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Efraim Torgovnik, "Strategies under a New Electoral
System: The Labor Party in the 1996 Israeli elections,"
Party Politics, 6 (January 2000), 95-106.
First Paragraph:
The 1996 Israeli national elections were held under a new
and unique electoral rule: the prime minister was elected
through personal elections in one national constituency
while the parties ran in a national proportional
representation system. Such a mix of electoral systems
requires special research underpinning regarding the effect
of a personal campaign and party electoral strategies on
election results. This paper mainly follows the campaigns of
the premiership candidates, the issues that were made
salient, and the structural, normative and symbolic features
that dominated the campaign. Of the two modes of candidate
assessment, on-line and memory-based, the former were
expected to dominate. The paper offers an analysis of the
campaign strategies, concentrating in particular on the key
policy issue -- the unfinished Oslo peace process
negotiations -- which was made salient by the incumbent
Labor Party and its prime minister candidate, Shimon Peres.
A campaign centered on a policy issue is likely to trigger
both retrospective and prospective issue voting. A
prosperous economy and a widespread sense of personal
well-being supported a positive retrospective assessment of
the incumbent Labor Party. Nevertheless, bad omens for Labor
were a lack of consensus over the peace accords, a growing
gap between the haves and the have-nots, the formation of
new political parties around ethnic and policy banners, and
the sense of threat among the country's religious
population, created under the Labor Party and its
anti-clerical coalition partner, Meretz.
Figures and Tables:
Table 1: Party and prime minister voting (1996, 1992)
Table 2: Support for the Oslo peace accords by party vote
(%)
Table 3: Personal security after the Oslo peace accords by
party vote (%)
Table 4: candidates' qualities (%)
Last Paragraph:
It appears that Labor and Peres did not fully
internalize the implications of Israel's transition to dual
electoral rule: proportional voting for the Knesset and
direct election of the prime minister. Labor's campaign (1)
suffered from disorganized management and conflict among its
leading figures; (2) failed to shift the emphasis of the
campaign after major terrorist attacks; (3) confused the
voters with its mini-war in Lebanon and its delay in
withdrawing from Hebron, which suggested to the electorate
that Labor's key campaign issue -- the Oslo peace accords --
involved security risks; and (4) gave credibility to
Netanyahu's safe-peace issue. New salient issues were
generated during the campaign. The division of Jerusalem
entered the election agenda, and Labor and Peres stood
accused. The new issues that emerged due to Labor's peace
position and the political tie which had plagued Israeli
politics since 1981 left only narrow margins for Labor in
1996.
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