

It is true that aspects of the recent reforms within the Democratic party can also be seen as centralizing power within the national organization and strengthening the national party in comparison with the state parties. Surely this was the thrust of the guidelines for the selection of delegates to the 1972 Democratic convention, when the national party was far more successful in obtaining state-party compliance than most observers thought possible.[76] Moreover, the new charter for the Democratic party, adopted at the 1974 midterm convention, constituted the first genuine constitution for a major American party.[77] Reviewing the reforms in the Democratic party since the 1968 Convention, Crotty concludes:

> More was attempted, and accomplished, than can truthfully be said to have been envisioned in the decades since the Progressive movement of the early 1900s. . . . In contrast to earlier attempts at political change, the intent was to strengthen and preserve an institution of incomparable value to the American political system rather than to destroy or replace it.[78]

Other students of American parties, however, emerge with a different evaluation of the reform movement, contending that the reforms sought to "wreck"[79] or "dismantle"[80] the party. On balance, the reforms in question probably did little to wreck or dismantle the party organization any further, simply leaving it as weak as ever. Even Crotty concedes this, stating, "The party charter's early contributions suggest only marginal differences in the way the national party is operating."[81] And Charles Longley's careful assessment of party nationalization in America (chapter 5 in this volume) sees much change but little difference:

> The conventional wisdom concerning national parties is no longer accurate—nor is it wholly inaccurate. Allied with the highly visible "practical" problems already noted, there remain the systemic constraints fostered by the separation of powers and federalism. In sum these considerations argue against a wholesale revision of our understanding of American party politics.[82]

Where reform proposals had a *real* opportunity to change the character of American parties, they were not adopted. Rejected at an early stage in the charter were proposals to create formal dues-paying party membership and to require local, regional, and national conventions to set party policy. At the 1974 conference itself, the proposal to elect the national party chairman for a four-year term (instead of allowing the presidential nominee to choose the chairman at the convention) was defeated, and even the proposal for mandatory midterm conferences was rejected.[83]

Whether because of the recent reforms or in spite of them, party politics in the United States remains characterized by personalities and interest groups, both of which neither promote popular control of government nor produce coordinated public policies for dealing with the social and economic problems arising under emerging conditions of scarcity. Strong parties, not weak ones, are called for. Huntington's remarks about politics in developing countries apply with equal force to the United States:

> . . . the development of a strong party substitutes an institutionalized public interest for fragmented private ones . . . .
>
> The evils attributed to party are, in reality, the attributes of a disorganized and fragmented politics of clique and faction which prevails when parties are nonexistent or still very weak. Their cure lies in political organization.[84]

Would the development of stronger parties amount to retrogression in the democratization of political power, identified earlier as the direction of political reform in America? Assuming that democratization ought to be judged by the degree of popular control of government policy rather than by the degree of opportunity for citizens to participate as individuals in election campaigns, I think that stronger parties would actually increase citizens' power over and responsibility for the collective political destiny. I think this because I recognize that the real world is *not* one of perfect information and no behavior costs, that most people do not or cannot take advantage of individualistic opportunities to participate in nominating and electing candidates, and that to view party reform in terms of decentralized and individualistic participation at the election stage is to slight values of democratic government at subsequent stages.

How could stronger party organizations promote popular control of government and coordinated public policies? It should first be noted that I do not subscribe to the *maximization* of organizational strength. Second, one should be reminded that complexity of organization and centralization of power are continuous rather than dichotomous concepts. The choice is not between organized or unorganized parties, nor between centralized or decentralized parties. One should analyze organizational strength by assessing the mixture of degree of organization and centralization of power as variable properties of parties. It turns out that in the United States, both

major parties display a greater degree of party organization than centralization of power in comparison with European parties.[85] My prescription is primarily to increase the centralization-of-power component of organizational strength for American parties, not to maximize it.

I realize that a proposal that specifies no distinct target (for example, 9 units of centralization out of a possible score of 15 units) suffers from ambiguity; this is one reason why proposals couched in maximization language are more readily understood and command greater fervor. I have no answer to the ambiguity charge other than to note that ambiguity pervades our entire existence, and it is better to admit its presence than to assume its absence. The thrust of my prescription is that American national parties, which are among the most decentralized in the world, should be entrusted with increased organizational power. The purpose of my prescription is to promote popular control of government and coordinated public policies through the capacity of the electorate to hold the parties accountable for the policies they advocate.

