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Ian McAllister and Donley T. Studlar, "Conservative
Euroscepticism and the Referendum Party in the 1997 British
General Election," Party Politics, 6 (July 2000),
359-371.
First Paragraph:
The vote for the anti-European Referendum Party in the 1997
British general election was, according to Curtice and Steed
(1997: 305), 'the strongest ever performance by a British
minor party'. Indeed, in 19 constituencies the party's vote
exceeded the margin of defeat for a Conservative candidate,
suggesting that in these seats the party's intervention had
a pivotal role in determining the outcome. Nevertheless,
most election analyses have discounted any substantial
electoral impact for the Referendum Party, as well as any
constituency effects for Conservative candidates declaring
themselves to be Eurosceptics.
Figures and Tables:
Table 1: Euroscepticism among 1997 Conservative election
candidates (%)
Table 2: The 1997 Conservative vote by constituency
contest
Table 3: Influences on the Conservative vote (regression
estimates)
Table 4: Conservative losses potentially attributable to the
Referendum Party
Last Paragraph:
Overall, the British general election of 1997 was not close.
But in several individual constituencies, even allowing for
the impact of other factors, a tight race allowed the
Referendum Party to have a discernible, even if largely
hidden, impact on the Conservative Party's seats. The
Referendum Party, despite the many handicaps accruing to a
small, new party organized around one person and one issue,
was better able to tap these discontents than were the
Conservatives, even the Eurosceptical candidates. Thus the
Referendum Party had direct as well as indirect (agenda
setting) effects on the electoral outcome (Carter et al.,
1998). A more consistent, coherent Eurosceptical position by
the Conservative Party might have obviated the Referendum
challenge and allowed them to retain more seats, but it also
might have led to a party split on the elite level.
Nevertheless, the Conservatives suffered the expected
electoral consequences for party disunity.
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