Steven D. Roper, "The Influence of Romanian Campaign Finance Laws on Party System Development and Corruption," Party Politics, 8 (March, 2002), 175-192.

First Paragraph:
The issue of party development in East Europe has received considerable attention over the past decade. Much of the literature attempts to explain party development by reference either to the transition process (Ishiyama, 1995; Olson, 1998) or to the influence of institutional factors such as the electoral system (Herron and Nishikawa, 1999; Moser, 1999). However, the relationship between campaign finance laws and party system development has received far less attention. Most of the recent research that has been conducted on the relationship between campaign finance and party development tends to explore these linkages in Western countries (Katz and Mair, 1995; Mendilow, 1992; Van Biezen, 2000). Few works have focused on the influence of East European campaign finance laws on party system development (Kopecky, 1995). This is surprising, given that previous research has found that campaign finance does have an effect on the parties and the party system (Katz and Mair, 1995). Moreover, it is surprising that this issue receives such little attention given the widespread use of these laws in East Europe and that the requirements, and especially the enforcement mechanisms, of these laws are perceived to have an influence on electoral corruption.

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Last Paragraph:
Issues of campaign finance and media access go to the heart of corruption, which is an important social force that becomes even more important as it interacts with other societal and individual behaviors. In developing countries, there has been a discussion of the relationship between corruption and clientelism, which can be defined as a relationship between persons of a higher social status (patrons) and those of a lower status (clients). As Hutchcroft (1997) points out, this relationship or linkage between patron and client does not necessarily have to involve corrupt practices, but as Waterbury (1973: 537) argues 'when a patron occupies a public position or extracts favors from those in public positions, patronage and corruption overlap'. Sajo (1998) notes that clientelism is a social organization while corruption is an individual behavior that can become a mass phenomenon. In the context of East Europe, he argues that these two forces are 'fused at the hip' and that 'clientelism -- in interaction with various forms and levels of corruption -- is becoming a stable form of social organization' (p. 38). Ultimately, the communist patron- client relationship has become transformed into post-communist clientelist corruption. While the role and influence of cartel parties and campaign finance on corruption needs more empirical work, it is clear that the creation and modification of campaign finance laws can have a profound influence on parties and the party system which ultimately has an influence on corruption.