Given stronger national party organization, party members in government positions or party candidates in government positions would have to reckon with party policies in their actions and promises. The party organization would be able to provide some constraints on the behavior of party members in government as well as some inducements to ensure cooperation with party policies. Granted, party influence on the behavior of public officials runs counter to the American tradition of freewheeling politics and individual independence; increased party influence is a hard notion for some to accept. But it is pure folly to contend that most American public officials are now autonomous actors and that party influence would seriously compromise that autonomy. In reality, American senators, congressmen, governors, sheriffs, and even presidents have political debts to hidden groups that periodically collect these debts by influencing the behavior of officials on government matters that touch their interests.[86] Increases in the degree of party direction of government activity would only replace these camouflaged patterns of influence with open links of party direction. An argument for strengthening these party links should not be reduced to absurdity by interpreting it as a proposal for iron-clad party control. Hawley considered this objection and concluded:

> Thus, while I am not unmindful of the possibility that elected officials can become mere fronts for party leaders, the lack of dependence of elected officials on the party seems the more serious problem for democracy.[87]

The question seems to be, how can the parties be strengthened enough to provide a meaningful degree of central direction and control?

One school of thought contends that the American parties cannot be

changed very much, because they are products of their environment. As Keefe says, "The parties are less what they make of themselves than what their environment makes of them."[88] And a good deal of the criticism directed at the APSA proposal for more "responsible" parties argued that the American political environment, especially federalism and the separation of powers, ensured that the parties would be decentralized and pragmatic rather than centralized and programmatic regardless of efforts to change them.[89] However, little systematic research has been done in the past to assess the parameters of environmental effects on party characteristics. Recent research by Harmel and Janda has shown that while the environment definitely affects party character, there is considerable potential for change at the party level as well.[90]

Studying ninety-five competitive parties in twenty-eight democratic nations, Harmel and Janda found that the country as a variable explained 57 percent of the variance in complexity of organization and 65 percent of the variance in centralization of power. As for federalism and the separation of powers as theoretical factors operating behind the identity of the country,

Table 9-3
Effects of Environmental Variables on Party Organization and Centralization

	Complexity of Organization	*Centralization of Power*
Percentage of variance explained by the identity of the country[a]	57	65
Percentage of the total variance explained:		
by federalism[b]	0	8
by separation of powers[c]	3	5
Percentage of the country environmental variance explained:[d]		
by federalism	0	12
by separation of powers	5	8

[a]The entries are based on the E^2 statistics computed from a one-way analysis of variance using the country identification as the independent variable. The dependent variables are the scales described in table 9-1. The analysis involved 95 parties and 28 countries.

[b]This analysis is based on 88 parties with data available on federalism and separation of powers. A total of 58 parties were in unitary states, 17 in effectively federal states, and 13 in states with mixed power distributions. The percentage of variance explained was determined through an analysis of variance.

[c]This analysis is based on 71 parties in parliamentary systems and 17 parties in presidential systems. Analysis of variance was used.

[d]These entries were computed by dividing the total variance that could be explained by the country by the percentage of variance explained by federalism and separation of powers. There was no significant interaction between the two factors and thus little overlapping explained variance.

federalism and the separation of powers together accounted for no more than 20 percent of the variance that can be attributed to the country environment.[91] The results are given in table 9-3.

It seems that although environmental variables have effects as theorized, there is substantial room for party-level reforms to affect party character. Moreover, it is not the case that party reform needs only to deal with party-level variables. In fact, the progressive reforms that instituted the direct primary did alter the political environment, and the impact of the delegate selection guidelines within the Democratic party was to revise state legislation on delegate selection, increasing the number of primaries for both parties.[92] Thus, even if parties are what the environment makes them (which is only about 60 percent true in the case of degree of organization and centralization of power), the environment itself is not immune to party reform. In any event, one cannot use these data to argue a convincing case of environmental determinism against proposals to strengthen party organization.

Although changes in the political environment are not beyond the reach of party reform, some aspects of the environment are more difficult to change than others. Obviously, proposals for wholesale constitutional change—such as replacing the presidential system with a parliamentary one—are not politically viable, even if they were desirable. In general—and with good reason—the more sweeping the proposal for change, the more political opposition. Some relatively specific changes, like nominating party candidates by party conventions or committees rather than through direct primaries, would tend to eliminate the extremes of decentralization but would also be politically intractable because of popular commitment to primaries and the need for statutory action in the individual states. Proposals for strengthening the parties are more likely to be adopted if they are relatively specific and capable of implementation at the center of national politics. The one proposal that appears to have the most political viability and the greatest promise for accomplishing its purpose deals with campaign financing.

