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Michael Marsh, "Candidates or Parties?: Objects of
Electoral Choice in Ireland," Party Politics, 13 (July
2007), 500-527.
First paragraph:
Studies of electoral behaviour tend to focus on party
choice. When it comes to high-profile single-candidate
elections, such as those for president in the United States,
there is a recognition that the party label is not all that
matters and that personal attributes of the candidates have
an importance independent of party. Yet there is a
significant and growing literature arguing that candidates
themselves should be and are important sources of votes in
many countries and in much less significant elections.
Candidates may attract support for who they are, or what
they have done, or what they might do, rather than simply
because of the party to which they belong. There are good
institutional reasons for this. Under certain electoral
systems, individual candidates have a strong incentive to
differentiate themselves from others in their party and to
develop a personal following. In a widely cited article,
Carey and Shugart (1995) explained how this stimulus would
be higher where the vote was cast for a candidate and not a
party and where that vote had a significant effect not just
on which parties won seats but on which candidates did so
(see also Katz, 1986; Marsh, 1985b). Many states use
multi-member electoral systems that provide particularly
strong incentives, including Finland, Switzerland and the
Irish Republic,1 while many others, including mixed-member
systems such as New Zealand, and singlemember plurality
systems, including Britain, the US and Canada, provide some
encouragement for candidates to seek personal support
Figures and Tables:
Table 1. Patterns of voting in multi-candidate
situations
Table 2. Main and subsidiary reasons offered for selecting
first choice candidate
Table 3. Self-reported most important factor in deciding
first preference, party or candidate?
Table 4. Would respondent vote for same candidate if
candidate stood for different party?
Table 5. Candidate or party index from direct questions
Table 6. Candidate and party ratings for respondents' first
preferences
Table 7. Candidate-party differences for lower
preferences
Table 8. Candidate- versus party-centred first preference
voting: a comparison of distributions obtained using
different measures
Table 9. Principal factor analyses of
candidate-/party-centred voter measures
Table 10. Multinomial logit estimation of vote choice
model
Figure 1. Predicted probability of actual first preference
vote.
Second Paragraph of
Conclusion:
There are many ways to explore how important party is to
voters. We have chosen four here: open-ended questions, a
simulated ballot, direct closedended questions and indirect
scale measures. All coincide in indicating a very
significant degree of candidate-centred voting; the more
direct measures suggest most and the more indirect ones
suggest least. All concur in identifying some parties'
voters as more party-centred (Greens, Sinn Féin,
Fianna Fáil) and others (Labour, Progressive
Democrats, Fine Gael) as more candidate- centred, at least
in 2002. Several measures do suggest that around 40 percent
of voters for these parties are significantly
candidate-centred.28 In general, the measures based on
behaviour indicate lower levels of candidatecentred voting
than those based on reported behaviour, while open-ended
questions seem to indicate by far the highest levels. It
seems likely that although many voters may vote a party
ticket they will rationalize this to themselves in terms of
candidate qualities. The open-ended measure correlates least
well with the other measures, but including all types of
measure in a factor analysis still results in an acceptable
scale. The cutoff points of this would be arbitrary, so this
does not tell us how many voters are either partyor
candidate-centred, but it does provide a measure of
differences in degree. Behavioural measures are not
applicable across many electoral contexts. However, the
results here indicate that the sort of closed-ended
questions used can produce results that are reasonably
equivalent to those obtained using reported behaviour. This
should be helpful in comparative work.
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