Campaign financing has justifiably been a subject of great concern to political candidates and the public alike. Campaign costs have risen greatly since the 1950s, and there is no reason to expect the trend to be reversed. Candidates worry about raising enough funds to conduct effective campaigns, and the public worries about the political debts that candidates will contract in search of adequate funds. Scholars have written voluminously about money in politics, and numerous reforms have been proposed for raising and spending campaign funds.[93] Reflecting this agitation, Congress has responded recently with major campaign-financing legislation in 1971, 1974, and 1976—as explained by Jacobson in chapter 7 of this volume.[94]

Until recently, those attracted to the problem of campaign financing

have shown a reformers' bias against strong parties. The relationship between weak parties and the influence of money in politics has seldom been a central part of their analysis, and their specific proposals for reforming fund raising and spending rarely involved the party organizations directly in the control process.[95] In contrast, scholars who advocate strengthening our party system have turned to the control of campaign financing as a key factor in enhancing the parties' role in the political process.[96]

In our pluralist political system, sizable contributions are funneled into party politics from numerous individuals and interests. These funds are normally raised for the financing of specific election campaigns rather than party activities in general. Lawson describes the time-honored process:

> Funds are gathered from contributors with widely varying political philosophies, with the tacit or expressed understanding that no issue will be dealt with in a way inimical to any of their interests. Funds are spent on communications media which lend themselves to the superficial, repetitious, huckstering campaign messages that characterize our parties' appeal to the electorate. After victory, each elected official is free to interpret his party's "program"—to the extent that such an amorphous entity has emerged—exactly as he wishes, even if this means voting against the majority of his party in Congress.[97]

Also, as Hess points out, "trouble arises because candidates seek funds in large amounts from people or interests who then wish preferential treatment from the government."[98] This *quid pro quo* quality is enhanced when contributions are given directly to the candidates rather than mediate through the party organization. This tendency for direct contributions to candidates has increased in recent years with the growth of candidates' ad hoc campaign organizations. The result of this more direct link between the candidates and their sources of funds is an increase in elected officials' independence of the party organziation. If a candidate arranges for his own campaign financing, he can afford this independence. But again, his increased independence of the party is purchased at a cost: he sacrifices some of this autonomy to his large contributors, which amounts to trading in visible links for invisible ones.

The evils of money in politics are usually expressed in terms of trading financial support before election for government influence after election. This danger is ever present in interest-group politics, and it is intensified in a form of party politics that makes the candidate the direct recipient of campaign funds. This point has been grasped by several recent critics of our weak party system who urge the development of more responsible parties. Broder proposes

> channeling virtually all funds for general election campaigns, from the Treasury or from many small givers, through the party organization, rather

than continuing the irresponsible practice of forcing each candidate to forage for himself among the big givers. Leashing the undisciplined power of money in politics remains a high-priority element in any program for reviving responsible party government.[99]

To the extent that public subsidies are provided for election campaigns, Hess also suggests that "they be given directly to the political parties, rather than directly to the candidates."[100] In possession of funds to support candidates of their choosing, the national parties would acquire some significant increase in organizational power.[101] As a result, the ability of the parties as organizations to induce support of party policies should be increased.

The study by Jacobson (chapter 7 of this volume) reviews the role assigned to the parties in public financing of electoral campaigns. It is a small one. The 1966 law, suspended by Congress the following year, would have given public funds directly to the national parties, but worry developed over placing too much power in the hands of the parties and the national chairman. All later subsidy proposals gave money directly to candidates. Jacobson states, "In other mature democracies the issue is one of *party* finance; in the United States, it is one of campaign finance. The distinction is fundamental."[102] Indeed it is, and the distinction is underscored by Herbert Alexander, the foremost student of money in politics. After noting that in other democracies across the world, public financing is directed toward political parties rather than candidates, Alexander states:

> Accordingly, ways should be thought through in which candidate-funding at least in general elections, can be channeled through the parties. Ultimately, the way to get more accountability and responsibility in political finance would seem to be through democratically reformed, adequately funded political parties, not through increased candidate independence.[103]

As for the actual effect of public financing on congressional campaigns, Hodson and McDevitt's study of the 1972 and 1976 senatorial elections found that funding of senatorial campaigns directly by political parties decreased not only proportionately but also in dollar figures between 1972 and 1976. They attach special importance to this finding because parties are more likely than other sources to target their giving to competitive races, and they are also the only major source of funds not strongly favoring incumbency.[104]

It seems feasible to propose that public funds be given directly to political parties rather than to candidates, yet this avenue has not been explored very far in the history of congressional legislation. The source of opposition is easy to identify. Incumbent members of congress have gotten where they are through successful competition in the current interest-group system. Public funding of political parties suggests that future office

holders submit to a greater degree of party control than at present, which is unlikely to gain their favor. In their recommendations for election financing, the Committee on Economic Development stated that:

> resistance to change is deeply imbedded in custom and reinforced by vested interests. Perhaps the chief obstacle lies in the fact that the machinery of government—at all levels—is in the hands of those who have gained their positions under the prevailing system. They are thoroughly familiar with the operational details involved in nominations and elections, however obscure these may be to the average citizen or to potential opponents. A system that has placed men in power is likely to hold attraction for many of them.[105]

The same observation applies for any set of proposals to strengthen American political parties, for stronger parties would inevitably restrict the extraordinary independence that members of Congress enjoy under our system of partitioned government authority and weak parties.

Conclusion

The normative argument of this chapter is that American political parties need to be strengthened rather than reformed. It envisions a place for parties in the political system akin to that recommended in the 1950 American Political Science Association Report, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System*, but with some important differences. First, the idealized state of "party government" that inspired the report is not regarded as compatible with the separation of powers in the American constitutional system. Moreover, the party-government model puts a high premium on ideological differentiation between the parties, which may be forthcoming but is not essential. My view of "responsible parties" is closer to that of James, who distinguishes between the party-government and responsible-party models by noting:

> The principal mechanisms of Responsible Parties are the possibilities of shared involvement and risks under the party label. From this sharing should follow collective responsibility, simplification of electoral control by the general public, and party competition—without any need to specify the ideological or programmatic content of this competition.[106]

My proposal for strengthening American national parties also puts more emphasis on the centralization of power within the national committees in the financing of election campaigns with substantial support from an organized party membership. Other centralizing tendencies will no doubt follow, but the continued practice of candidate nomination by direct primaries, the fragmenting effects of federalism, and Americans' tradi-

tional suspicion of political parties are expected to resist this centralizing trend and to prevent any situation of extreme centralization of power. The argument is that the American political system not only can stand some degree of party centralization but also needs it. American government and politics are not being well served by our current national parties, which are so extemely *de*centralized that they stand virtually alone among parties in Western democraciesland competitive parties throughout the world.

Who would be served by such a party system? Much of the writing in favor of stronger, more programmatic parties issues from liberal academicians who look to responsible parties as a means for accomplishing social change and redistributing wealth within society. Viewed in this light, proposals for developing responsible parties can be seen as an argument directed primarily at liberal Democrats for implementation within the Democratic party. But this view has several blind spots. First, the restructuring of opportunities within society is not exclusively a concern of liberal Democrats. Conservative Republicans have their own opinions about the most efficient and effective ways of allocating society's goods. There is also the important need to control social change as well as to create it. Sample surveys have shown that vast numbers of Americans are worried about dealing with social change, which is reflected in their strong responses to the "social issue."[107] These are preferences that any democrat, Republican or Democrat, needs to respect.

Finally, conservative Republicans as well as liberal Democrats have urged their own versions of a programmatic Republican party. This is often discussed in terms of a realignment of the party system along liberal-conservative lines. Many Republicans see a conservative majority in the United States that is divided unfortunately between the Democrats and Republicans so that Democrats have a party majority within the country, thus submerging the true conservative majority. William A. Rusher has grappled with this political conundrum. According to Rusher, the biggest obstacle faced by conservatives in America is " . . . simply to get, somehow, into a single party."[108] "Somehow," but how?

American parties are highly institutionalized, and party loyalties cannot be changed by wishing. There must be some inducement for change. These inducements are most likely to come from concrete party actions taken to show that the parties mean to deliver on their promises by directing the behavior of their members in government. If the Republican party were to become a force behind its programs, perhaps the conservative majority—as Rusher sees it—would be drawn to a party that meant what it said. If the Democratic party were to acquire more organizational authority, perhaps its presidents might be able to get their party proposals through a Congress controlled by their own members.[109]

Who would be served by a system of responsible parties? Eventually the public should benefit from mass inputs into party decisions, decreases in private influences on government decisions, increases in coordination of government policies, and creative competition between the parties in developing imaginative programs for public evaluation and choice with the knowledge that party programs were likely to be carried out.

Notes

1. William J. Crotty, *Political Reform and the American Experiment* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1977), pp. 267, 293.
2. Giovanni Sartori, "Political Development and Political Engineering," in *Public Policy*, vol. 17, ed. John D. Montgomery and Albert O. Hirschman (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), pp. 261-298.
3. Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, *The Sometimes Governments: A Critical Study of the 50 American State Legislatures* (Kansas City, Mo.: Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, 1973), p. 11.
4. Ibid., p. xiv.
5. Ibid., p. 152.
6. Ibid., pp. 160, 165.
7. See the changes in American state legislatures since the mid-1960s as recounted in William J. Keefe and Morris S. Ogul, *The American Legislative Process: Congress and the States* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 450-454, which credits the reform movement for the results.
8. "Bar group proposes a citizens' legislature,'" *Chicago Tribune*, 26 June 1978.
9. Crotty, *Political Reform and the American Experiment*, p. x.
10. Ibid., p. 271.
11. Charles Frankel, "The Philosophy of the Enlightenment," in *A History of Philosophical Systems*, ed. Vergilius Ferm (New York: The Philosophica. Library, 1950), pp. 266-279. Dante Germino interprets the philosophical shift from "theocentric humanism" to "anthropocentric humanism" as emphasizing the use of reason to manage social relationships while obtaining desired goals. Man would "for the first time create history instead of serving forces beyond his control." See Germino, "The Contemporary Relevance of the Classics of Political Philosophy," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, vol. 1: *Political Science Scope and Theory*, (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 242.
12. Crotty, *Political Reform and the American Experiment*, p. xi.
13. See James A. Caporaso, "A Philosophy of Science Assessment of the Stanford Studies in Conflict and Integration," in *Quantitative Interna-*

tional Politics: An Appraisal, ed. Francis W. Hoole and Dina A. Zinnes (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 354-382.

14. See Dennis J. Palumbo, "Organization Theory and Political Science," in Greenstein and Polsby (1975), vol. 2, *Micropolitical Theory*, p. 323, for a succinct statement of the major assumptions in rational choice theory.

15. Anthony Downs, "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," *Journal of Political Economy* 65 (April 1957):139. Downs argues that the consequences of imperfect information include government bias in favor of producer and against consumer interests, the effectiveness of lobbying in legislative policy making, and even political apathy. He concludes: "Clearly, rational behavior in a democracy is not what most normative theorists assume it to be. Political theorists in particular have often created models of how the citizens of a democracy ought to behave without taking into account the economics of political action" (p. 149). Palumbo, "Organization Theory and Political Science," also notes the unreality of the assumption of complete information (pp. 332-334).

16. See Brian Barry and Douglas W. Rae, "Political Evaluation," in Greenstein and Polsby, eds., *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 1: *Political Science Scope and Theory*, p. 341. They interpret the problem as one of "internal consistency" among valued alternatives, which cannot be ensured "unless all the criteria used to rank them can be reduced to a single consideration."

17. Austin Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction: Party Reform in America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 191.*

18. Ibid., p. 81.

19. Ibid., pp. 80-81.

20. Wilson (1973), p. 4.

21. Thomas W. Madron and C.P. Shelf, Political Parties in the United States (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1974), p. 335.

22. Saloma and Sontag (1972), p. 8.

23. Ibid., p. 22.

24. American Political Science Association, Committee on Political Parties, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System," *American Political Science Review* 44 (September 1950):supplement.

25. See Evron M. Kirkpatrick, "'Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System': Political Science, Policy Science, or Pseudo-Science," *American Political Science Review* 65 (December 1971):965-990.

26. Gerald M. Pomper, "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System? What, Again?" *Journal of Politics* 33 (November 1971):917-919.

27. Ibid., p. 939. See also the argument below in this chapter.

28. Wilson (1973), p. 95.

29. Gerald M. Pomper et al., *The Performance of American Government: Checks and Minuses*. (New York: The Free Press, 1972), pp. 76-77.

30. Walter Dean Burnham, "The United States: The Politics of Heterogeneity," in *Electoral Behavior*, ed. Richard Rose (New York: The Free Press, 1974), p. 716.

31. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr. "'Reform' Is Wrecking the U.S. Party System," *Fortune* (November 1977):178.

32. Jeane Jordan Kirkpatrick, *Dismantling the Parties: Reflections on Party Reform and Party Decomposition* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), p. 13.

33. Walter Dean Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1970), p. 133.

34. Saloma and Sontag (1972), p. 6.

35. In his study, *The New Style in Election Campaigns* (Boston: Holbrook Press, 1972), Robert Agranoff finds: "The candidate organization, the news event, the computer-generated letter, and most importantly the electronic media are the prevalent means of getting messages across in the modern campaign. The rise of the candidate volunteer and electronic media has enabled the candidate to by[illegible]s the party and appeal directly to the voters" (p. 5).

36. Robert A. Hitlin and John S. Jackson III, "On Amateur and Professional Polticians," *Journal of Politics* 39 (August 1977):786-793, finds that reforms of the delegate-selection process promoted the representation of amateurs in the Democratic conventions. The equation of "amateur" with "reformer" is not complete, however, and at least one major student of party reform characterizes reformers as "purists" rather than "amateurs." See Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction*, p. 142.

37. John W. Soule and James W. Clarke, "Amateurs and Professionals: A Study of Delegates to the 1968 Democratic National Convention," *American Political Science Review* 64 (September 1970):888. Reprinted with permission.

38. The Soule and Clarke conceptualization of amateurs and professionals followed the theory initially advanced in Peter B. Clark and James Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organization," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 6 (September 1961):129-166, and developed later in James Q. Wilson, *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). Comparative studies of amateurs and professionals in different conventions are undertaken in John W. Soule and Wilma E. McGrath, "A Comparative Study of Presidential Nomination Conventions: The Democrats 1968 and 1972," *American Journal of Political Science* 19 (August 1975):501-517, and by Hitlin and Jackson, "On Amateur and Professional Politicians." These studies have applied the conceptualization without questioning the extent to which the two goals of intraparty democracy and programmatic parties actually coincided within the same individuals. A study by C. Richard Hofstetter, "The Amateur Politician: A Problem in Construct Validation," *Midwest Journal of Political*

Science 15 (February 1971):31-56, tried to apply the concepts to party leaders in central Ohio, with suspect results. Hofstetter writes, "If it were true that amateurs and professionals could be arrayed along a single dimension with regard to attitudes about party functioning, as Wilson's characterization of the amateur-professional attitude syndromes suggests, then a single factor should emerge from the factor analysis of role perceptions. An orthogonal rotation by Varimax criteria, however, demonstrates that two independent and theoretically meaningful factors emerge from the analysis rather than one factor. Since each of these factors accounts for a considerable proportion of the total covariance, it is concluded that the assumption of unidimensionality of role perceptions is incorrect" (p. 41). Soule and Clarke, in "Amateurs and Professionals", also did not find unidimensionality among the ten items they created to measure amateurism (they found four factors), but they did not choose to draw distinctions within the concept (p. 890).

39. Lawson (1976), p. 137. According to the intensity of issue orientation, Lawson places programmatic parties just after *issueless* parties, which avoid specific pronouncements altogether, and *pragmatic* parties, which deal with immediate practical problems only. More intense on issues are *ideological* parties, which formulate issues in an abstract, future-oriented way, in strict accordance with a known doctrine of thought.

40. See Gerald M. Pomper, *Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1975), chap. 7; and Edward R. Tufte, *Political Control of the Economy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 71-76.

41. While Pomper's study of the fulfillment of American party platforms finds that party members in Congress tend to show somewhat greater unity in voting on measures that are related to issues on which the parties have adopted *conflicting* platform positions, the pattern is mixed, with party members sometimes averaging *less* cohesion on votes dealing with conflicting platform positions than on all votes during a presidential term. Moreover, the overall indexes of cohesion tend to be low overall, seldom exceeding 67 except for *bipartisan* votes. See Pomper, *Elections in America*, pp. 195-197.

42. A study of the "coherence" of American parties in comparison with parties in European democracies finds that the American parties rate significantly lower on a five-item coherence scale measuring legislative cohesion and four manifestations of party factionalism: leadership, issue, ideological, and tactical. See Kenneth Janda, "A Comparative Study of Party Organizations: U.S., Europe, and the World," in *The Party Symbol*, ed. William J. Crotty (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1980) pp. 339-358.

43. Duverger (1959), p. 134.

44. Ibid., p. 58.

45. Blondel (1969), p. 124.

46. See Kenneth Janda, *Political Parties: A Cross-National Survey* (New York: The Free Press, 1980). The full study involves 158 parties operating in a stratified random sample of 53 countries from 1950 through 1962.

47. For a lucid discussion of canonical analysis, see Mark S. Levine, *Canonical Analysis and Factor Comparison Techniques* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage University Papers in Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 1977).

48. These data were made available by William Crotty, who participated in the original study. Delegates who rated "leaders in party reform activity" at 30 degrees or below on a "feeling thermometer" were scored as antireform, while those who rated "leaders in party reform activity" at 80 degrees or above were counted as proreform, with the remaining delegates regarded as neutral. According to this operationalization, 12 percent of the Democratic delegates and 26 percent of the Republican delegates were designated as antireform in comparison with 59 percent Democrats and 19 percent Republicans as proreform. As might be expected, more Republicans (55 percent) than Democrats (29 percent) were neutral toward party-reform leaders, for reform was not the issue at the 1972 Republican convention that it was at the Democratic convention.

49. This interpretation of democracy has been associated most closely with various writings of Robert A. Dahl. See his "Pluralism Revisited," *Comparative Politics* 10 (January 1978):201-203, for an explicit discussion of centralization and decentralization in the context of pluralism. See also William Alton Kelso, *American Democratic Theory: Pluralism and Its Critics* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Pre , 1978).

50. Wright (1971), p. 7.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., pp. 39-40.

53. Among the Democrats, 78 percent of the proreform delegates strongly favored "widespread participation in making most party decisions" as opposed to 38 percent of the antireform delegates. The respective figures for Republican delegates were 67 percent and 32 percent.

54. W.D. Hawley, *Nonpartisan Elections and the Case for Party Politics* (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 150-151.

55. Judith H. Parris, *The Convention Problem: Issues in Reform of Presidential Nominating Procedures* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972), pp. 60-61.

56. Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction*, pp. 45-46.

57. Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection to the Democratic National Committee, *Mandate for Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Democratic National Committee, 1970), p. 40.

58. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Representation at National Political Conventions: The Case of 1972," *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975):280-281.

59. Ibid., p. 280.

60. Ibid., p. 277.

61. Crotty writes that "the movement to force fifty state parties and the District of Columbia's party to accept rules promulgated by a national party body" was an undertaking that was "unparalleled in the history of American party politics. It was bound to be difficult. Yet, in less than three years, the McGovern-Fraser Commission wrought a political miracle." See William J. Crotty, *Decision for Democrats* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), pp. 104-105.

62. John S. Jackson and Robert A. Hitlin, "A Comparison of Party Elites: The Stanford Commission and the Delegates to the Democratic Mid-Term Conference," *American Politics Quarterly* 4 (October 1976):452.

63. Paul Scott, "Political Parties and Reflective Representation: Organizational Effects on Its Distortion, A Cross-National Study" (unpublished Master's Paper, Department of Political Science, Northwestern University, 1976).

64. See Austin Ranney, "The Direct Primary: A Uniquely United States' Institution," *News for Teachers of Political Science*, a publication of the American Political Science Association, March 1978, pp. 20-21.

65. Ranney, *Curing the Mischiefs of Faction*, pp. 121, 129.

66. Morgens N. Pederson, "Lawyers in Politics: The Danish Folketing and United States Legislatures," *Comparative Legislative Behavior*, ed. Samuel C. Patterson and John C. Wahlke (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1972), p. 28.

67. Richard A. Joslyn, "The Impact of Television on Partisan Politics" (Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1977, p. 21.

68. Kirkpatrick, *Dismantling the Parties*, p. 13.

69. Kirkpatrick, "Representation at National Political Conventions," p. 280.

70. Data on a sample of the world's parties operating from 1957 to 1962 reveal that 84 percent have some membership requirements, with almost 60 percent requiring their members to pay dues as well as formally enroll in the party. See Janda (1980), p. 127.

71. *Harvard Law Review* 88 (April 1975):1155-1163. Most of the issue is on "developments in the law—elections," but the section cited deals with party activities as state action. This issue is a rich source of information on national and state law related to parties and elections.

72. Joseph A. Schlesinger, "Political Party Organization," in *Handbook of Organizations*, in ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 765-766.

73. Blondel (1972), begins his analysis of party goals by saying, "The goals of political parties relate to their social bases" (p. 87).

74. See Otto Kirchheime, "The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems," in LaPalombara and Weiner (1966), pp. 177-200.

75. See Janda, "A Comparative Analysis of Party Organizations: U.S., Europe, and the World" in *The Party Symbol*, ed. WIlliam Crotty (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman, 1980), p. 355.

76. Crotty reports that knowledgeable observers were doubtful of the outcomes of the reform movement, presuming that both the delegate-selection committee and the national party to be impotent for enforcing state-party compliance. Nevertheless, the final report on implementation of the guidelines for delegate selection to the 1972 convention revealed significant change in every state party. "An incredible 97 percent of the guidelines had been enforced, an unequalled record of success." See Crotty, *Decison for the Democrats*, pp. 139-142.

77. Crotty's analysis of the charter holds that it relegated "state party rules and state laws to an inferior position, recognizing their force only when they did not conflict with national party by-laws. . . . " Ibid., pp. 242 and 244.

78. Ibid., p. 254.

79. Ladd, "Reform is Wrecking the U.S. Party System."

80. Jeane Kirkpatrick, "Dismantling the Parties."

81. Crotty, *Decision for the Democrats*, p. 251.

82. See Charles Longley, "Party Nationalization in America," chap. 5 in this volume.

83. *Democratic Review*, February/March, 1975, pp. 38-39.

84. Huntington (1968), pp. 405-406.

85. According to a test of the significance of differences between means, the mean score of the American parties on a six-item scale of party organization is not significantly different from the mean for forty-two European parties, but the American parties rate substantially and significantly lower on an eight-item scale of centralization of power. See Janda (1980), p. 352.

86. Lowi even argued that the most important difference between Republicans and Democrats "*is to be found in the interest groups they identify with*" (emphasis in the original). See Theodore J. Lowi, *The End of Liberalism* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1969), p. 72.

87. Hawley, *Nonpartisan Elections*, p. 163.

88. William J. Keefe, *Parties, Politics, and Public Policy in America*, 2d ed. (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1976), p. 1.

89. See Murray S. Stedman, Jr., and Herbert Sonthoff, "Party Responsibility—A Critical Inquiry," *Western Political Quarterly* 4 (September 1951):454-486.

90. See Robert Harmel and Kenneth Janda, *Parties and Their En-*

vironment: Limits to Reform? (forthcoming). Also see Harmel, "Relative Impacts of Contextual and Internal Factors on Party Decentralization: A Cross-National Analysis" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern University, 1977).

91. These findings are based on the ^{2} statistic generated from a one-way analysis of variance using the country identification codes as nominal variables predicting to party scores on scales of degree of organization and centralization of power. This analysis was performed to assess the maximum amount of "environmental" effects on party characteristics, assuming that system-level factors in each country combined in some unique configuration that could only be captured completely by treating each country as a variable. The next step in theory and research is to probe beneath the country label to account for common system-level sources of variance in party characteristics. Having done this for a measure of party decentralization, Harmel arrived at four system-level factors—areal size of the country, its degree of democracy, its decentralization of power within the polity, and its autocratic tendencies—which accounted for 34 percent of the variance in decentralization scores for 114 parties across the world. The system-level variables accounted for more variance than the best party-level variables—ideological position and restrictive party strategy—which added only an additional 4 percent of explained variance in a block-hierarchical regression analysis. Ibid.

92. See Richard L. Rubin, "Presidential Primaries: Continuities, Dimensions of Change, and Political Implications" (Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 9.

93. Alexander Heard wrote the 1960s classic, *The Costs of Democracy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, 1962). A great deal of research has been produced since. For a recent assessment, see Herbert Alexander, *Financing Politics: Money, Elections, and Political Reform* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1976).

94. See Gary C. Jacobson, "Campaign-Finance Regulation: Politics and Policy in the 1970s," chap. 7 in this volume.

95. See, for example, Committee for Economic Development, *Financing a Better Election System* (New York: Committee for Economic Development, 1968), and D.D. Dunn, *Financing Presidential Campaigns* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1972).

96. For example, see Joyce Gelb and Marian Palley, *Tradition and Change in American Party Politics* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975), pp. 238-239.

97. Lawson, *Comparative Study of Political Parties*, pp. 175-176.

98. Stephen Hess, *The Presidential Campaign* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 82.

99. David S. Broder, *The Party's Over: The Failure of Politics in America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 236.

100. Hess, *The Presidential Campaign*, p. 89.

101. Hawley would concur: "If, then, we could put the parties back into the campaign funding business we could also strengthen the parties' role in candidate selection and campaign management," in *Nonpartisan Elections*, p. 161.

102. Jacobson, chap. 7 in this volume.

103. Herbert E. Alexander, *Campaign Money: Reform and Reality in the States* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), p. 10.

104. Timothy A. Hodson and Roland D. McDevitt, "Congressional Campaign Finance: The Impact of Recent Reforms" (Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1977), pp. 4, 14. Also see Gary C. Jacobson, "The Effects of Campaign Spending in Congressional Elections," *American Political Science Review* 72 (June 1978):469-491, who finds that ceilings on spending tend to help incumbents over challengers.

105. Committee for Economic Development, *Financing a Better Election System*, p. 19. Reprinted with permission.

106. Judson L. James, *American Political Parties in Transition* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 19.

107. Scammon and Wattenberg describe the "social issue," as "a set of public attitudes concerning the more personally frightening aspects of disruptive social change." More specifically, these frightening aspects include crime, racial conflict, dissent, and changing lifestyles. See Richard M. Scammon and Benjamin J. Wattenberg, *The Real Majority: An Extraordinary Examination of the American Electorate* (New York: Coward, McCann, and Geoghegan, 1971), p. 43.

108. *New York Times*, 23 June 1975.

109. It should be recognized that presidents too would have to adjust their behavior given the development of stronger national parties, which is why they have not worked to strengthen the national organization while in office. See Harold F. Bass, "Presidential Responsibility for National Party Atrophy" (Paper prepared for delivery at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., 1977).

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